

ARM[®] Architecture Reference Manual

Supplement

ARMv8, for the ARMv8-R AArch32 architecture profile



ARM Architecture Reference Manual Supplement

ARMv8, for the ARMv8-R AArch32 architecture profile

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Preface

This preface introduces the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual Supplement ARMv8, for the ARMv8-R AArch32 architecture profile*. It contains the following sections:

- *Using this book* on page x.
- *Conventions* on page xi.
- *Additional reading* on page xii.
- *Feedback* on page xiii.

Using this book

This supplement describes the operation of an ARMv8-R *processing element* (PE) in AArch32 state. It describes the ARMv8-R profile in terms of how it differs from the ARM v8-A profile.

This book is a supplement to the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile* (DDI0487), and is intended to be used with it. It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the ARMv8 architecture.

This manual is organized into parts that follow the order and structure in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*:

Part A	Provides an introduction to the ARMv8-R architecture.
Part B	Describes the non-debug features in which the ARMv8-R profile differs from the ARMv8-A profile.
Part C	Describes the <i>ARMv8-R Protected Memory System Architecture</i> (PMSAv8).
Part D	Describes the ARMv8-R instruction set.
Part E	Describes the ARMv8-R System registers and System instructions.
Part F	Describes the debug features in which the ARMv8-R profile differs from the ARMv8-A profile.
Part G	Describes the ARMv8-R debug registers.
Part H	Describes the ARMv8-R pseudocode.
Appendixes	Provide additional information.

Conventions

The following sections describe conventions that this book can use:

- *Typographic conventions.*
- *Signals.*
- *Numbers.*
- *Pseudocode descriptions.*

Typographic conventions

The following table describes the typographic conventions:

Typographic conventions	
Style	Purpose
<i>italic</i>	Introduces special terminology, and denotes citations.
bold	Denotes signal names, and is used for terms in descriptive lists, where appropriate.
monospace	Used for assembler syntax descriptions, pseudocode, and source code examples. Also used in the main text for instruction mnemonics and for references to other items appearing in assembler syntax descriptions, pseudocode, and source code examples.
SMALL CAPITALS	Used for a few terms that have specific technical meanings, and are included in the <i>Glossary</i> in the <i>ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile</i> .
Colored text	Indicates a link. This can be: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A URL, for example http://infocenter.arm.com. • A cross-reference, that includes the page number of the referenced information if it is not on the current page, for example, <i>Pseudocode descriptions</i>. • A link, to a chapter or appendix, or to a glossary entry, or to the section of the document that defines the colored term, for example Chapter A1.

Signals

In general this specification does not define processor signals, but it does include some signal examples and recommendations.

The signal conventions are:

Signal level	The level of an asserted signal depends on whether the signal is active-HIGH or active-LOW. Asserted means: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HIGH for active-HIGH signals. • LOW for active-LOW signals.
Lowercase n	At the start or end of a signal name denotes an active-LOW signal.

Numbers

Numbers are normally written in decimal. Binary numbers are preceded by 0b, and hexadecimal numbers by 0x. In both cases, the prefix and the associated value are written in a monospace font, for example 0xFFFF0000.

Pseudocode descriptions

This book uses a form of pseudocode to provide precise descriptions of the specified functionality.

Additional reading

This section lists relevant publications from ARM and third parties.

See the Infocenter <http://infocenter.arm.com> and <http://developer.arm.com>, for access to ARM documentation.

ARM publications

- *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv7-A and ARMv7-R edition* (ARM DDI 0406).
- *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile* (ARM DDI 0487).
- *ARM® CoreSight™ Architecture Specification* (ARM IHI 0029).
- *ARM® Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture Specification, ETMv4* (ARM IHI 0064).
- *ARM® Generic Interrupt Controller Architecture Specification, GIC architecture version 3.0 and version 4.0* (ARM IHI 0069).

Other publications

- JEDEC Solid State Technology Association, *Standard Manufacturer's Identification Code*, JEP106.

Feedback

ARM welcomes feedback on its documentation.

Feedback on this book

If you have comments on the content of this book, send an e-mail to errata@arm.com. Give:

- The title.
- The number, DDI0568A.b.
- The page numbers to which your comments apply.
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Part A

ARMv8-R Architecture Introduction and Overview

Chapter A1

ARMv8-R Introduction and Overview

This chapter introduces the ARMv8 architecture, the architecture profiles it defines, and the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile that this manual defines. It contains the following sections:

- [*About the ARMv8 architecture and architecture profiles on page A1-18.*](#)
- [*The ARMv8-R AArch32 architecture profile on page A1-19.*](#)
- [*Supported extensions in ARMv8-R AArch32 on page A1-20.*](#)
- [*Changes between ARMv7-R and ARMv8-R AArch32 on page A1-21.*](#)

A1.1 About the ARMv8 architecture and architecture profiles

The ARM architecture that this Architecture Reference Manual describes defines the behavior of an abstract machine, referred to as a *processing element* (PE). Implementations that are compliant with the ARM architecture must conform to the described behavior of the PE. This manual does not describe how to build an implementation of the PE, nor does it limit the scope of such implementations beyond the defined behaviors.

Except where the architecture specifies differently, the programmer-visible behavior of an implementation that is compliant with the ARM architecture must be the same as a simple sequential execution of the program on the PE. This programmer-visible behavior does not include the execution time of the program.

The ARM Architecture Reference Manual also describes rules for software to use the PE.

The ARM architecture includes definitions of:

- An associated debug architecture.
- Associated trace architectures, which define trace macrocells that implementers can implement with the associated processor hardware. For more information, see the *Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture Specification*.

The ARM architecture is a *Reduced Instruction Set Computer* (RISC) architecture with the following RISC architecture features:

- A large uniform register file.
- A load/store architecture, where data-processing operations only operate on register contents, not directly on memory contents.
- Simple addressing modes, with all load/store addresses determined from register contents and instruction fields only.

ARMv8 defines three architecture profiles:

- | | |
|----------|---|
| A | Application profile: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Supports a <i>Virtual Memory System Architecture</i> (VMSA) based on a <i>Memory Management Unit</i> (MMU).• Supports the A64, A32, and T32 instruction sets. |
| R | Real-time profile, described in this manual: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Supports a <i>Protected Memory System Architecture</i> (PMSA) based on a <i>Memory Protection Unit</i> (MPU).• Supports the A32 and T32 instruction sets. |
| M | Microcontroller profile: <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Implements a programmers' model that is designed for low-latency interrupt processing, with hardware stacking of registers and support for writing interrupt handlers in high-level languages.• Supports a PMSA based on an MPU.• Supports a variant of the T32 instruction set. |

This Architecture Reference Manual Supplement:

- Describes the ARMv8-R profile in terms of how it differs from the ARMv8-A profile. If a definition is not mentioned in this Supplement, the definition in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile* applies.
- Does not describe details of other profiles but assumes knowledge of the ARMv8-A profile.
- Describes differences between the ARMv7-R and ARMv8-R profiles.

A1.2 The ARMv8-R AArch32 architecture profile

The main features of the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile are:

- One Execution state, AArch32.
- The A32 and T32 instruction sets, which are compatible with earlier versions of the ARM architecture.
- The *Protected Memory System Architecture* (PMSA) that defines memory ordering and memory management with a single 32-bit *physical address* (PA) space. The ARMv8-R PMSA is not compatible with the ARMv7-R architecture.
- A programmers' model and its interfaces to System registers that control most PE and memory system features and provide status information.
- Support for Advanced SIMD and floating-point instructions (OPTIONAL).
- The ARMv8-R virtualization model.
- The ARMv8 Debug architecture that provides software access to debug features.

A1.3 Supported extensions in ARMv8-R AArch32

A1.3.1 Security extensions

ARMv8-R only supports a single Security state, Non-secure.

A1.3.2 ARMv8.x extensions for the ARMv8-A profile

ARMv8-R does not support any of the ARMv8.x extensions.

A1.3.3 Advanced SIMD and floating-point extensions

Both the Advanced SIMD and floating-point instructions are OPTIONAL. When they are implemented, they must conform to the ARMv8-A AArch32 specifications.

The inclusion of double-precision floating-point processing is also OPTIONAL. When only the single-precision encoding format is implemented and Advanced SIMD is not implemented, the floating-point implementation must be a D16 implementation.

For more information, see [Advanced SIMD and floating-point support on page B1-26](#) and [Single-precision only floating-point implementations on page D1-54](#).

A1.4 Changes between ARMv7-R and ARMv8-R AArch32

- The architecture is described in terms of the ARMv8 Exception levels. ARMv8-R implementations support EL0, EL1, and EL2.
- ARMv8-R supports virtualization, which provides:
 - Support for the EL2 Exception level.
 - A second MPU that provides stage 1 memory protection for memory accesses from EL2 and optionally provides stage 2 memory protection for accesses from EL1 and EL0. These protection stages act as address translation regimes in the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile.
- A redefined PMSA, PMSAv8, provides:
 - A new model for defining protection regions, using a pair of 32-bit addresses to define the region.
 - An increase of the minimum protection region size from 32 bytes to 64 bytes.
 - No support for subregions or overlapping regions.
- There is no CPACR.D32DIS control in ARMv8-R floating-point implementations.
- ARMv8-R supports only a trivial Jazelle implementation.
- Divide by zero trapping is not supported in hardware.

Part B

Differences in the ARMv8-R Architecture from ARMv8-A

Chapter B1

Differences between the ARMv8-A and ARMv8-R AArch32 Profiles

This chapter describes the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile. It contains the following sections:

- *Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 application level architecture on page B1-26.*
- *Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 instruction sets on page B1-27.*
- *Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 system level architecture on page B1-28.*

B1.1 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 application level architecture

B1.1.1 Advanced SIMD and floating-point support

In addition to the Advanced SIMD and floating-point support in ARMv8-A, ARMv8-R AArch32 also supports single-precision floating-point implementations without Advanced SIMD. If an implementation supports only single-precision floating-point operations and does not support Advanced SIMD, then it must implement only 16 double-precision registers, D0-D15, that is, it must be a D16 implementation. See also [ARMv8-R Advanced SIMD and floating-point instructions on page D1-53](#) and [Single-precision only floating-point implementations on page D1-54](#).

Table B1-1 shows the field values that are permitted in ARMv8-R in addition to the values that are permitted in ARMv8-A.

Table B1-1 Advanced SIMD and floating-point ID field values additionally permitted in ARMv8-R

Field	Value	Description
MVFR0.FPDP	0000	No double-precision support.
MVFR0.SIMDReg	0001	16x 64-bit register SIMD&FP register file.
MVFR1.FPHP	0001	Support for half-precision to and from single-precision conversion (no double-precision).
MVFR1.SIMDHP	0000	No Advanced SIMD
MVFR1.SIMDSP	0000	No Advanced SIMD
MVFR1.SIMDInt	0000	No Advanced SIMD
MVFR1.SIMDLS	0000	No Advanced SIMD

The ARMv8-A definitions of [HCPTR](#), TASE, NSACR, and CPACR apply for all implementations, including D16.

B1.1.2 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 application level programmers' model

The following are the differences from the ARMv8-A profile as it is described in chapter *The AArch32 Application Level Programmers' Model* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

- ARMv8-R only supports a single Security state.
- ARMv8-R implementations cannot include EL3.
- EL2 is required in ARMv8-R.
- Exception levels in ARMv8-R are based on the ARMv8-A AArch32 PE modes. Hyp mode provides the EL2 functionality.
- ARMv8-R supports the A32 and T32 instruction sets with some modifications, see [Part D ARMv8-R Instructions](#).

B1.1.3 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 application level memory model

ARMv8-R redefines [DMB](#) and [DSB](#), and defines a new instruction, [DFB](#).

ARMv8-R relaxes the ordering requirements for DMB and DSB by enforcing ordering only in terms of certain Exception level criteria:

- Accesses from EL1 and EL0 are ordered only with respect to accesses using the same VMID.
- Accesses from EL2 are ordered only with respect to other accesses from EL2.

All other memory barrier requirements are unchanged. See *Memory barriers* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

B1.2 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 instruction sets

See [Chapter D1 ARMv8-R Instruction Set](#).

B1.3 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 system level architecture

B1.3.1 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 system level programmers' model

Virtualization

ARMv8-R includes a modified form of the ARMv8-A AArch32 virtualization scheme. In common with AArch32 state in ARMv8-A, EL2 in ARMv8-R AArch32 supports virtualization and adds Hyp mode to the implemented PE modes. The relationship between Hyp mode and the other implemented PE modes is the same as for an ARMv8-A AArch32 implementation that does not include EL3. See [Memory protection units \(MPUs\) on page C1-32](#).

GIC

A *Generic Interrupt Controller* (GIC) implemented with an ARMv8-R PE must not implement LPI support.

B1.3.2 Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 system level memory model

Address space

ARMv8-R uses a 32-bit address space with a flat mapping from the *virtual address* (VA) used by the PE to the *physical address* (PA).

Address translation

In ARMv8-R, address translation is the process of flat-mapping a VA to a PA and determining the access permissions and memory attributes of the target PA.

System register support for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED memory features

The type, presence, and accessibility of *tightly-coupled memory* (TCM) to EL1 and EL0 or just EL2 is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

B1.3.3 The ARMv8-R Protected Memory System Architecture, PMSAv8

This Supplement defines PMSAv8. See [Chapter C1 ARMv8-R Protected Memory System Architecture](#).

Part C

ARMv8-R Protected Memory System Architecture

Chapter C1

ARMv8-R Protected Memory System Architecture

This chapter provides a system-level view of the memory system architecture for an ARMv8-R implementation, the *Protected Memory System Architecture* (PMSAv8-32). It contains the following sections:

- [About PMSAv8-32 on page C1-32.](#)
- [Protection region attributes and access permissions on page C1-35.](#)
- [Default memory maps and Background region checks on page C1-38.](#)
- [Memory protection on page C1-40.](#)
- [PMSAv8-32 implications for caches on page C1-43.](#)

C1.1 About PMSAv8-32

For general information about the ARM memory model, see chapters *The AArch32 Application Level Memory Model* and *The AArch32 System Level Memory Model* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

An ARM PMSA is based on a *Memory Protection Unit* (MPU) that provides a memory protection scheme. The PMSA uses a flat mapping between the *virtual address* (VA) accessed by the PE and the 32-bit *physical address* (PA) accessed in the memory system. That is, for all accesses, the VA is the same as the PA, see [Address translation and translation regimes in PMSAv8-32 on page C1-33](#).

PMSAv8-32 only supports a unified memory protection scheme. It does not support separate instruction and data regions in the address map. PMSAv8-32 is not backwards-compatible with PMSAv7 or earlier ARM PMSAs.

C1.1.1 Protection regions

An MPU defines protection regions in the 4GB address map. A protection region is a contiguous memory region for which the MPU defines the memory attributes, for example the memory type and the access permissions.

Protection regions:

- Are defined by a pair of a Base Address Register and a Limit Address Register, see [Memory protection units \(MPUs\)](#).
- Have a minimum size of 64 bytes.
- Have a maximum size of the entire address map, 4GB.
- Must not overlap.
- Do not need to be contiguous.

The definition of a protection region specifies the start and the end of the region, the access permissions to the region, and the memory attributes for the region. For more information, see [Memory protection on page C1-40](#).

C1.1.2 Memory protection units (MPUs)

PMSAv8-32 defines two MPUs:

EL1-controlled MPU

Defines the protection regions for accesses from EL1 and from EL0.

EL2-controlled MPU

Defines the protection regions for accesses from EL2.

When the value of [HCR.VM](#) is 1 and for accesses from EL1 and from EL0, the EL2-controlled MPU uses these protection regions to modify the access permissions and memory attributes that are assigned by the EL1-controlled MPU.

See [Protection region attributes and access permissions on page C1-35](#). For an address that does not match any defined protection region, PMSAv8-32 defines Background regions and default memory maps. See [Default memory maps and Background region checks on page C1-38](#).

An PMSAv8-32 implementation can provide a virtualization scheme in which a single PE supports multiple guest environments under the control of a single hypervisor that executes at EL2, where executing at EL2 means executing in Hyp mode. Typically, an operating system executing at EL1 programs the EL1-controlled MPU to define the memory map for its own operation and for applications it runs at EL0. A hypervisor executing at EL2 programs the EL2-controlled MPU to define the memory map for its own operation and to modify the access permission and memory attribute assignments that are performed by the EL1&0 stage 1 translation.

C1.1.3 Address translation and translation regimes in PMSAv8-32

In ARMv8-R:

- Address translation describes the process of flat mapping the *virtual address* (VA) used by the PE to the *physical address* (PA) accessed in the memory system and determining the access permissions and memory attributes of the target PA.
- A *translation regime* maps a VA to a PA, using one or two stages of address translation to assign the access permissions and memory attributes of the target PA. When two translation stages are used, the intermediate address is treated as an *intermediate physical address* (IPA).

———— Note ————

These definitions provide consistency between the ARMv8-A and ARMv8-R descriptions of the memory model.

PMSAv8-32 defines the following translation regimes:

EL1&0 translation regime

This assigns the access permissions and memory attributes for any access from EL1 or EL0.

This translation regime has one or two stages of translation:

- All accesses from EL1 or EL0 are translated by the EL1-controlled MPU, if it is enabled. This translation is a stage 1 translation.
- When the value of `HCR.VM` is 1, the access is also translated by the EL2-controlled MPU. This translation is a stage 2 translation, and can modify the access permissions and memory attributes that are assigned by the stage 1 translation.

For the EL1&0 stage 1 translation, an address ADDRESS is in protection region *n* if:

`PRBAR<n>.BASE:'000000' <= ADDRESS <= PRLAR<n>.LIMIT:'111111'`

EL2 translation regime

This assigns the access permissions and memory attributes for any access from EL2.

This translation regime has a single stage of translation, stage 1, that is performed by the EL2-controlled MPU.

For the EL2 stage 1 translation, an address ADDRESS is in protection region *n* if:

`HPRBAR<n>.BASE:'000000' <= ADDRESS <= HPRLAR<n>.LIMIT:'111111'`

The attributes for a protection region are defined by the combination of:

- The values that are programmed into the Base Address Register and Limit Address Register pair that define the protection region.
- A Memory Attributes Indirection register that is indexed by those values.

Figure C1-1 on page C1-34 shows how memory accesses are handled when both MPUs are enabled. For other scenarios, see [Effect of enabling one or both MPUs on attribute assignment and fault generation on page C1-40](#).




Figure C1-1 PMSAv8-32 memory access permission and attribute control

C1.2 Protection region attributes and access permissions

The protection region attribute fields control the memory type, Cacheability, and Shareability of the region. ARMv8-R uses the same memory types and memory attributes as ARMv8-A. The ARMv8-R identification scheme is based on the scheme that is used by VMSAv8-32 when using the Long-descriptor translation table format. See *VMSAv8-32 Long-descriptor format memory region attributes* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

The memory attributes and access permissions for a protection region are defined by entries in:

- The **PRBAR** and **PRLAR**, or **HPRBAR** and **HPRLAR**, that define the region.
- The **MAIR**<*m*>.Attr<*n*> or **HMAIR**<*m*>.Attr<*n*> field that is indexed by **PRLAR**.AttrIndx or **HPRLAR**.AttrIndx, respectively. In ARMv8-R, the PE always behaves as if the value of TTBCR.EAE were 1 even though the encoding space that TTBCR uses in ARMv8-A is unallocated in ARMv8-R. For information about the behavior when TTBCR.EAE is 1, see the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

See also *Assignment model of memory attributes and access permissions*.

For the EL1&0 translation regime, when both MPUs are enabled and the value of **HCR**.VM is 1, the stage 1 memory attribute and access permission assignments are combined with the stage 2 assignments as described in *Combining attributes on page C1-36*.

C1.2.1 Assignment model of memory attributes and access permissions

PRBAR.SH, HPRBAR.SH

Defines the Shareability, for a Normal memory protection region. For any type of Device memory, and for Normal Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable memory, the value of the SH[1:0] field is IGNORED.

PRBAR.AP[2:1], HPRBAR.AP[2:1]

Defines the Access permissions. For encoding information, see the register description.

PRBAR.XN, HPRBAR.XN

Defines the Execute-never attribute for the region. For encoding information, see the register description.

XN == 1 The region is Execute-never.

PMSAv8-32 makes no distinction between Privileged execute-never (PXN) and Unprivileged execute-never (UXN).

PRLAR.AttrIndx, HPRLAR.AttrIndx

Indexes an Attr<*n*> field in **MAIR**<*m*> or **HMAIR**<*m*>, as follows:

- AttrIndx[2] indicates the MAIR register to be used:
AttrIndx[2] == 0 Use MAIR0 or HMAIR0.
AttrIndx[2] == 1 Use MAIR1 or HMAIR1.
- AttrIndx[2:0] indicates the required Attr field, Attr<*n*>, where *n* = AttrIndx[2:0].

MAIR<*m*>.Attr<*n*>, **HMAIR**<*m*>.Attr<*n*>

Defines:

- The memory type, Normal memory or a type of Device memory.
- For Normal memory:
 - The Inner Cacheability and Outer Cacheability attributes, each of which is one of Non-cacheable, Write-Through Cacheable, or Write-Back Cacheable.
 - For Write-Through Cacheable and Write-Back Cacheable regions, the Read-Allocate and Write-Allocate policy hints, each of which is Allocate or Do not allocate.

C1.2.2 Combining attributes

For the EL1&0 translation regime, when both MPUs are enabled and the value of [HCR.VM](#) is 1, the stage 1 and stage 2 attributes and access permissions are combined as follows:

- If the stage 1 access permissions indicate that an access is not permitted, a stage 1 Permission fault is generated regardless of the stage 2 permissions.
- If the stage 1 access permissions indicate that an access is permitted but the stage 2 access permissions indicate that it is not permitted, a stage 2 Permission fault is generated.
- If an access is permitted by both the stage 1 and the stage 2 access permissions, the memory attributes are combined as shown in [Table C1-1](#), [Table C1-2](#), and [Table C1-3 on page C1-37](#).

Table C1-1 Combining the stage 1 and stage 2 memory type assignments

Rule	If the memory type assigned by either stage is:	The resultant memory type is:
Device has precedence over Normal	Any Device memory type	A Device memory type
Non-Gathering has precedence over Gathering	A Device-nGxx memory type	A Device-nGxx memory type
Non-Reordering has precedence over Reordering	A Device-nGnRx memory type	A Device-nGnRx memory type
No Early Write Acknowledgement has precedence over Early Write Acknowledgement	The Device-nGnRnE memory type	The Device-nGnRnE memory type

Regardless of any Shareability attribute that results from the combinations that are described in [Table C1-3 on page C1-37](#):

- Any location for which the resultant memory type is any type of Device memory is always treated as Outer Shareable.
- Any location for which the resultant memory type is Normal Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable is always treated as Outer Shareable.

[Table C1-2](#) shows the assignments at each stage of translation are combined to create the resultant Cacheability attribute. These rules apply independently for the Inner Cacheability and Outer Cacheability attributes.

Table C1-2 Combining Cacheability assignments for Normal memory

Stage 1 assignment	Stage 2 assignment	Resultant Cacheability
Non-cacheable	Any	Non-cacheable
Any	Non-cacheable	Non-cacheable
Write-Through Cacheable	Write-Through or Write-Back Cacheable	Write-Through Cacheable
Write-Through or Write-Back Cacheable	Write-Through Cacheable	Write-Through Cacheable
Write-Back Cacheable	Write-Back Cacheable	Write-Back Cacheable

A protection region is treated as Outer Shareable, regardless of any Shareability assignments at either stage of translation if:

- The resultant memory type attribute, as described in [Table C1-1](#), is any type of Device memory.
- The resultant memory type attribute, as described in [Table C1-1](#), is Normal memory, and the resultant Cacheability, as described in [Table C1-2](#), is Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable.

For a protection region with a resultant memory type attribute of Normal that is not Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable, [Table C1-3](#) shows how the Shareability attribute is obtained from the assignment at each stage of translation.

Table C1-3 Combining Shareability assignments for Normal not Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable memory

Stage 1 assignment	Stage 2 assignment	Resultant Shareability
Outer Shareable	Any	Outer Shareable
Inner Shareable	Outer Shareable	Outer Shareable
Inner Shareable	Inner Shareable	Inner Shareable
Inner Shareable	Non-shareable	Inner Shareable
Non-shareable	Outer Shareable	Outer Shareable
Non-shareable	Inner Shareable	Inner Shareable
Non-shareable	Non-shareable	Non-shareable

C1.3 Default memory maps and Background region checks

Each PMSAv8-32 MPU has an associated default memory map which is used when the MPU is not enabled.

When the MPU is enabled and Background region checking is enabled, privileged accesses that do not hit defined protection regions undergo a second check.

- For the EL1 MPU, Background region checking is enabled for privileged access when the value of [SCTLR.BR](#) is 1.
- For the EL2 MPU, Background region checking is enabled for accesses from EL2 when the value of [HSCTLR.BR](#) is 1.

For details, see [Effect of enabling one or both MPUs on attribute assignment and fault generation](#) on page C1-40.

C1.3.1 EL1 MPU default memory map

[Table C1-4](#) and [Table C1-5](#) describe the default memory map defined for the EL1 MPU. When the value of [HCR.DC](#) is 0, Background region checking by the EL1 MPU also uses this memory map.

Table C1-4 Instruction accesses and EL1 Background region checks

Address range	SCTLR.I==0	SCTLR.I==1	XN
0x00000000 – 0x7FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Non-shareable, Write-Through Cacheable	Execution permitted
0x80000000 – 0xFFFFFFFF	Not applicable	Not applicable	Execute-never

Table C1-5 Data accesses and EL1 Background region checks

Address range	SCTLR.C==0	SCTLR.C==1
0x00000000 – 0x3FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Non-shareable, Write-Back, Write-Allocate Cacheable
0x40000000 – 0x5FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Non-shareable, Write-Through Cacheable
0x60000000 – 0x7FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable
0x80000000 – 0xBFFFFFFF	Device-nGnRE	Device-nGnRE
0xC0000000 – 0xFFFFFFFF	Device-nGnRnE	Device-nGnRnE

When the value of [HCR.DC](#) is 1, the Background region and the Default memory map produce accesses with the following attributes:

- Normal memory.
- Non-shareable.
- Inner Write-Back Read-Allocate, Write-Allocate Cacheable.
- Outer Write-Back Read-Allocate, Write-Allocate Cacheable.
- Execution permitted.

C1.3.2 EL2 MPU default memory map

Table C1-6 and Table C1-7 describe the default memory map defined for the EL2 MPU. Background region checking by the EL2 MPU also uses this memory map.

Table C1-6 Instruction accesses and EL2 Background region checks

Address range	HSCTLR.I==0	HSCTLR.I==1	XN
0x00000000 – 0x7FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Non-shareable, Write-Through Cacheable	Execution permitted
0x80000000 – 0xFFFFFFFF	Not applicable	Not applicable	Execute-never

Table C1-7 Data accesses and EL2 Background region checks

Address range	HSCTLR.C==1	HSCTLR.C==1
0x00000000 – 0x3FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Non-shareable, Write-Back, Write-Allocate Cacheable
0x40000000 – 0x5FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Non-shareable, Write-Through Cacheable
0x60000000 – 0x7FFFFFFF	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable	Normal, Shareable, Non-cacheable
0x80000000 – 0xBFFFFFFF	Device-nGnRE	Device-nGnRE
0xC0000000 – 0xFFFFFFFF	Device-nGnRnE	Device-nGnRnE

C1.4 Memory protection

An MPU checks whether the address used by a memory access matches a defined protection region. It uses the properties that are defined for that region or for the Background region to determine whether the access is permitted and if it is permitted, how it must behave.

- The EL1 MPU is enabled when the value of [SCTLR.M](#) is 1.
- The EL2 MPU is enabled when the value of [HSCTLR.M](#) is 1.

Each MPU provides two mechanisms for defining its own protection regions by:

- Using indirect accesses, where:
 - [PRSELR/HPRSELR](#) is programmed to specify the required protection region.
 - [PRBAR/HPRBAR](#) and [PRLAR/HPRLAR](#) are programmed to specify the address range and attributes for that region.
- Directly specifying the address range and attributes for the first 32 regions using [PRBAR<n>/HPRBAR<n>](#) and [PRLAR<n>/HPRLAR<n>](#).

For the EL2 protection regions, [HPREN](#) provides direct access to the region enable for regions 0-31.

C1.4.1 Effect of enabling one or both MPUs on attribute assignment and fault generation

For accesses that fault:

- MPU-generated faults follow the PMSAv8-32 Long-descriptor format and are reported in the same way as VMSAv8-32 faults.
- All MPU faults are treated as level 0 faults. For translation operations, PMSA contexts return the 64-bit PAR format. The PAR format discards the least significant bits but the translation query uses the entire input address. For more information, see *MMU faults in AArch32 state* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*. For fault status codes, see [DFSR](#), [IFSR](#), and [HSR](#).
- If the value of [EDSCR.HDD](#) is 1, stage 2 faults in Debug state are reported as Debug events at EL1. See [Behavior in Debug state on page F1-189](#).

For an access that does not fault:

When both the EL1-controlled MPU and the EL2-controlled MPU are enabled:

- For an EL2 access (an access from Hyp mode), the EL2 MPU configuration settings determine the access permissions and memory attributes.
- For EL1 and EL0 accesses, the EL1 MPU configuration settings determine the stage 1 access permissions and memory attributes. If the *Effective value* of [HCR.VM](#) is 1, those access permissions and memory attributes are then modified by the EL2-controlled MPU, as described in [Combining attributes on page C1-36](#).

When the EL1-controlled MPU is disabled and the EL2-controlled MPU is enabled:

- For an EL2 access (an access from Hyp mode), the EL2 MPU configuration settings determine the access permissions and memory attributes.
- For an EL1 or EL0 access, the EL1 Background region settings determine the stage 1 access permissions and memory attributes. If the *Effective value* of [HCR.VM](#) is 1, those access permissions and memory attributes are then modified by the EL2-controlled MPU, as described in [Combining attributes on page C1-36](#).

When the EL1-controlled MPU is enabled but the EL2-controlled MPU is disabled:

- For an EL2 access (an access from Hyp mode), the EL2 Background region settings determine the access permissions and memory attributes.
- For EL1 and EL0 accesses, the EL1 MPU configuration settings determine the access permissions and memory attributes. If the *Effective value* of [HCR.VM](#) is 1, those access permissions and memory attributes are then combined with the EL2 Background region settings, as described in [Combining attributes on page C1-36](#).

When both the EL1 MPU-controlled and the EL2-controlled MPU are disabled:

- For an EL2 access (an access from Hyp mode), the EL2 Background region settings determine the stage 1 access permissions and memory attributes.
- For an EL1 or EL0 access, the EL1 Background region settings determine the access permissions and memory attributes. If the *Effective value* of [HCR.VM](#) is 1, those access permissions and memory attributes are then modified by the EL2 Background region settings, as described in [Combining attributes on page C1-36](#).




Figure C1-2 Stage 1 translation for EL1 and EL0 accesses




Figure C1-3 Stage 2 translation for EL1 and EL0, stage 1 translation for EL2 accesses

Combining is trivial if the EL1 MPU check resulted in attributes from the EL1 Background region because the two Background regions are identical when both of them are enabled.

C1.5 PMSAv8-32 implications for caches

Enabling or reconfiguring the MPU, or reprogramming any protection regions, can result in new and different memory attributes for a previously accessed or speculatively accessed address. In this situation, the rules for Mismatched memory attributes apply. See the *Mismatched memory attributes* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

C1.5.1 Cache line length

A PMSAv8-32 MPU permits the definition of protection regions that might be smaller than a cache line in the implementation. Therefore, the following rules apply:

- If the MPU is configured such that multiple differing attributes apply to a single cache line, then for any access to that cache line the rules for mismatched memory attributes apply. See *Memory region attributes* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.
- Marking any part of a cache line as Write-Back permits the entire line to be treated as Write-Back.

Part D

ARMv8-R Instructions

Chapter D1

ARMv8-R Instruction Set

This chapter describes the T32 and A32 instruction sets of the ARMv8-R profile. It contains the following sections:

- *ARMv8-R base instructions on page D1-48.*
- *ARMv8-R Advanced SIMD and floating-point instructions on page D1-53.*
- *Single-precision only floating-point implementations on page D1-54.*
- *Instruction encodings on page D1-56.*

D1.1 ARMv8-R base instructions

Table D1-1 summarizes the instructions that are new in the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile or redefined from ARMv8-A. For instructions that are unchanged with respect to ARMv8-A, see the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

Table D1-1 ARMv8-R base instructions

Instruction	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	Notes
ADC	Unchanged	
ADD	Unchanged	
ADR	Unchanged	
AESD, AESE, AESIMC, AESMC	Unchanged	
AND	Unchanged	
ASR	Unchanged	
B	Unchanged	
BFC	Unchanged	
BFI	Unchanged	
BIC	Unchanged	
BKPT	Unchanged	
BL, BLX, BX, BXJ	Unchanged	
CBNZ CBZ	Unchanged	
CDP CDP2	Unchanged	
CLREX	Unchanged	
CLZ	Unchanged	
CMN	Unchanged	
CMP	Unchanged	
CPS, CPSID, CPSIE	Unchanged	
CRC32, CRC32C	Unchanged	
DBG	Unchanged	
DCPS1, DCPS2	Unchanged	
DCPS3	Unused	
DFB on page D2-66	New	
DMB on page D2-59	Redefined	Differences from the ARMv8-A AArch32 application level architecture on page B1-26
DSB on page D2-62	Redefined	

Table D1-1 ARMv8-R base instructions (continued)

Instruction	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	Notes
EOR	Unchanged	
ERET	Unchanged	
HLT	Unchanged	
HVC	Unchanged	
ISB	Unchanged	
IT	Unchanged	
LDA, LDAB, LDAEX, LDAEXB, LDAEXD, LDAEXH, LDAH	Unchanged	
LDC, LDC2	Unchanged	
LDM, LDMIA, LDMFD, LDMDA, LDMFA, LDMDB, LDMEA, LDMIB, LDMEB	Unchanged	
LDR, LDRB, LDRBT, LDRD	Unchanged	
LDREX, LDREXB, LDREXD, LDREXH, LDRH, LDRHT, LDRSB, LDRSBT, LDRSH, LDRSHT, LDRT	Unchanged	
LSL	Unchanged	
LSR	Unchanged	
MCR, MCR2, MCRR, MCRR2	Unchanged	
MLA	Unchanged	
MLS	Unchanged	
MOV	Unchanged	
MOVT	Unchanged	
MRC, MRC2, MRRC, MRRC2	Unchanged	
MRS	Unchanged	
MSR	Unchanged	
MUL	Unchanged	
MVN	Unchanged	
NOP	Unchanged	
ORN	Unchanged	
ORR	Unchanged	
PKHBT, PKHTB	Unchanged	

Table D1-1 ARMv8-R base instructions (continued)

Instruction	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	Notes
PLD	Unchanged	
PLI	Unchanged	
POP	Unchanged	
PUSH	Unchanged	
QADD, QADD16, QADD8, QASX, QDADD	Unchanged	
QDSUB, QSAX, QSUB, QSUB16, QSUB8	Unchanged	
RBIT	Unchanged	
REV, REV16, REVSH	Unchanged	
RFE, RFEDA, RFEDB, RFEIA, RFEIB	Unchanged	
ROR	Unchanged	
RRX	Unchanged	
RSB	Unchanged	
RSC	Unchanged	
SADD16, SADD8	Unchanged	
SASX	Unchanged	
SBC	Unchanged	
SBFX	Unchanged	
SDIV	Unchanged	
SEL	Unchanged	
SETEND	Unchanged	
SEV	Unchanged	
SEVL	Unchanged	
SHA1C, SHA1M, SHA1P, SHA1H, SHA1SU0, SHA1SU1	Unchanged	
SHA256H, SHA256H2, SHA256SU0, SHA256SU1	Unchanged	
SHADD16, SHADD8	Unchanged	
SHASX	Unchanged	
SHSAX	Unchanged	

Table D1-1 ARMv8-R base instructions (continued)

Instruction	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	Notes
SHSUB16, SHSUB8	Unchanged	
SMC	Unused	
SMLABB, SMLABT, SMLATB, SMLATT, SMLAD, SMLADX, SMLAL, SMLALS, SMLALBB, SMLALBT, SMLALTB, SMLALTT, SMLALD, SMLALDX, SMLAWB, SMLAWT	Unchanged	
SMLSD, SMLSDX, SMLS LD, SMLS LD, SMLLA, SMMLAR	Unchanged	
SMMLS, SMMLSR	Unchanged	
SMMUL, SMMULR, SMUAD, SMUADX, SMULBB, SMULBT, SMULTB, SMULTT, SMULL, SMULLS, SMULWB, SMULWT	Unchanged	
SMUSD, SMUSDX	Unchanged	
SRS, SRS DA, SRS DB, SRS IA, SRS IB	Unchanged	
SSAT, SSAT16	Unchanged	
SSAX	Unchanged	
SSUB16, SSUB8	Unchanged	
STC, STC2	Unchanged	
STL, STLB, STLH	Unchanged	
STRL, STRLB, STRLH	Unchanged	
STM, STMIA, STMEA, STMDA, STMED, STMDB, STMFD, STMIB, STMFA	Unchanged	
STR, STRB, STRBT, STRD, STRH, STRHT, STRT	Unchanged	
STRLEX, STRLEXB, STRLEXH, STRLEXD	Unchanged	
SUB	Unchanged	
SVC	Unchanged	
SXTAB, SXTAB16, SXTAH	Unchanged	
SXTB, SXTB16, SXTBH	Unchanged	

Table D1-1 ARMv8-R base instructions (continued)

Instruction	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	Notes
TBB, TBH	Unchanged	
TEQ	Unchanged	
TST	Unchanged	
UADD16, UADD8	Unchanged	
UASX	Unchanged	
UBFX	Unchanged	
UDF	Unchanged	
UDIV	Unchanged	
UHADD16, UHADD8	Unchanged	
UHASX	Unchanged	
UHSAX	Unchanged	
UHSUB16, UHSUB8	Unchanged	
UMAAL	Unchanged	
UMLAL	Unchanged	
UMULL	Unchanged	
UQADD16, UQADD8	Unchanged	
UQASX	Unchanged	
UQSAX	Unchanged	
UQSUB16, UQSUB8	Unchanged	
USAD8	Unchanged	
USADA8	Unchanged	
USAT, USAT16	Unchanged	
USAX	Unchanged	
USUB16, USUB8	Unchanged	
UXTAB, UXTAB16	Unchanged	
UXTAH	Unchanged	
UXTB, UXTB16	Unchanged	
UXTH	Unchanged	
WFE	Unchanged	
WFI	Unchanged	
YIELD	Unchanged	

D1.2 ARMv8-R Advanced SIMD and floating-point instructions

The ARMv8-R AArch32 profile supports Advanced SIMD and floating-point operations. For the instruction descriptions, see the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

ARMv8-R only supports single-precision floating-point operations. See also [Advanced SIMD and floating-point support on page B1-26](#) and [Single-precision only floating-point implementations on page D1-54](#).

D1.3 Single-precision only floating-point implementations

ARMv8-R permits a floating-point implementation that supports only single-precision floating-point instructions. Such an implementation must be a D16 implementation, that is, it must support only floating-point registers D0-D15. Instruction encodings that would access floating-point registers beyond D15 are UNDEFINED.

Table D1-2 shows the A32/T32 instruction encodings that are implemented in a single-precision only floating-point implementation.

Table D1-2 ARMv8-R instructions in an ARMv8-R single-precision only implementation

Instruction	Encoding	Conditions
VABS	A2/T2	sz=0
VADD (floating-point)	A2/T2	sz=0
VCMP	A1/T1 A2/T2	sz=0
VCVT (integer to floating-point, floating-point), VCVTR	A1/T1	sz=0
VCVT (between floating-point and fixed-point, floating-point)	A1/T1	sz=0
VCVTA (floating-point), VCVTN (floating-point), VCVTP (floating-point), VCVTM (floating-point)	A1/T1	sz=0
VCVTB, VCVTT	A1/T1	sz=0
VDIV	A1/T1	sz=0
VFMA, VFMS	A2/T2	sz=0
VFNMA, VFNMS	A1/T1	sz=0
VLDM, VLDMDB, VLDMIA	A1/T1 A2/T2	all
VLDR	A1/T1 A2/T2	all
VMAXNM, VMINNM	A2/T2	sz=0
VMLA (floating-point), VMLS (floating-point)	A2/T2	sz=0
VMOV (immediate)	A2/T2	sz=0
VMOV (register, SIMD)	A2/T2	sz=0
VMOV (general-purpose register to scalar)	A1/T1	opc1:opc2 = '0x00'
VMOV (scalar to general-purpose register)	A1/T1	U:opc1:opc2 = '0x00'
VMOV (between general-purpose register and single-precision register)	A1/T1	all
VMOV (between two general-purpose registers and two single-precision registers)	A1/T1	all
VMOV (between two general-purpose registers and a doubleword floating-point register)	A1/T1	all
VMRS	A1/T1	-
VMSR	A1/T1	-

Table D1-2 ARMv8-R instructions in an ARMv8-R single-precision only implementation

Instruction	Encoding	Conditions
VMUL (floating-point)	A2/T2	sz=0
VNEG	A2/T2	sz=0
VNMLA, VNMLS, VNMUL	A1/T1 A2/T2	sz=0
VPOP	A1/T1 A2/T2	all
VPUSH	A1/T1 A2/T2	all
VRINTA (floating-point), VRINTN (floating-point), VRINTP (floating-point), VRINTM (floating-point)	A1/T1	sz=0
VRINTX (floating-point)	A1/T1	sz=0
VRINTZ (floating-point), VRINTR	A1/T1	sz=0
VSELEQ, VSELGE, VSELGT, VSELVS	A1/T1	sz=0
VSQRT	A1/T1	sz=0
VSTM, VSTMDB, VSTMIA	A1/T1 A2/T2	all
VSTR	A1/T1 A2/T2	all
VSUB (floating-point)	A1/T1	sz=0

D1.4 Instruction encodings

This section contains the encoding for the instructions that are new in ARMv8-R. For all other encoding information, see *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

D1.4.1 Miscellaneous system

This section describes the encoding of the Miscellaneous system instruction class. This section is decoded from Section *Branches and miscellaneous control* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	4	3	0
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	0	(0)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	opc	option		

Decode fields	
opc	Instruction Page
000x	Unallocated.
0010	CLREX
0011	Unallocated.
0100	DSB and DFB
0101	DMB
0110	ISB
0111	Unallocated.
1xxx	Unallocated.

Chapter D2

Description of Redefined and New Instructions

This chapter contains the description of the instructions that are redefined or new in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A. It contains the following sections:

- [Redefined instructions on page D2-58](#)
- [New instruction on page D2-65](#)

D2.1 Redefined instructions

This section contains the description of the instructions that are redefined in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A.

D2.1.1 DMB

Data Memory Barrier is a memory barrier that ensures the ordering of observations of memory accesses.

The ordering requirements of DMB are:

- EL0 and EL1 memory accesses are ordered only with respect to memory accesses using the same VMID.
- EL2 memory accesses are ordered only with respect to other EL2 memory accesses.

These ordering requirements are a relaxation from the ARMv8-A behavior of DMB.

A1

31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	0
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	0	1	0	1	option	

A1 variant

DMB{<c>}{<q>} {<option>}

Decode for this encoding

// No additional decoding required

T1

15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	0
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	0	(0)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	1	0	1	option	

T1 variant

DMB{<c>}{<q>} {<option>}

Decode for this encoding

// No additional decoding required

Assembler symbols

<c>	For encoding A1: see "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Must be AL or omitted. For encoding T1: see "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
<q>	See "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
<option>	Specifies an optional limitation on the barrier operation. Values are: SY Full system is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Can be omitted. This option is referred to as the full system DMB. Encoded as option = 0b1111.

ST	Full system is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. SYST is a synonym for ST. Encoded as option = 0b1110.
LD	Full system is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1101.
ISH	Inner Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1011.
ISHST	Inner Shareable is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1010.
ISHLD	Inner Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1001.
NSH	Non-shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0111.
NSHST	Non-shareable is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0110.
NSHLD	Non-shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0101.
OSH	Outer Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0011.
OSHST	Outer Shareable is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0010.
OSHLD	Outer Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0001.

All other encodings of option are reserved. It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether options other than SY are implemented. All unsupported and reserved options must execute as a full system DMB operation, but software must not rely on this behavior.

————— Note —————

The instruction supports the following alternative <option> values, but ARM recommends that software does not use these alternative values:

- SH as an alias for ISH.
- SHST as an alias for ISHST.
- UN as an alias for NSH.

- UNST as an alias for NSHST.

Operation for all encodings

```

if ConditionPassed() then
    EncodingSpecificOperations();
    case option of
        when '0001' domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
        when '0010' domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
        when '0011' domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable; types = MBReqTypes_All;
        when '0101' domain = MBReqDomain_Nonshareable; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
        when '0110' domain = MBReqDomain_Nonshareable; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
        when '0111' domain = MBReqDomain_Nonshareable; types = MBReqTypes_All;
        when '1001' domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
        when '1010' domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
        when '1011' domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable; types = MBReqTypes_All;
        when '1101' domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
        when '1110' domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
        otherwise domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem; types = MBReqTypes_All;

    if HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} then
        if HCR.BSU == '11' then
            domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem;
        if HCR.BSU == '10' && domain != MBReqDomain_FullSystem then
            domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable;
        if HCR.BSU == '01' && domain == MBReqDomain_Nonshareable then
            domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable;

    DataMemoryBarrier(domain, types);

```

D2.1.2 DSB

Data Synchronization Barrier is a memory barrier that ensures the completion of memory accesses.

The ordering requirements of DSB are:

- EL0 and EL1 memory accesses are ordered only with respect to memory accesses using the same VMID.
- EL2 memory accesses are ordered only with respect to other EL2 memory accesses.

These ordering requirements are a relaxation from the ARMv8-A behavior of DSB.

This instruction is used by the alias [DFB](#). See [Alias conditions](#) for details of when each alias is preferred.

A1

31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	0
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	0	1	0	0	option	

A1 variant

DSB{<c>}{<q>} {<option>}

Decode for this encoding

// No additional decoding required

T1

15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	0
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	0	(0)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	1	0	0	option	

T1 variant

DSB{<c>}{<q>} {<option>}

Decode for this encoding

// No additional decoding required

Alias conditions

Alias	is preferred when
DFB	option == '1100'

Assembler symbols

<c>	For encoding A1: see "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Must be AL or omitted. For encoding T1: see "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
<q>	See "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

<option>	Specifies an optional limitation on the barrier operation. Values are:
SY	Full system is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Can be omitted. This option is referred to as the full system DSB. Encoded as option = 0b1111.
ST	Full system is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. SYST is a synonym for ST. Encoded as option = 0b1110.
LD	Full system is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1101.
ISH	Inner Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1011.
ISHST	Inner Shareable is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1010.
ISHL	Inner Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b1001.
NSH	Non-shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0111.
NSHST	Non-shareable is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0110.
NSHL	Non-shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0101.
OSH	Outer Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads and writes are the required access types in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0011.
OSHST	Outer Shareable is the required Shareability domain, writes are the required access type in both "Group A" and "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0010.
OSHL	Outer Shareable is the required Shareability domain, reads are the required access type in "Group A", and reads and writes are the required access types in "Group B". For more information see "Data Memory Barrier (DMB)" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Encoded as option = 0b0001.
For option = 0b1100, see DFB . All other encodings of option are reserved. It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether options other than SY and DFB are implemented. All unsupported and reserved options must execute as a full system DSB operation, but software must not rely on this behavior.	

Note

The instruction supports the following alternative <option> values, but ARM recommends that software does not use these alternative values:

- SH as an alias for ISH.
 - SHST as an alias for ISHST.
 - UN as an alias for NSH.
 - UNST as an alias for NSHST.
-

Operation for all encodings

```
if ConditionPassed() then
    EncodingSpecificOperations();
case option of
    when '0001' domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
    when '0010' domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
    when '0011' domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable; types = MBReqTypes_All;
    when '0101' domain = MBReqDomain_Nonshareable; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
    when '0110' domain = MBReqDomain_Nonshareable; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
    when '0111' domain = MBReqDomain_Nonshareable; types = MBReqTypes_All;
    when '1001' domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
    when '1010' domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
    when '1011' domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable; types = MBReqTypes_All;
    when '1101' domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem; types = MBReqTypes_Reads;
    when '1110' domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem; types = MBReqTypes_Writes;
    otherwise domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem; types = MBReqTypes_All;

if HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} then
    if HCR.BSU == '11' then
        domain = MBReqDomain_FullSystem;
    if HCR.BSU == '10' && domain != MBReqDomain_FullSystem then
        domain = MBReqDomain_OuterShareable;
    if HCR.BSU == '01' && domain == MBReqDomain_Nonshareable then
        domain = MBReqDomain_InnerShareable;

if option == '1100' and PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
    DataFullBarrier();
else
    DataSynchronizationBarrier(domain, types);
```


D2.2 New instruction

This section contains the description of the instruction that is new in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A.

D2.2.1 DFB

Data Full Barrier is a memory barrier that ensures the completion of memory accesses.

If executed at EL2, this instruction orders memory accesses irrespective of their Exception level or associated VMID. If executed at EL1 or EL0, this instruction behaves as DSB SY.

This instruction is an alias of the [DSB](#) instruction. This means that:

- The encodings in this description are named to match the encodings of [DSB](#).
- The description of [DSB](#) gives the operational pseudocode for this instruction.

A1

ARMv8.0-R

31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0
1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	(0)	(0)	(0)	(0)	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0

A1 variant

DFB{<C>}{<q>}

is equivalent to

DSB{<C>}{<q>} #12

and is always the preferred disassembly.

T1

ARMv8.0-R

15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3		0	
1	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	1	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	1	0	(0)	0	(1)	(1)	(1)	(1)	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	0

option

T1 variant

DFB{<C>}{<q>}

is equivalent to

DSB{<C>}{<q>} #12

and is always the preferred disassembly.

Assembler symbols

- <C> For encoding A1: see "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Must be AL or omitted.
- For encoding T1: see "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- <q> See "Standard assembler syntax fields" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

Operation for all encodings

The description of [DSB](#) gives the operational pseudocode for this instruction.

Part E

ARMv8-R System Registers and System Instructions

Chapter E1

ARMv8-R System Registers and System Instructions

This chapter contains the list of the System registers and System instructions in ARMv8-R. It contains the following sections:

- [ARMv8-R System register list on page E1-72.](#)
- [ARMv8-R System instructions on page E1-78.](#)

E1.1 ARMv8-R System register list

Table E1-1 summarizes the System registers in the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile. It specifies whether the register is unchanged, redefined, new, or not used when the ARMv8-R System registers are compared to the registers that are supported in ARMv8-A. For information on the System registers that are unchanged with respect to ARMv8-A, see the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*. Registers that are not listed in Table E1-1 are UNALLOCATED in v8-R.

The following terms describe register access at each Exception level that ARMv8-R supports:

RW	Read/write.
RO	Read-only.
-	Not accessible.
RAZ/WI	Read-As-Zero, Writes Ignored.
Cfg	Configurable access.
WO	Write-only.

Table E1-1 ARMv8-R System registers

Register	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	EL2	EL1	EL0
ACTLR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
ACTLR2	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
ADFSR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
AIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
AIFSR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
AMAIRO	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
AMAIR1	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
CCSIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
CLIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
CNTRFRQ	Unchanged	RW	RO	RO
CNTHCTL	Unchanged	RW	-	-
CNTHP_CTL	Unchanged	RW	-	-
CNTHP_CVAL	Unchanged	RW	-	-
CNTHP_TVAL	Unchanged	RW	-	-
CNTKCTL	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
CNTPCT	Unchanged	RO	Cfg	Cfg
CNTP_CTL	Unchanged	RW	Cfg	Cfg
CNTP_CVAL	Unchanged	RW	Cfg	Cfg
CNTP_TVAL	Unchanged	RW	Cfg	Cfg
CNTVCT	Unchanged	RO	RO	Cfg
CNTVOFF	Unchanged	RW	-	-
CNTV_CTL	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
CNTV_CVAL	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg

Table E1-1 ARMv8-R System registers (continued)

Register	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	EL2	EL1	EL0
CNTV_TVAL	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
CONTEXTIDR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
CPACR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
CSSELR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
CTR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
DBGAUTHSTATUS	Redefined	RO	RO	-
DBGBCR<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGBVR<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGBXVR<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGCLAIMCLR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGCLAIMSET	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGDCCINT	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGDEVID	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
DBGDEVID1	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
DBGDEVID2	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
DBGDIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	Cfg
DBGDRAR	Unchanged	RO	RO	RO
DBGDSAR	Unchanged	RO	RO	RO
DBGDSCRext	Redefined	RW	RW	-
DBGDSCRint	Unchanged	RO	RO	RO
DBGDTRRXext	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGDTRRXint	Unchanged	RO	RO	RO
DBGDTRTText	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGDTRTXint	Unchanged	WO	WO	WO
DBGOSDLR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGOSECCR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGOSLAR	Unchanged	WO	WO	-
DBGOSLSR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
DBGPRCR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGVCR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGWCR<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DBGWFAR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-

Table E1-1 ARMv8-R System registers (continued)

Register	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	EL2	EL1	EL0
DBGWVR<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DFAR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
DFSR	Redefined	RW	RW	-
DLR	Unchanged	RW	RW	RW
DSPSR	Unchanged	RW	RW	RW
FCSEIDR	Unchanged	RAZ/WI	RAZ/WI	-
FPEXC	Unchanged	Cfg	Cfg	-
FPSCR	Redefined (access only)	Cfg	Cfg	Cfg
FPSID	Unchanged	Cfg	Cfg	-
HACR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HACTLR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HACTLR2	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HADFSR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HAIFSR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HAMAIRO	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HMAIR1	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HCPTR	Redefined	RW	-	-
HCR	Redefined	RW	-	-
HCR2	Redefined	RW	-	-
HDCR	Redefined	RW	-	-
HDFAR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HIFAR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HMAIRO	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HMAIR1	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HMPUIR	New	RO	-	-
HPRBAR	New	RW	-	-
HPRBAR<n>	New	RW	-	-
HPRENr	New	RW	-	-
HPRLAR	New	RW	-	-
HPRLAR<n>	New	RW	-	-
HPRSELr	New	RW	-	-
HPFAR	Unchanged	RW	-	-

Table E1-1 ARMv8-R System registers (continued)

Register	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	EL2	EL1	EL0
HRMR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HSCTLR	Redefined	RW	-	-
HSR	Redefined	RW	-	-
HSTR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HTPIDR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
HVBAR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
ID_AFR0	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_DFR0	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_ISAR0	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_ISAR1	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_ISAR2	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_ISAR3	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_ISAR4	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_ISAR5	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_MMFR0	Redefined	RO	RO	-
ID_MMFR1	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_MMFR2	Redefined	RO	RO	-
ID_MMFR3	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_MMFR4	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_PFR0	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
ID_PFR1	Unchanged Complying with the general differences between the architecture profiles, the following field value settings apply in ARMv8-R AArch32: Virtualization 0b0001 Virt_frac 0b0000 Security 0b0000 Sec_frac 0b0001	RO	RO	-
IFAR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
IFSR	Redefined	RW	RW	-
ISR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
JIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
JMCR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
JOSCR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
MAIR0	Unchanged	RW	RW	-

Table E1-1 ARMv8-R System registers (continued)

Register	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	EL2	EL1	EL0
MAIR1	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
MIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
MPIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
MPUIR	New	RO	RO	-
MVBAR	Unchanged	-	-	-
MVFR0	Unchanged	Cfg	Cfg	-
MVFR1	Unchanged	Cfg	Cfg	-
MVFR2	Unchanged	Cfg	Cfg	-
NMRR	Unused	-	-	-
NSACR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
PAR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
PMCCFILTR	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMCCNTR	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMCEID0	Unchanged	RO	RO	Cfg
PMCEID1	Unchanged	RO	RO	Cfg
PMCNTENCLR	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMCNTENSET	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMCR	Redefined	RW	RW	Cfg
PMEVCNTR<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMEVTYPER<n>	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMINTENCLR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
PMINTENSET	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
PMOVSr	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMOVSSET	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMSELR	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMSWINC	Unchanged	WO	WO	Cfg
PMUSERENR	Unchanged	RW	RW	RO
PMXVCNTR	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PMXEVTYPER	Unchanged	RW	RW	Cfg
PRBAR	New	RW	RW	-
PRBAR<n>	New	RW	RW	-
PRLAR	New	RW	RW	-

Table E1-1 ARMv8-R System registers (continued)

Register	Status with respect to ARMv8-A	EL2	EL1	EL0
PRLAR<n>	New	RW	RW	-
PRSELR	New	RW	RW	-
PRRR	Unused	-	-	-
REVIDR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
RMR	Unused	-	-	-
RVBAR	Unchanged	RO	RO	-
SCTLR	Redefined	RW	RW	-
SPSR	Unchanged			
TCMTR	Unchanged			
TPIDRPRW	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
TPIDRURO	Unchanged	RW	RW	RO
TPIDRURW	Unchanged	RW	RW	RW
VBAR	Unchanged	RW	RW	-
VMPIDR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
VPIDR	Unchanged	RW	-	-
VSCTLR	New	RW	-	-

E1.2 ARMv8-R System instructions

System instructions that are in use in ARMv8-R AArch32 are unchanged from the ARMv8-A profile.
[ID_MMFR2.UniTLB == 0b0000](#) ensures that the TLB-related system instructions are UNALLOCATED.

For information on the System instructions, see the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

Chapter E2

Description of the Redefined or New System Registers

This chapter contains the description of the System registers that are new or redefined in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A. It contains the following sections:

- [Redefined System registers on page E2-80.](#)
- [New System registers on page E2-154.](#)

E2.1 Redefined System registers

This section contains the description of the System registers that are redefined in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A.

E2.1.1 DBGAUTHSTATUS, Debug Authentication Status register

The DBGAUTHSTATUS characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about the state of the IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED authentication interface for debug.

Configurations

System register DBGAUTHSTATUS is architecturally mapped to External register [DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1](#).


This register is required in all implementations.

Attributes

DBGAUTHSTATUS is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The DBGAUTHSTATUS bit assignments are:



Bits [31:12]

Reserved, RES0.

HNID, bits [11:10]

Hyp non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

- 00 Separate Hyp enable not implemented, or EL2 not implemented.
- 10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.
- 11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

For ARMv8-R:

- If EL2 is implemented, bit [11] is RAO.
- If EL2 is not implemented, bits [11:10] are RAZ.

HID, bits [9:8]

Hyp invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

- 00 Separate Hyp enable not implemented, or EL2 not implemented.
- 10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.
- 11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

For ARMv8-R:

- If EL2 is implemented, bit [9] is RAO.
- If EL2 is not implemented, bits [9:8] are RAZ.

SNID, bits [7:6]

Secure non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

SID, bits [5:4]

Secure invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

NSNID, bits [3:2]

Non-secure non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.

11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

NSID, bits [1:0]

Non-secure invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.

11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

Accessing the DBGAUTHSTATUS

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p14, 0, <Rt>, c7, c14, 6	000	110	0111	1110	1110

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p14, 0, <Rt>, c7, c14, 6	0	-	RO	RO
p14, 0, <Rt>, c7, c14, 6	1	-	n/a	RO

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HDCR.TDA](#)==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.2 DBGDSCRext, Debug Status and Control Register, External View

The DBGDSCRext characteristics are:

Purpose

Main control register for the debug implementation.

Configurations

This register is required in all implementations.


This register is in the Warm reset domain. Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. On a Warm or Cold reset RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

DBGDSCRext is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The DBGDSCRext bit assignments are:



Bit [31]

Reserved, RES0.

RXfull, bit [30]

DTRRX full. Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.RXfull](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.RXfull](#).

ARM deprecates use of this bit other than for save/restore. Use DBGDSCRint to access the DTRRX full status.

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

TXfull, bit [29]

DTRTX full. Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.TXfull](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.TXfull](#).

ARM deprecates use of this bit other than for save/restore. Use DBGDSCRint to access the DTRTX full status.

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

Bit [28]

Reserved, RES0.

RXO, bit [27]

Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.RXO](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.RXO](#).

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

TXU, bit [26]

Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.TXU](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.TXU](#).

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

Bits [25:24]

Reserved, RES0.

INTdis, bits [23:22]

Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.INTdis](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this field is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this field is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.INTdis](#).

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

TDA, bit [21]

Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.TDA](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.TDA](#).

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

Bits [20:19]

Reserved, RES0.

NS, bit [18]

Non-secure status. This bit is RES1.

ARM deprecates use of this field.

SPNIDdis, bit [17]

Secure privileged profiling disabled status bit. This bit is RES0.

ARM deprecates use of this field.

SPIDdis, bit [16]

Secure privileged AArch32 invasive self-hosted debug disabled status bit. This bit is RES0.

ARM deprecates use of this field.

MDBGGen, bit [15]

Monitor debug events enable. Enable Breakpoint, Watchpoint, and Vector Catch exceptions.

0 Breakpoint, Watchpoint, and Vector Catch exceptions disabled.

1 Breakpoint, Watchpoint, and Vector Catch exceptions enabled.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

HDE, bit [14]

Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.HDE](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.HDE](#).

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

Bit [13]

Reserved, RES0.

UDCCdis, bit [12]

Traps EL0 accesses to the DCC registers to Undefined mode.

0 EL0 accesses to the DCC registers are not trapped to Undefined mode.

1 EL0 accesses to the DBGDSCRint, DBGDTRRXint, DBGDTRTXint, DBGDIDR, DBGDSAR, and DBGDRAR are trapped to Undefined mode.

———— Note ————

All accesses to these registers are trapped, including LDC and STC accesses to DBGDTRTXint and DBGDTRRXint, and MRRC accesses to DBGDSAR and DBGDRAR.

Traps of EL0 accesses to the DBGDTRRXint and DBGDTRTXint are ignored in Debug state.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bits [11:7]

Reserved, RES0.

ERR, bit [6]

Used for save/restore of [EDSCR.ERR](#).

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked), this bit is RO, and software must treat it as UNK/SBZP.

When DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 1 (the OS lock is locked), this bit is RW and holds the value of [EDSCR.ERR](#).

The architected behavior of this field determines the value it returns after a reset.

MOE, bits [5:2]

Method of Entry for debug exception. When a debug exception is taken, this field is set to indicate the event that caused the exception:

0001 Breakpoint

0011 Software breakpoint (BKPT) instruction

0101 Vector catch

1010 Watchpoint

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [1:0]

Reserved, RES0.

Accessing the DBGDSCRext

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p14, 0, <Rt>, c0, c2, 2	000	010	0000	1110	0010

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility			
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2	
p14, 0, <Rt>, c0, c2, 2	0	-	RW	RW	
p14, 0, <Rt>, c0, c2, 2	1	-	n/a	RW	

Individual fields within this register might have restricted accessibility when DBGOSLSR.OSLK == 0 (the OS lock is unlocked.) See the field descriptions for more detail.

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HDCR.TDA](#)==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.3 DFSR, Data Fault Status Register

The DFSR characteristics are:

Purpose

Holds status information about the last data fault.

Configurations


RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

DFSR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The DFSR bit assignments are:



Bits [31:17]

Reserved, RES0.

FnV, bit [16]

FAR not Valid, for a Synchronous external abort.

0 DFAR is valid.

1 DFAR is not valid, and holds an UNKNOWN value.

This field is only valid for a Synchronous external abort. It is RES0 for all other Data Abort exceptions.

Bits [15:14]

Reserved, RES0.

CM, bit [13]

Cache maintenance fault. For synchronous faults, this bit indicates whether a cache maintenance instruction generated the fault. The possible values of this bit are:

0 Abort not caused by execution of a cache maintenance instruction.

1 Abort caused by execution of a cache maintenance instruction.

On an asynchronous fault, this bit is UNKNOWN.

ExT, bit [12]

External abort type. This bit can be used to provide an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED classification of external aborts.

In an implementation that does not provide any classification of external aborts, this bit is RES0.

For aborts other than external aborts this bit always returns 0.

WnR, bit [11]

Write not Read bit. Indicates whether the abort was caused by a write or a read instruction. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Abort caused by a read instruction.
- 1 Abort caused by a write instruction.

For faults on the cache maintenance and address translation System instructions in the (coproc==1111) encoding space this bit always returns a value of 1.

Bit [10]

Reserved, RES0.

LPAE, bit [9]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [8:6]

Reserved, RES0.

STATUS, bits [5:0]

Fault status bits. Possible values of this field are:

- 000100 Translation fault
- 001100 Permission fault
- 010000 Synchronous external abort, other than synchronous parity or ECC error
- 010001 SError interrupt
- 011000 Synchronous parity or ECC error on memory access
- 011001 SError parity or ECC error on memory access
- 100001 Alignment fault
- 100010 Debug exception
- 110100 IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED fault (Cache lockdown fault)
- 110101 IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED fault (Unsupported Exclusive access fault)

All other values are reserved.

Accessing the DFSR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c5, c0, 0	000	000	0101	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c5, c0, 0	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c5, c0, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HCR.TVM](#)==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HCR.TRVM](#)==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HSTR.T5](#)==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.4 HCPTR, Hyp Architectural Feature Trap Register

The HCPTR characteristics are:

Purpose

Controls:

- Trapping to Hyp mode of access, at EL1 or EL0, to trace, and to Advanced SIMD or floating-point functionality.
- Hyp mode access to trace, and to Advanced SIMD or floating-point functionality.

———— Note ————

Accesses to this functionality:

- Other than Hyp mode are also affected by settings in the CPACR and NSACR.
- From Hyp mode are also affected by settings in the NSACR.

Exceptions generated by the CPACR and NSACR controls are higher priority than those generated by the HCPTR controls.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

EL0	EL1	EL2
-	-	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Subject to the prioritization rules:

- If HSTR.T1=1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

Configurations


Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. These apply only if the PE resets into EL2. Otherwise, RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

HCPTR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HCPTR bit assignments are:



TCPAC, bit [31]

Traps EL1 accesses to the CPACR to Hyp mode.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 0 | This control has no effect on EL1 accesses to the CPACR. |
| 1 | EL1 accesses to the CPACR are trapped to Hyp mode. |

———— **Note** ————

The CPACR is not accessible at EL0.

When this register has an architecturally-defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bits [30:21]

Reserved, RES0.

TTA, bit [20]

Traps System register accesses to all implemented trace registers to Hyp mode.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | This control has no effect on System register accesses to trace registers. |
| 1 | Any System register access to an implemented trace register is trapped to Hyp mode, unless the access is trapped to EL1 by a CPACR or NSACR control, or the access is from EL0 and the definition of the register in the appropriate trace architecture specification indicates that the register is not accessible from EL0. A trapped instruction generates: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A Hyp Trap exception, if the exception is taken from EL0 or EL1. • An Undefined Instruction exception taken to Hyp mode, if the exception is taken from Hyp mode. |

If the implementation does not include a trace macrocell, or does not include a System register interface to the trace macrocell registers, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this bit:

- Is RES0.
- Is RES1.
- Can be written from Hyp mode.

———— **Note** ————

- The ETMv4 architecture does not permit EL0 to access the trace registers. If the implementation includes an ETMv4 implementation, EL0 accesses to the trace registers are UNDEFINED, and a resulting Undefined Instruction exception is higher priority than a HCPTR.TTA Hyp Trap exception.
- The architecture does not provide traps on trace register accesses through the optional memory-mapped external debug interface.

System register accesses to the trace registers can have side-effects. When a System register access is trapped, any side-effects that are normally associated with the access do not occur before the exception is taken.

When this register has an architecturally-defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

Bits [19:16]

Reserved, RES0.

TASE, bit [15]

Traps execution of Advanced SIMD instructions to Hyp mode when the value of HCPTR.TCP10 is 0.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 0 | This control has no effect on execution of Advanced SIMD instructions. |
|---|--|

- 1 When the value of HCPTR.TCP10 is 0, any attempt to execute an Advanced SIMD instruction is trapped to Hyp mode, unless it is trapped to EL1 by a CPACR or NSACR control. A trapped instruction generates:
- A Hyp Trap exception, if the exception is taken from NEL0 or EL1.
 - An Undefined Instruction exception taken to Hyp mode, if the exception is taken from Hyp mode.

When the value of HCPTR.TCP10 is 1, the value of this field is ignored.

If the implementation does not include Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality, this field is RES1. If the implementation includes floating-point functionality but does not include Advanced SIMD functionality, this field is RES1. Otherwise, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this field is implemented as a RW field. If it is not implemented as a RW field, then it is RAZ/WI.

For the list of instructions affected by this field, see "Controls of Advanced SIMD operation that do not apply to floating-point operation" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When this register has an architecturally-defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

Bit [14]

Reserved, RES0.

Bits [13:12]

Reserved, RES1.

TCP11, bit [11]

The value of this field is ignored. If this field is programmed with a different value to the TCP10 bit then this field is UNKNOWN on a direct read of the HCPTR.

If the implementation does not include Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality, this field is RES1.

When this register has an architecturally-defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

TCP10, bit [10]

Trap accesses to Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality to Hyp mode:

- 0 This control has no effect on accesses to Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality.
- 1 Any attempted access to Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality is trapped to Hyp mode, unless it is trapped to EL1 by a CPACR or NSACR control. A trapped instruction generates:
- A Hyp Trap exception, if the exception is taken from EL0 or EL1.
 - An Undefined Instruction exception taken to Hyp mode, if the exception is taken from Hyp mode.

The Advanced SIMD and floating-point features controlled by these fields are:

- Execution of any floating-point or Advanced SIMD instruction.
- Any access to the Advanced SIMD and floating-point registers D0-D31 and their views as S0-S31 and Q0-Q15.
- Any access to the FPSCR, FPSID, MVFR0, MVFR1, MVFR2, or FPEXC System registers.

If the implementation does not include Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality, this field is RES1.

When this register has an architecturally-defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

Bits [9:0]

Reserved, RES1.

Accessing the HCPTR:

To access the HCPTR:

MRC p15,4,<Rt>,c1,c1,2 ; Read HCPTR into Rt
MCR p15,4,<Rt>,c1,c1,2 ; Write Rt to HCPTR

Register access is encoded as follows:

coproc	opc1	CRn	CRm	opc2
1111	100	0001	0001	010

E2.1.5 HCR, Hyp Configuration Register

The HCR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides configuration controls for virtualization, including defining whether various Non-secure operations are trapped to Hyp mode.

Configurations


Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. Otherwise, RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

HCR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HCR bit assignments are:



Bit [31]

Reserved, RES0.

TRVM, bit [30]

Trap Reads of Memory controls. Traps EL1 reads of the memory control registers to Hyp mode. The registers for which read accesses are trapped are as follows:

[SCTLR](#), [DFSR](#), [IFSR](#), [DFAR](#), [IFAR](#), [ADFSR](#), [AIFSR](#), [PRRR](#), [NMRR](#), [MAIR0](#), [MAIR1](#), [AMAIRO](#), [AMAIR1](#), [CONTEXTIDR](#), [PRSELR](#), [PRBAR](#), [PRBAR<n>](#), [PRLAR](#), [PRLAR<n>](#).

0 This control has no effect on EL1 read accesses to memory control registers.

1 EL1 read accesses to the specified memory control registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

HCD, bit [29]

HVC instruction disable. Disables execution of HVC instructions.

- 0 HVC instruction execution is enabled at EL2 and EL1.
- 1 HVC instructions are UNDEFINED at EL2 and EL1. The Undefined Instruction exception is taken to the Exception level at which the HVC instruction is executed.

————— Note —————

HVC instructions are always UNDEFINED at EL0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

Bit [28]

Reserved, RES0.

TGE, bit [27]

Trap General Exceptions from EL0.

- 0 This control has no effect on execution at EL0.
- 1 All exceptions that would be routed to EL1 are routed to EL2.
The [SCTLR.M](#) bit is treated as being 0 for all purposes other than returning the result of a direct read of [SCTLR](#).
The [HCR](#).{FMO, IMO, AMO} bits are treated as being 1 for all purposes other than returning the result of a direct read of [HCR](#).
All virtual interrupts are disabled.
Any IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED mechanisms for signaling virtual interrupts are disabled.
An exception return to EL1 is treated as an illegal exception return.
The [HDCR](#).{TDRA, TDOSA, TDA} bits are ignored and treated as being 1 other than for the purpose of a direct read of [HDCR](#).

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TVM, bit [26]

Trap Memory controls. Traps EL1 writes to the memory control registers to Hyp mode. The registers for which write accesses are trapped are as follows:

[SCTLR](#), [DFSR](#), [IFSR](#), [DFAR](#), [IFAR](#), [ADFSR](#), [AIFSR](#), [PRRR](#), [NMRR](#), [MAIR0](#), [MAIR1](#), [AMAIR0](#), [AMAIR1](#), [CONTEXTIDR](#), [PRSELR](#), [PRBAR](#), [PRBAR<n>](#), [PRLAR](#), [PRLAR<n>](#).

- 0 This control has no effect on EL1 write accesses to EL1 memory control registers.
- 1 EL1 write accesses to EL1 memory control registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bit [25]

Reserved, RES0.

TPU, bit [24]

Trap cache maintenance instructions that operate to the Point of Unification. Traps EL1 execution of those cache maintenance instructions to Hyp mode. This applies to the following instructions:

[ICIMVAU](#), [ICIALLU](#), [ICIALUIS](#), [DCCMVAU](#).

————— Note —————

An Undefined Instruction exception generated at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2, and these instructions are always UNDEFINED at EL0.

- 0 This control has no effect on the execution of cache maintenance instructions.

1 EL1 execution of the specified instructions is trapped to Hyp mode.
When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TPC, bit [23]

Trap data or unified cache maintenance instructions that operate to the Point of Coherency. Traps EL1 execution of those cache maintenance instructions to Hyp mode. This applies to the following instructions:

DCIMVAC, DCCIMVAC, DCCMVAC.

———— Note ————

An Undefined Instruction exception generated at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2, and these instructions are always UNDEFINED at EL0.

0 This control has no effect on the execution of cache maintenance instructions.
1 EL1 execution of the specified instructions is trapped to Hyp mode.
When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TSW, bit [22]

Trap data or unified cache maintenance instructions that operate by Set/Way. Traps EL1 execution of those cache maintenance instructions by set/way to Hyp mode. This applies to the following instructions:

DCISW, DCCSW, DCCISW.

———— Note ————

An Undefined Instruction exception generated at EL0 is higher priority than this trap to EL2, and these instructions are always UNDEFINED at EL0.

0 This control has no effect on the execution of cache maintenance instructions.
1 EL1 execution of the specified instructions is trapped to Hyp mode.
When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TAC, bit [21]

Trap Auxiliary Control Registers. Traps EL1 accesses to the Auxiliary Control Registers to Hyp mode. This applies to the following register accesses:

ACTLR and, if implemented, ACTLR2.

0 This control has no effect on EL1 accesses to the Auxiliary Control Registers.
1 EL1 accesses to the specified registers are trapped to Hyp mode.
When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TIDCP, bit [20]

Trap IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED functionality. Traps EL1 accesses to the encodings for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED System Registers to Hyp mode.

MCR and MRC instructions accessing the following encodings:

- All coproc==p15, CRn==c9, Opcode1 = {0-7}, CRm == {c0-c2, c5-c8}, opcode2 == {0-7}.
- All coproc==p15, CRn==c10, Opcode1 == {0-7}, CRm == {c0, c1, c4, c8}, opcode2 == {0-7}.
- All coproc==p15, CRn==c11, Opcode1=={0-7}, CRm == {c0-c8, c15}, opcode2 == {0-7}.

When HCR.TIDCP is set to 1, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether any of this functionality accessed from EL0 is trapped to Hyp mode. If it is not, it is UNDEFINED, and the PE takes an Undefined Instruction exception to Undefined mode.

0 This control has no effect on EL1 and EL0 accesses to the System register encodings for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED functionality.

- 1 EL1 accesses to the specified System register encodings for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED functionality are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bit [19]

Reserved, RES0.

TID3, bit [18]

Trap ID group 3. Traps EL1 reads of the following registers to Hyp mode:

ID_PFR0, ID_PFR1, ID_DFR0, ID_AFR0, ID_MMFR0, ID_MMFR1, ID_MMFR2, ID_MMFR3, ID_ISAR0, ID_ISAR1, ID_ISAR2, ID_ISAR3, ID_ISAR4, ID_ISAR5, MVFR0, MVFR1, MVFR2, and ID_MMFR4, except that if ID_MMFR4 is implemented as RAZ/WI then it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether accesses to ID_MMFR4 are trapped.

Also an MRC access to any of the following encodings:

- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == {c3-c7}, opc2 == {0,1}.
- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == c3, opc2 == 2.
- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == c5, opc2 == {4,5}.

It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether this bit traps MRC accesses to the following encodings:

- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == c2, opc2 == 7.
- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == c3, opc2 == {3-7}.
- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == {c4, c6, c7}, opc2 == {2-7}.
- coproc==p15, opc1 == 0, CRn == c0, CRm == c5, opc2 == {2, 3, 6, 7}.

0 This control has no effect on EL1 reads of the ID group 3 registers.

1 The specified EL1 read accesses to ID group 3 registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TID2, bit [17]

Trap ID group 2. Traps the following register accesses to Hyp mode:

- EL1 and EL0 reads of the CTR, CCSIDR, CLIDR, and CSSELR.
- EL1 and EL0 writes to the CSSELR.

0 This control has no effect on EL1 and EL0 accesses to the ID group 2 registers.

1 The specified EL1 and EL0 accesses to ID group 2 registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TID1, bit [16]

Trap ID group 1. Traps EL1 reads of the following registers to Hyp mode:

TCMTR, TLBTR, REVIDR, AIDR, MPUIR.

0 This control has no effect on EL1 reads of the ID group 1 registers.

1 The specified EL1 read accesses to ID group 1 registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TID0, bit [15]

Trap ID group 0. Traps the following register accesses to Hyp mode:

- EL1 reads of the JIDR and FPSID.
- If the JIDR is RAZ from EL0, EL0 reads of the JIDR.

————— Note —————

- It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the JIDR is RAZ or UNDEFINED at EL0. If it is UNDEFINED at EL0 then the Undefined Instruction exception takes precedence over this trap.
- The FPSID is not accessible at EL0.

- Writes to the FPSID are ignored, and not trapped by this control.

- 0 This control has no effect on EL1 reads of the ID group 0 registers.
- 1 The specified EL1 read accesses to ID group 0 registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TWE, bit [14]

Traps EL0 and EL1 execution of WFE instructions to Hyp mode:

- 0 This control has no effect on the execution of WFE instructions at EL0 or EL1.
- 1 Any attempt to execute a WFE instruction at EL0 or EL1 is trapped to Hyp mode, if the instruction would otherwise have caused the PE to enter a low-power state, except that when the value of **SCTLR.nTWE** is 0, the trap of EL0 execution to Undefined mode takes precedence over this trap.

The attempted execution of a conditional WFE instruction is only trapped if the instruction passes its condition code check.

Note

Since a WFE can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFE are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFE is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TWI, bit [13]

Traps EL0 and EL1 execution of WFI instructions to Hyp mode.

- 0 This control has no effect on the execution of WFI instructions at EL1 or EL0.
- 1 Any attempt to execute a WFI instruction at EL0 or EL1 is trapped to Hyp mode, if the instruction would otherwise have caused the PE to enter a low-power state, except that when the value of **SCTLR.nTWI** is 0, the trap of EL0 execution to Undefined mode takes precedence over this trap.

The attempted execution of a conditional WFI instruction is only trapped if the instruction passes its condition code check.

Note

Since a WFI can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFI are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFI is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

DC, bit [12]

Default Cacheability.

- 0 This control has no effect on the EL1&0 translation regime.
- 1 The HCR.VM field behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of the field.
- The memory type produced by the first stage default memory map of the EL1&0 translation regime is:
- Normal memory.
 - Non-shareable.
 - Inner Write-Back Read-Allocate, Write-Allocate Cacheable.
 - Outer Write-Back Read-Allocate, Write-Allocate Cacheable.

- For instruction accesses, not XN, meaning that execution is permitted.

This field has no effect on the EL2 translation regime.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

BSU, bits [11:10]

Barrier Shareability upgrade. This field determines the minimum Shareability domain that is applied to any barrier instruction executed from EL1 or EL0:

00	No effect
01	Inner Shareable
10	Outer Shareable
11	Full system

This value is combined with the specified level of the barrier held in its instruction, using the same principles as combining the Shareability attributes from two stages of address translation.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

FB, bit [9]

Force broadcast. Causes the following instructions to be broadcast within the Inner Shareable domain when executed from EL1:

BPIALL, ICIALLU.

0	This field has no effect on the operation of the specified instructions.
1	When one of the specified instruction is executed at EL1, the instruction is broadcast within the Inner Shareable Shareability domain.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

VA, bit [8]

Virtual SError interrupt exception.

0	This mechanism is not making a virtual SError interrupt pending.
1	A virtual SError interrupt is pending because of this mechanism.

The virtual SError interrupt is only enabled when the value of HCR.AMO bit is 1.

The Guest OS cannot distinguish the virtual exception from the corresponding physical exception.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

VI, bit [7]

Virtual IRQ exception.

0	This mechanism is not making a virtual IRQ pending.
1	A virtual IRQ is pending because of this mechanism.

The virtual IRQ is only enabled when the value of HCR.IMO bit is 1.

The Guest OS cannot distinguish the virtual exception from the corresponding physical exception.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

VF, bit [6]

Virtual FIQ exception.

0	This mechanism is not making a virtual FIQ pending.
1	A virtual FIQ is pending because of this mechanism.

The virtual FIQ is only enabled when the value of HCR.FMO bit is 1.

The Guest OS cannot distinguish the virtual exception from the corresponding physical exception.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

AMO, bit [5]

Error interrupt Mask Override. When this bit is set to 1, it overrides the effect of CPSR.A, and enables virtual exception signaling by the VA bit.

If the value of HCR.TGE is 1, then the HCR.AMO bit behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of the bit.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

IMO, bit [4]

IRQ Mask Override. When this bit is set to 1, it overrides the effect of CPSR.I, and enables virtual exception signaling by the VI bit.

If the value of HCR.TGE is 1, then the HCR.IMO bit behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of the bit.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

FMO, bit [3]

FIQ Mask Override. When this bit is set to 1, it overrides the effect of CPSR.F, and enables virtual exception signaling by the VF bit.

If the value of HCR.TGE is 1, then the HCR.FMO bit behaves as 1 for all purposes other than a direct read of the value of the bit.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bit [2]

Reserved, RES0.

SWIO, bit [1]

Set/Way Invalidation Override. Causes EL1 execution of the data cache invalidate by set/way instructions to be treated as data cache clean and invalidate by set/way.

0 This control has no effect on the operation of data cache invalidate by set/way instructions.

1 Data cache invalidate by set/way instructions operate as data cache clean and invalidate by set/way.

When this bit is set to 1, DCISW is executed as DCCISW.

As a result of changes to the behavior of DCISW, this bit is redundant in ARMv8. This bit can be implemented as RES1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

VM, bit [0]

Virtualization enable. Enables stage 2 protection for EL1 and EL0 accesses. This is provided by the EL2-controlled MPU. Possible values of this bit are:

0 EL1 and EL0 stage 2 address protection disabled.

1 EL1 and EL0 stage 2 address protection enabled and attribute combination enabled.

If the HCR.DC bit is set to 1, then the behavior of the PE when executing in a mode other than Hyp mode is consistent with HCR.VM being 1, regardless of the actual value of HCR.VM, other than the value returned by an explicit read of HCR.VM.

When the value of this bit is 1, data cache invalidate instructions executed at EL1 operate as data cache clean and invalidate instructions. For the invalidate by set/way instruction this behavior applies regardless of the value of the HCR.SWIO bit.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the HCR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 0	100	000	0001	1111	0001

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 0	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T1==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.6 HCR2, Hyp Configuration Register 2

The HCR2 characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides additional configuration controls for virtualization.

Configurations


RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

HCR2 is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HCR2 bit assignments are:



Bits [31:7]

Reserved, RES0.

MIOCNC, bit [6]

Mismatched Inner/Outer Cacheable Non-Coherency Enable, for the EL1&0 translation regime.

0 For the EL1&0 translation regime, for permitted accesses to a memory location that use a common definition of the Shareability and Cacheability of the location, there must be no loss of coherency if the Inner Cacheability attribute for those accesses differs from the Outer Cacheability attribute.

1 For the EL1&0 translation regime, for permitted accesses to a memory location that use a common definition of the Shareability and Cacheability of the location, there might be a loss of coherency if the Inner Cacheability attribute for those accesses differs from the Outer Cacheability attribute.

For more information see "Mismatched memory attributes" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The value of this field has no effect on translation regimes other than the EL1&0 translation regime.

This field can be implemented as RAZ/WI.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [5:0]

Reserved, RES0.

Accessing the HCR2

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 4	100	100	0001	1111	0001

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 4	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 4	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T1==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.7 HDCR, Hyp Debug Control Register

The HDCR characteristics are:

Purpose

Controls the trapping to Hyp mode of Non-secure accesses, at EL1 or lower, to functions provided by the debug and trace architectures and the Performance Monitors Extension.

Configurations


This register is in the Warm reset domain. Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. On a Warm or Cold reset RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

HDCR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HDCR bit assignments are:



Bits [31:22]

Reserved, RES0.

EPMAD, bit [21]

External debug interface access to Hyp mode Performance Monitors registers disable. This disables access by an external debugger to counters that are reserved for use from Hyp mode:

- 0 Access to all Performance Monitors counters by an external debugger is permitted.
- 1 Access to Performance Monitors counters in the range [HPMN..(PMCR.N-1)] by an external debugger is disabled, unless overridden by ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled().

If the Performance Monitors Extension is not implemented or does not support external debug interface accesses this bit is RES0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bits [20:18]

Reserved, RES0.

HPMD, bit [17]

Hyp Performance Monitors Disable. This control prohibits event counting in Hyp mode by the counters accessible at EL1.

- 0 Event counting by EL1-accessible counters allowed in Hyp mode.
- 1 Event counting by EL1-accessible counters prohibited in Hyp mode.

This control applies only to:

- The event counters in the range [0..HPMN-1].
- If **PMCR.DP** is set to 1, **PMCCNTR**.

The other event counters are unaffected. When **PMCR.DP** is set to 0, **PMCCNTR** is unaffected.

If the Performance Monitors Extension is not implemented, this field is RES0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bits [16:12]

Reserved, RES0.

TDRA, bit [11]

Trap Debug ROM Address register access. Traps EL0 and EL1 System register accesses to the Debug ROM registers to Hyp mode.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 0 | EL0 and EL1 System register accesses to the Debug ROM registers are not trapped to Hyp mode. |
| 1 | EL0 and EL1 System register accesses to the DBGDRAR or DBGDSAR are trapped to Hyp mode. |

If **HCR.TGE** or **HDCR.TDE** is 1, behavior is as if this bit is 1 other than for the purpose of a direct read.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TDOSA, bit [10]

Trap debug OS-related register access. Traps EL1 System register accesses to the powerdown debug registers to Hyp mode.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 0 | EL1 System register accesses to the powerdown debug registers are not trapped to Hyp mode. |
| 1 | EL1 System register accesses to the powerdown debug registers are trapped to Hyp mode. |

The registers for which accesses are trapped are as follows:

- **DBGOSLSR**, **DBGOSLAR**, **DBGOSDLR**, and the **DBGPRCR**.
- Any IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED register with similar functionality that the implementation specifies as trapped by this bit.

———— Note ————

These registers are not accessible at EL0.

If **HCR.TGE** or **HDCR.TDE** is 1, behavior is as if this bit is 1 other than for the purpose of a direct read.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TDA, bit [9]

Trap debug access. Traps EL0 and EL1 System register accesses to those debug System registers in the (coproc==1110) encoding space that are not trapped by either of the following:

- **HDCR.TDRA**.
- **HDCR.TDOSA**.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | Has no effect on System register accesses to the debug registers. |
| 1 | EL0 or EL1 System register accesses to the debug registers, other than the registers trapped by HDCR.TDRA and HDCR.TDOSA , are trapped to Hyp mode. |

Traps of accesses to **DBGDTRRXint** and **DBGDTRTXint** are ignored in Debug state.

If **HCR.TGE** or **HDCR.TDE** is 1, behavior is as if this bit is 1 other than for the purpose of a direct read.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TDE, bit [8]

Trap Debug exceptions. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 This control has no effect on the routing of debug exceptions, and has no effect on accesses to debug registers.
- 1 Debug exceptions generated at EL1 or EL0 are routed to EL2.
All accesses to Debug registers that would not be UNDEFINED if the value of this field was 0 are trapped to EL2.

When `HCR.TGE == 1`, the PE behaves as if the value of this field is 1 for all purposes other than returning the value of a direct read of the register.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

HPME, bit [7]

Hyp Performance Monitors Enable. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Hyp Performance Monitors disabled.
- 1 Hyp Performance Monitors enabled.

When the value of this bit is 1, the Performance Monitors counters that are reserved for use from Hyp mode are enabled. For more information see the description of the HPMN field.

If the Performance Monitors Extension is not implemented, this field is RES0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

TPM, bit [6]

Trap Performance Monitors accesses. Traps EL0 and EL1 accesses to all Performance Monitors registers to Hyp mode.

- 0 EL0 and EL1 accesses to all Performance Monitors registers are not trapped to Hyp mode.
- 1 EL0 and EL1 accesses to all Performance Monitors registers are trapped to Hyp mode.

————— Note —————

EL2 does not provide traps on Performance Monitor register accesses through the optional memory-mapped external debug interface.

If the Performance Monitors Extension is not implemented, this field is RES0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

TPMCR, bit [5]

Trap `PMCR` accesses. Traps EL0 and EL1 accesses to the `PMCR` to Hyp mode.

- 0 EL0 and EL1 accesses to the `PMCR` are not trapped to Hyp mode.
- 1 EL0 and EL1 accesses to the `PMCR` are trapped to Hyp mode.

————— Note —————

EL2 does not provide traps on Performance Monitor register accesses through the optional memory-mapped external debug interface.

If the Performance Monitors Extension is not implemented, this field is RES0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

HPMN, bits [4:0]

Defines the number of Performance Monitors counters that are accessible from EL1 modes, and from EL0 modes if unprivileged access is enabled.

If the Performance Monitors Extension is not implemented, this field is RES0.

HPMN divides the Performance Monitors counters as follows. If software is accessing Performance Monitors counter n then:

- If n is in the range $0 \leq n < \text{HPMN}$, the counter is accessible from EL1 and EL2, and from EL0 if unprivileged access to the counters is enabled. **PMCR.E** enables the operation of counters in this range. **HDCR.HPMD** disables the counters in this range in EL2. The counters in this range are always accessible from the IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED external debug interface.
- If n is in the range $\text{HPMN} \leq n < \text{PMCR.N}$, the counter is accessible only from EL2. **HDCR.HPME** enables the operation of counters in this range.

If this field is set to 0, or to a value larger than **PMCR.N**, then the following CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE behavior applies:

- The value returned by a direct read of **HDCR.HPMN** is UNKNOWN.
- Either:
 - An UNKNOWN number of counters are reserved for EL2 use. That is, the PE behaves as if **HDCR.HPMN** is set to an UNKNOWN non-zero value less than **PMCR.N**.
 - All counters are reserved for EL2 use, meaning no counters are accessible from EL1 and EL0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to the value of **PMCR.N**.

Accessing the HDCR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 1	100	001	0001	1111	0001

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 1	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c1, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T1==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.8 HSCTLR, Hyp System Control Register

The HSCTLR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides top-level control of the system operation in Hyp mode.

Configurations


Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. Otherwise, RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

HSCTLR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HSCTLR bit assignments are:



Bit [31]

Reserved, RES0.

TE, bit [30]

T32 Exception Enable. This bit controls whether exceptions to EL2 are taken to A32 or T32 state:

- 0 Exceptions, including reset, taken to A32 state.
- 1 Exceptions, including reset, taken to T32 state.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [29:28]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [27:26]

Reserved, RES0.

EE, bit [25]

The value of the PSTATE.E bit on entry to Hyp mode.

The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Little-endian. PSTATE.E is cleared to 0 on entry to Hyp mode.
- 1 Big-endian. PSTATE.E is set to 1 on entry to Hyp mode.

If an implementation does not provide big-endian support at Exception levels higher than EL0, this bit is RES0.

If an implementation does not provide little-endian support at Exception levels higher than EL0, this bit is RES1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value.

Bit [24]

Reserved, RES0.

Bits [23:22]

Reserved, RES1.

FI, bit [21]

Fast Interrupts enable. Permitted values of this bit are:

- 0 All performance features enabled.
- 1 Low interrupt latency configuration. Some performance features disabled.

In ARMv8-R:

- If FI == 1, then asynchronous errors and interrupts can interrupt LDM/STM instructions that access Normal memory. The register that provides the base address is restored to its original value and any other modified registers become UNKNOWN.
- Up to two MPUs can determine whether an access is to Normal memory, therefore the value of the FI field depends on whether the appropriate MPU or MPUs allow the access to the location as access to Normal memory.
 - For EL0 and EL1 accesses, this is the combination of the attributes determined by the configuration settings of the EL1-controlled MPU and the configuration settings of the EL2-controlled MPU
 - For EL2 accesses, these are the attributes determined by the configuration settings of the EL2-controlled MPU.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bit [20]

Reserved, RES0.

WXN, bit [19]

Write permission implies XN (Execute-never). For the EL2 translation regime, this bit can force all memory regions that are writable to be treated as XN. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 This control has no effect on memory access permissions.
- 1 Any region that is writable in the EL2 translation regime is forced to XN for accesses from software executing at EL2.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [18]

Reserved, RES1.

BR, bit [17]

Background Region enable for EL2.

- 0 EL2-controlled MPU Background region disabled. Any EL2 transaction that does not match an EL2-controlled MPU region results in a fault.
- 1 EL2-controlled MPU Background region enabled. For EL2 transactions that do not match an EL2-controlled MPU region, the EL2 Background region attributes are used.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bit [16]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [15:13]

Reserved, RES0.

I, bit [12]

Instruction access Cacheability control, for accesses at EL2:

0 All instruction access to Normal memory from EL2 are Non-cacheable for all levels of instruction and unified cache.

If the value of HSCTLR.M is 0, instruction accesses from stage 1 of the EL2 translation regime are to Normal, Outer Shareable, Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable memory.

1 All instruction access to Normal memory from EL2 can be cached at all levels of instruction and unified cache.

If the value of HSCTLR.M is 0, instruction accesses from stage 1 of the EL2 translation regime are to Normal, Outer Shareable, Inner Write-Through, Outer Write-Through memory.

This bit has no effect on the EL1&0 translation regime.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bit [11]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [10:9]

Reserved, RES0.

SED, bit [8]

SETEND instruction disable. Disables SETEND instructions at EL2.

0 SETEND instruction execution is enabled at EL2.

1 SETEND instructions are UNDEFINED at EL2.

If the implementation does not support mixed-endian operation at EL2, this bit is RES1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

ITD, bit [7]

IT Disable. Disables some uses of IT instructions at EL2.

0 All IT instruction functionality is enabled at EL2.

1 Any attempt at EL2 to execute any of the following is UNDEFINED:

- All encodings of the IT instruction with hw1[3:0] != 1000.
- All encodings of the subsequent instruction with the following values for hw1:

11xxxxxxxxxxxx

All 32-bit instructions, and the 16-bit instructions B, UDF, SVC, LDM, and STM.

1011xxxxxxxxxxxx

All instructions in "Miscellaneous 16-bit instructions" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

10100xxxxxxxxxxx

ADD Rd, PC, #imm

01001xxxxxxxxxxx

LDR Rd, [PC, #imm]

0100x1xxx111xxx

ADD Rdn, PC; CMP Rn, PC; MOV Rd, PC; BX PC; BLX PC.

010001xx1xxxx111

ADD PC, Rm; CMP PC, Rm; MOV PC, Rm. This pattern also covers UNPREDICTABLE cases with BLX Rn.

These instructions are always UNDEFINED, regardless of whether they would pass or fail the condition code check that applies to them as a result of being in an IT block.

It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the IT instruction is treated as:

- A 16-bit instruction, that can only be followed by another 16-bit instruction.
- The first half of a 32-bit instruction.

This means that, for the situations that are UNDEFINED, either the second 16-bit instruction or the 32-bit instruction is UNDEFINED.

An implementation might vary dynamically as to whether IT is treated as a 16-bit instruction or the first half of a 32-bit instruction.

ITD is optional, but if it is implemented in the [SCTLR](#) then it must also be implemented in the HSCTLR. If it is not implemented then this bit is RAZ/WI.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [6]

Reserved, RES0.

CP15BEN, bit [5]

System instruction memory barrier enable. Enables accesses to the DMB, DSB, and ISB System instructions in the (coproc==1111) encoding space from EL2:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | EL2 execution of the CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions is UNDEFINED. |
| 1 | EL2 execution of the CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions is enabled. |

CP15BEN is optional, but if it is implemented in the [SCTLR](#) then it must also be implemented in the HSCTLR. If it is not implemented then this bit is RAO/WI.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [4:3]

Reserved, RES1.

C, bit [2]

Cacheability control, for data accesses at EL2:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | All data accesses to Normal memory from EL2 are Non-cacheable for all levels of data and unified cache. |
| 1 | All data accesses to Normal memory from EL2 can be cached at all levels of data and unified cache. |

This bit has no effect on the EL1&0 translation regime.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

A, bit [1]

Alignment check enable. This is the enable bit for Alignment fault checking at EL2:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | Alignment fault checking disabled when executing at EL2.
Instructions that load or store one or more registers, other than load/store exclusive and load-acquire/store-release, do not check that the address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element or data elements being accessed. |
| 1 | Alignment fault checking enabled when executing at EL2. |

All instructions that load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element or data elements being accessed. If this check fails it causes an Alignment fault, which is taken as a Data Abort exception.

Load/store exclusive and load-acquire/store-release instructions have an alignment check regardless of the value of the A bit.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

M, bit [0]

MPU enable for the EL2-controlled MPU. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 EL2-controlled MPU disabled.
See the HSCTLR.I field for the behavior of instruction accesses to Normal memory.
- 1 EL2-controlled MPU enabled.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the HSCTLR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c0, 0	100	000	0001	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c0, 0	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c1, c0, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T1==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.9 HSR, Hyp Syndrome Register

The HSR characteristics are:

Purpose

Holds syndrome information for an exception taken to Hyp mode.

Configurations


RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

HSR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HSR bit assignments are:



EC, bits [31:26]

Exception Class. Indicates the reason for the exception that this register holds information about.
Possible values of this field are:

EC == 000000

Unknown reason.

See [ISS encoding for exceptions with an unknown reason](#).

EC == 000001

Trapped WFI or WFE instruction execution.

Conditional WFE and WFI instructions that fail their condition code check do not cause an exception.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from a WFI or WFE instruction](#).

EC == 000011

Trapped MCR or MRC access with (coproc==1111) that is not reported using EC 0b000000.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an MCR or MRC access](#).

EC == 000100

Trapped MCRR or MRRC access with (coproc==1111) that is not reported using EC 0b000000.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an MCRR or MRRC access](#).

EC == 000101

Trapped MCR or MRC access with (coproc==1110).

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an MCR or MRC access](#).

EC == 000110

Trapped LDC or STC access.

The only architected uses of these instructions are:

- An STC to write data to memory from DBGDTRRXint.
- An LDC to read data from memory to DBGDTRTXint.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an LDC or STC instruction](#).

EC == 000111

Access to Advanced SIMD or floating-point functionality trapped by a HCPTR. {TASE, TCP10} control.

Excludes exceptions generated because Advanced SIMD and floating-point are not implemented. These are reported with EC value 0b000000.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an access to SIMD or floating-point functionality, resulting from HCPTR](#).

EC == 001000

Trapped VMRS access, from ID group trap, that is not reported using EC 0b000111.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an MCR or MRC access](#).

EC == 001100

Trapped MRRC access with (coproc==1110).

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an MCRR or MRRC access](#).

EC == 001110

Illegal exception return to AArch32 state.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an Illegal state or PC alignment fault](#).

EC == 010001

Exception on SVC instruction execution in AArch32 state routed to EL2.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from HVC or SVC instruction execution](#).

EC == 010010

HVC instruction execution in AArch32 state, when HVC is not disabled.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from HVC or SVC instruction execution](#).

EC == 100000

Prefetch Abort from a lower Exception level.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from a Prefetch Abort](#).

EC == 100001

Prefetch Abort taken without a change in Exception level.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from a Prefetch Abort](#).

EC == 100010

PC alignment fault exception.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from an Illegal state or PC alignment fault](#).

EC == 100100

Data Abort from a lower Exception level.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from a Data Abort](#).

EC == 100101

Data Abort taken without a change in Exception level.

See [ISS encoding for an exception from a Data Abort](#).

All other EC values are reserved by ARM, and:

- Unused values in the range 0b000000 - 0b101100 (0x00 - 0x2C) are reserved for future use for synchronous exceptions.
- Unused values in the range 0b101101 - 0b111111 (0x2D - 0x3F) are reserved for future use, and might be used for synchronous or asynchronous exceptions.

The effect of programming this field to a reserved value is that behavior is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE, as described in "Reserved values in System and memory-mapped registers and translation table entries" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

IL, bit [25]

Instruction length bit. Indicates the size of the instruction that has been trapped to Hyp mode. When this bit is valid, possible values of this bit are:

- | | |
|---|-----------------------------|
| 0 | 16-bit instruction trapped. |
| 1 | 32-bit instruction trapped. |

This field is RES1 and not valid for the following cases:

- When the EC field is `0b000000`, indicating an exception with an unknown reason.
- Prefetch Aborts.
- Data Aborts that do not have valid ISS information, or for which the ISS is not valid.
- When the EC value is `0b001110`, indicating an Illegal state exception.

- Note

This is a change from the behavior in ARMv7, where the IL field is UNK/SBZP for the corresponding cases.

The IL field is not valid and is UNKNOWN on an exception from a PC alignment fault.

ISS, bits [24:0]

Instruction Specific Syndrome. Architecturally, this field can be defined independently for each defined Exception class. However, in practice, some ISS encodings are used for more than one Exception class.


The following subsections describe each ISS format.

ISS encoding for exceptions with an unknown reason

This encoding is used by:

- Unknown reason.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:

**Bits [24:0]**

Reserved, RES0.

This EC code is used for all exceptions that are not covered by any other EC value. This includes exceptions that are generated in the following situations:

- The attempted execution of an instruction bit pattern that has no allocated instruction in the current PE mode, including:
 - A read access using a System register encoding pattern that is not allocated for reads at the current Exception level.
 - A write access using a System register encoding pattern that is not allocated for writes at the current Exception level.
 - Instruction encodings for instructions not implemented in the implementation.
- In Debug state, the attempted execution of an instruction bit pattern that is unallocated in Debug state.
- In Non-debug state, the attempted execution of an instruction bit pattern that is unallocated in Non-debug state.
- The attempted execution of a short vector floating-point instruction.

- In an implementation that does not include Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality, an attempted access to Advanced SIMD or floating-point functionality under conditions where that access would be permitted if that functionality was present. This includes the attempted execution of an Advanced SIMD or floating-point instruction, and attempted accesses to Advanced SIMD and floating-point System registers.
- An exception generated because of the value of one of the [SCTLR](#).{ITD, SED, CP15BEN} control bits.
- Attempted execution of:
 - An HVC instruction when disabled by [HCR](#).HCD.
 - An HLT instruction when disabled by [EDSCR](#).HDE.
- An exception generated because of the attempted execution of an MSR (banked register) or MRS (banked register) instruction that would access a banked register that is not accessible from the PE mode at which the instruction was executed.

Note

An exception is generated only if the CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE behavior of the instruction is that it is UNDEFINED, see "MSR/MRS banked registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

- Attempted execution, in Debug state, of:
 - A DCPS1 instruction from EL0 when the value of [HCR](#).TGE is 1.
 - A DCPS2 instruction at EL1 or EL0 when the value of [EDSCR](#).HDD is 1 or when EL2 is not implemented.


"Undefined Instruction exception, when HCR.TGE is set to 1" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile describes the configuration settings for a trap that returns an HSR.EC value of 0b000000.

ISS encoding for an exception from a WFI or WFE instruction

This encoding is used by:

- Trapped WFI or WFE instruction execution.
Conditional WFE and WFI instructions that fail their condition code check do not cause an exception.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



CV, bit [24]

Condition code valid. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 The COND field is not valid.
- 1 The COND field is valid.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether CV is set to 1 or set to 0. See the description of the COND field for more information.

COND, bits [23:20]

The condition code for the trapped instruction.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1 and:

- If the instruction is conditional, COND is set to the condition code field value from the instruction.
- If the instruction is unconditional, COND is set to 0b1110.

A conditional A32 instruction that is known to pass its condition code check can be presented either:

- With COND set to 0b1110, the value for unconditional.
- With the COND value held in the instruction.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:

- CV is set to 0 and COND is set to an UNKNOWN value. Software must examine the SPSR.IT field to determine the condition, if any, of the T32 instruction.
- CV is set to 1 and COND is set to the condition code for the condition that applied to the instruction.

For an implementation that, for both A32 and T32 instructions, takes an exception on a trapped conditional instruction only if the instruction passes its condition code check, these definitions mean that when CV is set to 1 it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the COND field is set to 0b1110, or to the value of any condition that applied to the instruction.

Bits [19:1]

Reserved, RES0.

TI, bit [0]

Trapped instruction. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 WFI trapped.
- 1 WFE trapped.


"Trapping use of the WFI and WFE instructions" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile describes the configuration settings for this trap.

ISS encoding for an exception from an MCR or MRC access

This encoding is used by:

- Trapped MCR or MRC access with (coproc==1111) that is not reported using EC 0b000000.
- Trapped MCR or MRC access with (coproc==1110).
- Trapped VMRS access, from ID group trap, that is not reported using EC 0b000111.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



CV, bit [24]

Condition code valid. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 The COND field is not valid.
- 1 The COND field is valid.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether CV is set to 1 or set to 0. See the description of the COND field for more information.

COND, bits [23:20]

The condition code for the trapped instruction.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1 and:

- If the instruction is conditional, COND is set to the condition code field value from the instruction.
- If the instruction is unconditional, COND is set to 0b1110.

A conditional A32 instruction that is known to pass its condition code check can be presented either:

- With COND set to 0b1110, the value for unconditional.
- With the COND value held in the instruction.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:

- CV is set to 0 and COND is set to an UNKNOWN value. Software must examine the SPSR.IT field to determine the condition, if any, of the T32 instruction.
- CV is set to 1 and COND is set to the condition code for the condition that applied to the instruction.

For an implementation that, for both A32 and T32 instructions, takes an exception on a trapped conditional instruction only if the instruction passes its condition code check, these definitions mean that when CV is set to 1 it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the COND field is set to 0b1110, or to the value of any condition that applied to the instruction.

Opc2, bits [19:17]

The Opc2 value from the issued instruction.

For a trapped VMRS access, holds the value 0b000.

Opc1, bits [16:14]

The Opc1 value from the issued instruction.

For a trapped VMRS access, holds the value 0b111.

CRn, bits [13:10]

The CRn value from the issued instruction.

For a trapped VMRS access, holds the reg field from the VMRS instruction encoding.

Bit [9]

Reserved, RES0.

Rt, bits [8:5]

The Rt value from the issued instruction, the general-purpose register used for the transfer.

CRm, bits [4:1]

The CRm value from the issued instruction.

For a trapped VMRS access, holds the value 0b0000.

Direction, bit [0]

Indicates the direction of the trapped instruction. The possible values of this bit are:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | Write to System register space. MCR instruction. |
| 1 | Read from System register space. MRC or VMRS instruction. |

The following sections describe configuration settings for traps that are reported using EC value 0b000011:

- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL0 and PL1 accesses to the ID registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL0 and PL1 accesses to lockdown, DMA, and TCM operations" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL1 execution of cache maintenance instructions" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL1 execution of TLB maintenance instructions" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL1 accesses to the Auxiliary Control Register" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL0 and PL1 accesses to Performance Monitors registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL1 accesses to the CPACR" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL1 accesses to virtual memory control registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "General trapping to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL0 and PL1 accesses to CP15 System registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The following sections describe configuration settings for traps that are reported using EC value 0b000101:

- "ID group 0, Primary device identification registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure CP14 accesses to trace registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Trapping CP14 accesses to Debug ROM registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Trapping CP14 accesses to powerdown debug registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Trapping general CP14 accesses to debug registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The following sections describe configuration settings for traps that are reported using EC value 0b001000:


- "ID group 0, Primary device identification registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "ID group 3, Detailed feature identification registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

ISS encoding for an exception from an MCRR or MRRC access

This encoding is used by:

- Trapped MCRR or MRRC access with (coproc==1111) that is not reported using EC 0b000000.
- Trapped MRRC access with (coproc==1110).

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



CV, bit [24]

Condition code valid. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 The COND field is not valid.
- 1 The COND field is valid.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether CV is set to 1 or set to 0. See the description of the COND field for more information.

COND, bits [23:20]

The condition code for the trapped instruction.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1 and:

- If the instruction is conditional, COND is set to the condition code field value from the instruction.
- If the instruction is unconditional, COND is set to 0b1110.

A conditional A32 instruction that is known to pass its condition code check can be presented either:

- With COND set to 0b1110, the value for unconditional.
- With the COND value held in the instruction.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:

- CV is set to 0 and COND is set to an UNKNOWN value. Software must examine the SPSR.IT field to determine the condition, if any, of the T32 instruction.
- CV is set to 1 and COND is set to the condition code for the condition that applied to the instruction.

For an implementation that, for both A32 and T32 instructions, takes an exception on a trapped conditional instruction only if the instruction passes its condition code check, these definitions mean that when CV is set to 1 it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the COND field is set to 0b1110, or to the value of any condition that applied to the instruction.

Opc1, bits [19:16]

The Opc1 value from the issued instruction.

Bits [15:14]

Reserved, RES0.

Rt2, bits [13:10]

The Rt2 value from the issued instruction, the second general-purpose register used for the transfer.

Bit [9]

Reserved, RES0.

Rt, bits [8:5]

The Rt value from the issued instruction, the first general-purpose register used for the transfer.

CRm, bits [4:1]

The CRm value from the issued instruction.

Direction, bit [0]

Indicates the direction of the trapped instruction. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Write to System register space. MCRR instruction.
- 1 Read from System register space. MRRC instruction.

The following sections describe configuration settings for traps that are reported using EC value 0b000100:

- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL1 accesses to virtual memory control registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "General trapping to Hyp mode of Non-secure PL0 and PL1 accesses to CP15 System registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The following sections describe configuration settings for traps that are reported using EC value 0b001100:


- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure CP14 accesses to trace registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Trapping CP14 accesses to Debug ROM registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

ISS encoding for an exception from an LDC or STC instruction

This encoding is used by:

- Trapped LDC or STC access.
The only architected uses of these instructions are:
 - An STC to write data to memory from DBGDTRRXint.
 - An LDC to read data from memory to DBGDTRTXint.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



CV, bit [24]

Condition code valid. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 The COND field is not valid.
- 1 The COND field is valid.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether CV is set to 1 or set to 0. See the description of the COND field for more information.

COND, bits [23:20]

The condition code for the trapped instruction.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1 and:

- If the instruction is conditional, COND is set to the condition code field value from the instruction.
- If the instruction is unconditional, COND is set to 0b1110.

A conditional A32 instruction that is known to pass its condition code check can be presented either:

- With COND set to 0b1110, the value for unconditional.
- With the COND value held in the instruction.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:

- CV is set to 0 and COND is set to an UNKNOWN value. Software must examine the SPSR.IT field to determine the condition, if any, of the T32 instruction.
- CV is set to 1 and COND is set to the condition code for the condition that applied to the instruction.

For an implementation that, for both A32 and T32 instructions, takes an exception on a trapped conditional instruction only if the instruction passes its condition code check, these definitions mean that when CV is set to 1 it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the COND field is set to 0b1110, or to the value of any condition that applied to the instruction.

imm8, bits [19:12]

The immediate value from the issued instruction.

Bits [11:9]

Reserved, RES0.

Rn, bits [8:5]

The Rn value from the issued instruction. Valid only when AM[2] is 0, indicating an immediate form of the LDC or STC instruction.

When AM[2] is 1, indicating a literal form of the LDC or STC instruction, this field is UNKNOWN.

Offset, bit [4]

Indicates whether the offset is added or subtracted:

- | | |
|---|------------------|
| 0 | Subtract offset. |
| 1 | Add offset. |

This bit corresponds to the U bit in the instruction encoding.

AM, bits [3:1]

Addressing mode. The permitted values of this field are:

- | | |
|-----|---|
| 000 | Immediate unindexed. |
| 001 | Immediate post-indexed. |
| 010 | Immediate offset. |
| 011 | Immediate pre-indexed. |
| 100 | Literal unindexed.
LDC instruction in A32 instruction set only.
For a trapped STC instruction or a trapped T32 LDC instruction this encoding is reserved. |
| 110 | Literal offset.
LDC instruction only.
For a trapped STC instruction, this encoding is reserved. |

The values 0b101 and 0b111 are reserved. The effect of programming this field to a reserved value is that behavior is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE, as described in "Unallocated values in fields of AArch32 System registers and translation table entries" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

Bit [2] in this subfield indicates the instruction form, immediate or literal.

Bits [1:0] in this subfield correspond to the bits {P, W} in the instruction encoding.

Direction, bit [0]

Indicates the direction of the trapped instruction. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Write to memory. STC instruction.
- 1 Read from memory. LDC instruction.


"Trapping general CP14 accesses to debug registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile describes the configuration settings for the trap that is reported using EC value 0b000110.

ISS encoding for an exception from an access to SIMD or floating-point functionality, resulting from HCPTR

This encoding is used by:

- Access to Advanced SIMD or floating-point functionality trapped by a HCPTR. {TASE, TCP10} control. Excludes exceptions generated because Advanced SIMD and floating-point are not implemented. These are reported with EC value 0b000000.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



Excludes exceptions that occur because Advanced SIMD and floating-point functionality is not implemented, or because the value of HCR.TGE or HCR_EL2.TGE is 1. These are reported with EC value 0b000000.

CV, bit [24]

Condition code valid. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 The COND field is not valid.
- 1 The COND field is valid.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether CV is set to 1 or set to 0. See the description of the COND field for more information.

COND, bits [23:20]

The condition code for the trapped instruction.

When an A32 instruction is trapped, CV is set to 1 and:

- If the instruction is conditional, COND is set to the condition code field value from the instruction.
- If the instruction is unconditional, COND is set to 0b1110.

A conditional A32 instruction that is known to pass its condition code check can be presented either:

- With COND set to 0b1110, the value for unconditional.
- With the COND value held in the instruction.

When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:

- CV is set to 0 and COND is set to an UNKNOWN value. Software must examine the SPSR.IT field to determine the condition, if any, of the T32 instruction.
- CV is set to 1 and COND is set to the condition code for the condition that applied to the instruction.

For an implementation that, for both A32 and T32 instructions, takes an exception on a trapped conditional instruction only if the instruction passes its condition code check, these definitions mean that when CV is set to 1 it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the COND field is set to 0b1110, or to the value of any condition that applied to the instruction.

Bits [19:6]

Reserved, RES0.

TA, bit [5]

Indicates trapped use of Advanced SIMD functionality. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Exception was not caused by trapped use of Advanced SIMD functionality.
- 1 Exception was caused by trapped use of Advanced SIMD functionality.

Any use of an Advanced SIMD instruction that is not also a floating-point instruction that is trapped to Hyp mode because of a trap configured in the HCPTR sets this bit to 1.

For a list of these instructions, see "Controls of Advanced SIMD operation that do not apply to floating-point operation" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

Bit [4]

Reserved, RES0.

coproc, bits [3:0]

When the TA field returns the value 1, this field returns the value 1010, otherwise this field is RES0.

The following sections describe the configuration settings for the traps that are reported using EC value 0b000111:


- "General trapping to Hyp mode of Non-secure accesses to the SIMD and floating-point registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Traps to Hyp mode of Non-secure accesses to Advanced SIMD functionality" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

ISS encoding for an exception from HVC or SVC instruction execution

This encoding is used by:

- Exception on SVC instruction execution in AArch32 state routed to EL2.
- HVC instruction execution in AArch32 state, when HVC is not disabled.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



Bits [24:16]

Reserved, RES0.

imm16, bits [15:0]

The value of the immediate field from the HVC or SVC instruction.

For an HVC instruction, this is the value of the imm16 field of the issued instruction.

For an SVC instruction:

- If the instruction is unconditional, then:
 - For the T32 instruction, this field is zero-extended from the imm8 field of the instruction.

- For the A32 instruction, this field is the bottom 16 bits of the imm24 field of the instruction.
- If the instruction is conditional, this field is UNKNOWN.

The HVC instruction is unconditional, and a conditional SVC instruction generates an exception only if it passes its condition code check. Therefore, the syndrome information for these exceptions does not require conditionality information.


"Supervisor Call exception, when HCR.TGE is set to 1" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile describes the configuration settings for the trap reported with EC value 0b010001.

ISS encoding for an exception from a Prefetch Abort

This encoding is used by:

- Prefetch Abort from a lower Exception level.
- Prefetch Abort taken without a change in Exception level.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



Bits [24:11]

Reserved, RES0.

FnV, bit [10]

FAR not Valid, for a Synchronous external abort.

0 HIFAR is valid.

1 HIFAR is not valid, and holds an UNKNOWN value.

This field is only valid if the IFSC code is 010000. It is RES0 for all other aborts.

EA, bit [9]

External abort type. This bit can provide an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED classification of external aborts.

For any abort other than an external abort this bit returns a value of 0.

Bit [8]

Reserved, RES0.

S1PTW, bit [7]

Reserved, RES0.

Bit [6]

Reserved, RES0.

IFSC, bits [5:0]

Instruction Fault Status Code. Possible values of this field are:

000100	Translation fault
001100	Permission fault
010000	Synchronous external abort, other than synchronous parity or ECC error
011000	Synchronous parity or ECC error on memory access
100010	Debug exception, only when the EC value is 0b100001

All other values are reserved. The effect of programming this field to a reserved value is that behavior is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE, as described in "Unallocated values in fields of AArch32 System registers and translation table entries" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The following sections describe cases where Prefetch Abort exceptions can be routed to Hyp mode, generating exceptions that are reported in the HSR with EC value 0b100000:


- "Abort exceptions, when HCR.TGE is set to 1" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Routing Debug exceptions to Hyp mode" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

ISS encoding for an exception from an Illegal state or PC alignment fault

This encoding is used by:

- Illegal exception return to AArch32 state.
- PC alignment fault exception.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



Bits [24:0]

Reserved, RES0.

For more information about the Illegal state exception, see:

- "Illegal changes to PSTATE.M" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Illegal return events from AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Legal exception returns that set PSTATE.IL to 1" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "The Illegal Execution state exception" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.


For more information about the PC alignment fault exception, see "Branching to an unaligned PC" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

ISS encoding for an exception from a Data Abort

This encoding is used by:

- Data Abort from a lower Exception level.
- Data Abort taken without a change in Exception level.

The ISS encoding for these exceptions is:



ISV, bit [24]

Instruction syndrome valid. Indicates whether the syndrome information in ISS[23:14] is valid.

0 No valid instruction syndrome. ISS[23:14] are RES0.

1 ISS[23:14] hold a valid instruction syndrome.

This bit is 0 for all faults except Data Aborts generated by stage 2 address translations for which all the following apply to the instruction that generated the Data Abort exception:

- The instruction is an LDR, LDA, LDRT, LDRSH, LDRSHT, LDRH, LDAH, LDRHT, LDRSB, LDRSBT, LDRB, LDAB, LDRBT, STR, STL, STRT, STRH, STLH, STRHT, STRB, STLB, or STRBT instruction.
- The instruction is not performing register writeback.
- The instruction is not using the PC as a source or destination register.

For these cases, ISV is UNKNOWN if the exception was generated in Debug state in memory access mode, as described in "Data Aborts in Memory access mode" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile, and otherwise indicates whether ISS[23:14] hold a valid syndrome.

————— Note —————

In the A32 instruction set, LDR*T and STR*T instructions always perform register writeback and therefore never return a valid instruction syndrome.

SAS, bits [23:22]

Syndrome Access Size. When ISV is 1, indicates the size of the access attempted by the faulting operation.

- | | |
|----|------------|
| 00 | Byte |
| 01 | Halfword |
| 10 | Word |
| 11 | Doubleword |

This field is UNKNOWN when the value of ISV is UNKNOWN.

This field is RES0 when the value of ISV is 0.

SSE, bit [21]

Syndrome Sign Extend. When ISV is 1, for a byte, halfword, or word load operation, indicates whether the data item must be sign extended. For these cases, the possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Sign-extension not required.
- 1 Data item must be sign-extended.

For all other operations this bit is 0.

This field is UNKNOWN when the value of ISV is UNKNOWN.

This field is RES0 when the value of ISV is 0.

Bit [20]

Reserved, RES0.

SRT, bits [19:16]

Syndrome Register transfer. When ISV is 1, the register number of the Rt operand of the faulting instruction.

This field is UNKNOWN when the value of ISV is UNKNOWN.

This field is RES0 when the value of ISV is 0.

Bit [15]

Reserved, RES0.

AR, bit [14]

Acquire/Release. When ISV is 1, the possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Instruction did not have acquire/release semantics.
- 1 Instruction did have acquire/release semantics.

This field is UNKNOWN when the value of ISV is UNKNOWN.

This field is RES0 when the value of ISV is 0.

Bits [13:11]

Reserved, RES0.

FnV, bit [10]

FAR not Valid, for a Synchronous external abort.

- 0 HDFAR is valid.
- 1 HDFAR is not valid, and holds an UNKNOWN value.

This field is valid only if the DFSC code is 0b010000. It is RES0 for all other aborts.

EA, bit [9]

External abort type. This bit can provide an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED classification of external aborts.

For any abort other than an external abort this bit returns a value of 0.

CM, bit [8]

Cache maintenance. For a synchronous fault, identifies fault that comes from a cache maintenance or address translation instruction. For synchronous faults, the possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Fault not generated by a cache maintenance or address translation instruction.
- 1 Fault generated by a cache maintenance or address translation instruction.

S1PTW, bit [7]

Reserved, RES0.

WnR, bit [6]

Write not Read. Indicates whether a synchronous abort was caused by a write instruction or a read instruction. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Abort caused by a read instruction.
- 1 Abort caused by a write instruction.

For faults on cache maintenance and address translation instructions, this bit always returns a value of 1.

For an asynchronous Data Abort exception this bit is UNKNOWN.

DFSC, bits [5:0]

Data Fault Status Code. Possible values of this field are:

- 000100 Translation fault
- 001100 Permission fault
- 010000 Synchronous external abort, other than synchronous parity or ECC error
- 011000 Synchronous parity or ECC error on memory access
- 010001 SError interrupt
- 011001 Serror interrupt, parity or ECC error on memory access
- 100001 Alignment fault
- 100010 Debug exception, only when the EC value is 0b100100
- 110100 IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED fault (Cache lockdown fault)
- 110101 IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED fault (Unsupported Exclusive access fault)

All other values are reserved. The effect of programming this field to a reserved value is that behavior is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE, as described in "Unallocated values in fields of AArch32 System registers and translation table entries" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The following describe cases where Data Abort exceptions can be routed to Hyp mode, generating exceptions that are reported in the HSR with EC value 0b100100:

- "Abort exceptions, when HCR.TGE is set to 1" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Routing Debug exceptions to Hyp mode" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

The following describe cases that can cause a Data Abort exception that is taken to Hyp mode, and reported in the HSR with EC value of 0b100000 or 0b100100:

- "Hyp mode control of Non-secure access permissions" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
- "Memory fault reporting in Hyp mode" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

Accessing the HSR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c5, c2, 0	100	000	0101	1111	0010

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c5, c2, 0	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c5, c2, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T5==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.10 ID_MMFR0, Memory Model Feature Register 0

The ID_MMFR0 characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about the implemented memory model and memory management support in AArch32.

Configurations

There are no configuration notes.

Attributes

ID_MMFR0 is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The ID_MMFR0 bit assignments are:

31	28	27	24	23	20	19	16	15	12	11	8	7	4	3	0
InnerShr	FCSE	AuxReg	TCM	ShareLvl	OuterShr	PMSA	VMSA								

InnerShr, bits [31:28]

Innermost Shareability. Indicates the innermost Shareability domain implemented. Defined values are:

- 0000 Implemented as Non-cacheable.
- 0001 Implemented with hardware coherency support.
- 1111 Shareability ignored.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the permitted values are 0000, 0001, and 1111.

This field is valid only if the implementation supports two levels of Shareability, as indicated by ID_MMFR0.ShareLvl having the value 0001.

When ID_MMFR0.ShareLvl is zero, this field is UNK.

FCSE, bits [27:24]

Indicates whether the implementation includes the FCSE. Defined values are:

- 0000 Not supported.
- 0001 Support for FCSE.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0000.

AuxReg, bits [23:20]

Auxiliary Registers. Indicates support for Auxiliary registers. Defined values are:

- 0000 None supported.
- 0001 Support for Auxiliary Control Register only.
- 0010 Support for Auxiliary Fault Status Registers (AIFSR and ADFSR) and Auxiliary Control Register.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0010.

Note

Accesses to unimplemented Auxiliary registers are UNDEFINED.

TCM, bits [19:16]

Indicates support for TCMs and associated DMAs. Defined values are:

- 0000 Not supported.
- 0001 Support is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. ARMv7 requires this setting.
- 0010 Support for TCM only, ARMv6 implementation.
- 0011 Support for TCM and DMA, ARMv6 implementation.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the permitted values are 0000 and 0001.

ShareLvl, bits [15:12]

Shareability Levels. Indicates the number of Shareability levels implemented. Defined values are:

- 0000 One level of shareability implemented.
- 0001 Two levels of shareability implemented.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0001.

OuterShr, bits [11:8]

Outermost Shareability. Indicates the outermost Shareability domain implemented. Defined values are:

- 0000 Implemented as Non-cacheable.
- 0001 Implemented with hardware coherency support.
- 1111 Shareability ignored.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the permitted values are 0000, 0001, and 1111.

PMSA, bits [7:4]

Indicates support for a PMSA. Defined values are:

- 0000 Not supported.
- 0001 Support for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED PMSA.
- 0010 Support for PMSAv6, with a Cache Type Register implemented.
- 0011 Support for PMSAv7, with support for memory subsections. ARMv7-R profile.
- 0100 Support for ARMv8-R base and limit PMSA.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0100.

VMSA, bits [3:0]

Indicates support for a VMSA. Defined values are:

- 0000 Not supported.
- 0001 Support for IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED VMSA.
- 0010 Support for VMSAv6, with Cache and TLB Type Registers implemented.
- 0011 Support for VMSAv7, with support for remapping and the Access flag. ARMv7-A profile.
- 0100 As for 0011, and adds support for the PXN bit in the Short-descriptor translation table format descriptors.

0101 As for 0100, and adds support for the Long-descriptor translation table format.
All other values are reserved.
In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

Accessing the ID_MMFR0

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c1, 4	000	100	0000	1111	0001

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c1, 4	0	-	RO	RO
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c1, 4	1	-	n/a	RO

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HCR.TID3](#)==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HSTR.T0](#)==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.11 ID_MMFR2, Memory Model Feature Register 2

The ID_MMFR2 characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about the implemented memory model and memory management support in AArch32.

Configurations

There are no configuration notes.

Attributes

ID_MMFR2 is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The ID_MMFR2 bit assignments are:

31	28	27	24	23	20	19	16	15	12	11	8	7	4	3	0
HWAccFlg	WFISall	MemBarr	UniTLB	HvdTLB	L1HvdRng	L1HvdBG	L1HvdFG								

HWAccFlg, bits [31:28]

Hardware Access Flag. In earlier versions of the ARM Architecture, this field indicates support for a Hardware Access flag, as part of the VMSAv7 implementation. Defined values are:

0000 Not supported.

0001 Support for VMSAv7 Access flag, updated in hardware.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0000.

WFISall, bits [27:24]

Wait For Interrupt Stall. Indicates the support for Wait For Interrupt (WFI) stalling. Defined values are:

0000 Not supported.

0001 Support for WFI stalling.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the permitted values are 0000 and 0001.

MemBarr, bits [23:20]

Memory Barrier. Indicates the supported memory barrier System instructions in the (coproc==1111) encoding space:

0000 None supported.

0001 Supported memory barrier System instructions are:

- Data Synchronization Barrier (DSB).

0010 As for 0001, and adds:

- Instruction Synchronization Barrier (ISB).
- Data Memory Barrier (DMB).

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0010.

ARM deprecates the use of these operations. ID_ISAR4.Barrier_instrs indicates the level of support for the preferred barrier instructions.

UniTLB, bits [19:16]

Unified TLB. Indicates the supported TLB maintenance operations, for a unified TLB implementation. Defined values are:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 0000 | Not supported. |
| 0001 | Supported unified TLB maintenance operations are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invalidate all entries in the TLB. • Invalidate TLB entry by VA. |
| 0010 | As for 0001, and adds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invalidate TLB entries by ASID match. |
| 0011 | As for 0010, and adds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invalidate instruction TLB and data TLB entries by VA All ASID. This is a shared unified TLB operation. |
| 0100 | As for 0011, and adds: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invalidate Hyp mode unified TLB entry by VA. • Invalidate entire EL1&0 unified TLB. • Invalidate entire Hyp mode unified TLB. |
| 0101 | As for 0100, and adds the following operations: TLBIMVALIS, TLBIMVAALIS, TLBIMVALHIS, TLBIMVAL, TLBIMVAAL, TLBIMVALH. |
| 0110 | As for 0101, and adds the following operations: TLBIIPAS2IS, TLBIIPAS2LIS, TLBIIPAS2, TLBIIPAS2L. |

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

HvdTLB, bits [15:12]

If the Unified TLB field (UniTLB, bits [19:16]) is not 0000, then the meaning of this field is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED. ARM deprecates the use of this field by software.

L1HvdRng, bits [11:8]

Level 1 Harvard cache Range. Indicates the supported Level 1 cache maintenance range operations, for a Harvard cache implementation. Defined values are:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 0000 | Not supported. |
| 0001 | Supported Level 1 Harvard cache maintenance range operations are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invalidate data cache range by VA. • Invalidate instruction cache range by VA. • Clean data cache range by VA. • Clean and invalidate data cache range by VA. |

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0000.

L1HvdBG, bits [7:4]

Level 1 Harvard cache Background fetch. Indicates the supported Level 1 cache background fetch operations, for a Harvard cache implementation. When supported, background fetch operations are non-blocking operations. Defined values are:

- | | |
|------|---|
| 0000 | Not supported. |
| 0001 | Supported Level 1 Harvard cache background fetch operations are: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fetch instruction cache range by VA. |

- Fetch data cache range by VA.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0000.

L1HvdFG, bits [3:0]

Level 1 Harvard cache Foreground fetch. Indicates the supported Level 1 cache foreground fetch operations, for a Harvard cache implementation. When supported, foreground fetch operations are blocking operations. Defined values are:

0000 Not supported.

0001 Supported Level 1 Harvard cache foreground fetch operations are:

- Fetch instruction cache range by VA.
- Fetch data cache range by VA.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8 the only permitted value is 0000.

Accessing the ID_MMFR2

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c1, 6	000	110	0000	1111	0001

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c1, 6	0	-	RO	RO
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c1, 6	1	-	n/a	RO

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HCR.TID3==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HSTR.T0==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.12 IFSR, Instruction Fault Status Register

The IFSR characteristics are:

Purpose

Holds status information about the last instruction fault.

Configurations


RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

IFSR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The IFSR bit assignments are:



Bits [31:17]

Reserved, RES0.

FnV, bit [16]

FAR not Valid, for a Synchronous external abort.

0 IFAR is valid.

1 IFAR is not valid, and holds an UNKNOWN value.

This field is only valid for a Synchronous external abort. It is RES0 for all other Prefetch Abort exceptions.

Bits [15:13]

Reserved, RES0.

ExT, bit [12]

External abort type. This bit can be used to provide an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED classification of external aborts.

In an implementation that does not provide any classification of external aborts, this bit is RES0.

For aborts other than external aborts this bit always returns 0.

Bits [11:10]

Reserved, RES0.

LPAE, bit [9]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [8:6]

Reserved, RES0.

STATUS, bits [5:0]

Fault status bits. Possible values of this field are:

000100	Translation fault
001100	Permission fault
010000	Synchronous external abort, other than synchronous parity or ECC error
011000	Synchronous parity or ECC error on memory access
100001	PC alignment fault
100010	Debug exception

All other values are reserved.

Accessing the IFSR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c5, c0, 1	000	001	0101	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c5, c0, 1	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c5, c0, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HCR.TVM==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HCR.TRVM==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HSTR.T5==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.13 PAR, Physical Address Register

The PAR characteristics are:

Purpose

Returns the output address (OA) from an address translation instruction that executed successfully, or fault information if the instruction did not execute successfully.

Usage constraints

PAR is accessible as follows:

EL0	EL1	EL2
-	RW	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile. Subject to the prioritization rules:

- If HSTR.T7==1, Accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

Configurations

In ARMv8-R, PAR returns a 64-bit value.

RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

In ARMv8-R, PAR is a 64-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PAR bit assignments are:


For all register layouts:

F, bit [0]

Indicates whether the instruction performed a successful address translation.

- 0 Address translation completed successfully.
- 1 Address translation aborted.

When the instruction returned a 64-bit value to the PAR, PAR.F==0:



This section describes the register value returned by the successful execution of an Address translation instruction. Software might subsequently write a different value to the register, and that write does not affect the operation of the PE.

On a successful conversion, the PAR can return a value that indicates the resulting attributes, rather than the values that appear in the translation table descriptors. More precisely:

- Memory attribute fields are permitted to report the resulting attributes, as determined by any permitted implementation choices and any applicable configuration bits, instead of reporting the values that appear in the translation table descriptors. This applies to the ATTR and SH fields.
- See the NS bit description for constraints on the value it returns.

ATTR, bits [63:56]

Memory attributes for the returned output address. This field uses the same encoding as the Attr<n> fields in MAIR0 and MAIR1.

The value returned in this field can be the resulting attribute, as determined by any permitted implementation choices and any applicable configuration bits, instead of the value that appears in the translation table descriptor.

Bits [55:40]

Reserved, RES0.

PA, bits [39:12]

Output address. The output address (OA) corresponding to the supplied input address. This field returns address bits[39:12].

LPAE, bit [11]

When updating the PAR with the result of the translation operation, this bit is set as follows:

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1 | Long-descriptor translation table format used. This means the PAR returned a 64-bit value. |
|---|--|

IMP DEF, bit [10]

IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

NS, bit [9]

In ARMv8-R, this bit is UNKNOWN.

SH, bits [8:7]

Shareability attribute, for the returned output address. Permitted values are:

- | | |
|----|------------------|
| 00 | Non-shareable. |
| 10 | Outer Shareable. |
| 11 | Inner Shareable. |

The value 01 is reserved.

————— **Note** —————

This field returns the value 10 for:

- Any type of Device memory.
- Normal memory with both Inner Non-cacheable and Outer Non-cacheable attributes.

The value returned in this field can be the resulting attribute, as determined by any permitted implementation choices and any applicable configuration bits, instead of the value that appears in the translation table descriptor.

Bits [6:1]


Reserved, RES0.

F, bit [0]

Indicates whether the instruction performed a successful address translation.

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | Address translation completed successfully. |
|---|---|

When the instruction returned a 64-bit value to the PAR, PAR.F==1:



This section describes the register value returned by a fault on the execution of an Address translation instruction. Software might subsequently write a different value to the register, and that write does not affect the operation of the PE.

IMP DEF, bits [63:56]

IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

IMP DEF, bits [55:52]

IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

IMP DEF, bits [51:48]

IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED.

Bits [47:12]

Reserved, RES0.

LPAE, bit [11]

When updating the PAR with the result of the translation operation, this bit is set as follows:

1 Long-descriptor translation table format used. This means the PAR returned a 64-bit value.

Bit [10]

Reserved, RES0.

FSTAGE, bit [9]

Indicates the translation stage at which the translation aborted:

0 Translation aborted because of a fault in the stage 1 translation.

1 Translation aborted because of a fault in the stage 2 translation.

S2WLK, bit [8]

If this bit is set to 1, it indicates the translation aborted because of a stage 2 fault during a stage 1 translation table walk.

Bit [7]

Reserved, RES0.

FST, bits [6:1]

Fault status field. Values are as in the [DFSR.STATUS](#) and [IFSR.STATUS](#) fields when using the Long-descriptor translation table format.

F, bit [0]

Indicates whether the instruction performed a successful address translation.

1 Address translation aborted.

Accessing the PAR:

To access the PAR when accessing as a 64-bit register:

MRRC p15,0,<Rt>,<Rt2>,c7 ; Read PAR[31:0] into Rt and PAR[63:32] into Rt2
MCRR p15,0,<Rt>,<Rt2>,c7 ; Write Rt to PAR[31:0] and Rt2 to PAR[63:32]

Register access is encoded as follows:

coproc	opc1	CRm
1111	0000	0111

E2.1.14 PMCR, Performance Monitors Control Register

The PMCR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides details of the Performance Monitors implementation, including the number of counters implemented, and configures and controls the counters.

Configurations

System register PMCR[6:0] is architecturally mapped to External register [PMCR_EL0](#)[6:0].

This register is in the Warm reset domain. Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. On a Warm or Cold reset RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

PMCR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PMCR bit assignments are:

31	24	23	16	15	11	10	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0				
IMP				IDCODE				N		RES0		LC	DP	X	D	C	P	E

IMP, bits [31:24]

Implementer code. This field is RO with an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value.

The implementer codes are allocated by ARM. Values have the same interpretation as bits [31:24] of the MIDR.

IDCODE, bits [23:16]

Identification code. This field is RO with an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED value.

Each implementer must maintain a list of identification codes that is specific to the implementer. A specific implementation is identified by the combination of the implementer code and the identification code.

N, bits [15:11]

Number of event counters. A RO field that indicates the number counters implemented. A value of 0b00000 in this field indicates that only the Cycle Count Register PMCCNTR is implemented.

The value of this field is the number of event counters implemented. This value is in the range of 0b00000, in which case only the PMCCNTR is implemented, to 0b11111, which indicates that the PMCCNTR and 31 event counters are implemented.

In an implementation that includes EL2, reads of this field from EL1 and EL0 return the value of [HDCR](#).HPMN.

Bits [10:7]

Reserved, RES0.

LC, bit [6]

Long cycle counter enable. Determines which PMCCNTR bit generates an overflow recorded by PMOVSr[31].

0 Cycle counter overflow on increment that changes PMCCNTR[31] from 1 to 0.

1 Cycle counter overflow on increment that changes PMCCNTR[63] from 1 to 0.

ARM deprecates use of PMCR.LC = 0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

DP, bit [5]

Disable cycle counter when event counting is prohibited. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 PMCCNTR, if enabled, counts when event counting is prohibited.
- 1 PMCCNTR does not count when event counting is prohibited.

If EL2 is not implemented, this field is RES0, otherwise it is an RW field.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

X, bit [4]

Enable export of events in an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED event stream. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Do not export events.
- 1 Export events where not prohibited.

This field enables the exporting of events over an event bus to another device, for example to an OPTIONAL trace macrocell. If the implementation does not include such an event bus then this field is RAZ/WI, otherwise it is an RW field.

In an implementation that includes an event bus, no events are exported when counting is prohibited.

This field does not affect the generation of Performance Monitors overflow interrupt requests or signaling to a cross-trigger interface (CTI) that can be implemented as signals exported from the PE.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

D, bit [3]

Clock divider. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 When enabled, PMCCNTR counts every clock cycle.
- 1 When enabled, PMCCNTR counts once every 64 clock cycles.

This bit is RW.

If PMCR.LC = 1, this bit is ignored and the cycle counter counts every clock cycle.

ARM deprecates use of PMCR.D = 1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

C, bit [2]

Cycle counter reset. This bit is WO. The effects of writing to this bit are:

- 0 No action.
- 1 Reset PMCCNTR to zero.

This bit is always RAZ.

Resetting PMCCNTR does not clear the PMCCNTR overflow bit to 0.

P, bit [1]

Event counter reset. This bit is WO. The effects of writing to this bit are:

- 0 No action.
- 1 Reset all event counters accessible in the current EL, not including PMCCNTR, to zero.

This bit is always RAZ.

In EL0 and EL1, if EL2 is implemented, a write of 1 to this bit does not reset event counters that [HDCR](#).HPMN reserves for EL2 use.

In EL2, a write of 1 to this bit resets all the event counters except PMCCNTR.

Resetting the event counters does not clear any overflow bits to 0.

E, bit [0]

Enable. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 All counters that are accessible at EL1, including PMCCNTR, are disabled.
- 1 All counters that are accessible at EL1 are enabled by PMCNSET unless the value of HDCR.HPMD is 1, in which case event counting by the following counters is prohibited:
 - Counters in the range of 0-n, where n is one less than the value of HDCR.HPMN.
 - PMCCNTR if the value of PMCR.DP is 1.

This bit is RW.

If EL2 is implemented, this bit does not affect the operation of event counters that HDCR.HPMD reserves for EL2 use.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the PMCR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c9, c12, 0	000	000	1001	1111	1100

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c9, c12, 0	0	RW	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c9, c12, 0	1	RW	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

Not dependent on other bits:

- If PMUSERENR.EN==0, accesses to this register from EL0 are trapped to Undefined mode.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HDCR.TPM==1, accesses to this register from EL0 and EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HDCR.TPMCR==1, accesses to this register from EL0 and EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HSTR.T9==1, accesses to this register from EL0 and EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.1.15 SCTLR, System Control Register

The SCTLR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides the top-level control of the system, including its memory system.

Configurations


Fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.

Attributes

SCTLR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The SCTLR bit assignments are:



Bit [31]

Reserved, RES0.

TE, bit [30]

T32 Exception Enable. This bit controls whether exceptions to an Exception Level that is executing at EL1 are taken to A32 or T32 state:

- 0 Exceptions, including reset, taken to A32 state.
- 1 Exceptions, including reset, taken to T32 state.

Bits [29:28]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [27:26]

Reserved, RES0.

EE, bit [25]

The value of the PSTATE.E bit on branch to an exception vector or coming out of reset.

The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Little-endian. PSTATE.E is cleared to 0 on taking an exception or coming out of reset.
- 1 Big-endian. PSTATE.E is cleared to 0 on taking an exception or coming out of reset.

If an implementation does not provide big-endian support for data accesses at Exception levels higher than EL0, this bit is RES0.

If an implementation does not provide little-endian support for data accesses at Exception levels higher than EL0, this bit is RES1.

Bit [24]

Reserved, RES0.

Bits [23:22]

Reserved, RES1.

FI, bit [21]

Fast Interrupts enable. This bit is a read-only copy of the [HSCTLR.FI](#) bit.

UWXN, bit [20]

Unprivileged write permission implies EL1 XN (Execute-never). This bit can force all memory regions that are writable at EL0 to be treated as XN for accesses from software executing at EL1. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 This control has no effect on memory access permissions.
- 1 Any region that is writable at EL0 forced to XN for accesses from software executing at EL1.

WXN, bit [19]

Write permission implies XN (Execute-never). For the EL1&0 translation regime, this bit can force all memory regions that are writable to be treated as XN. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 This control has no effect on memory access permissions.
- 1 Any region that is writable in the EL1&0 translation regime is forced to XN for accesses from software executing at EL1 or EL0.

nTWE, bit [18]

Traps EL0 execution of WFE instructions to Undefined mode.

- 0 Any attempt to execute a WFE instruction at EL0 is trapped to Undefined mode, if the instruction would otherwise have caused the PE to enter a low-power state.
- 1 This control has no effect on the EL0 execution of WFE instructions.

The attempted execution of a conditional WFE instruction is only trapped if the instruction passes its condition code check.

Note

Since a WFE or WFI can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFE of WFI are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFE or WFI is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.

BR, bit [17]

Background Region enable. When the EL1-controlled MPU is enabled, this bit controls how an EL1 access that does not map to any MPU memory region is handled:

- 0 EL1-controlled MPU Background region disabled. Any EL1 transaction that does not match an EL1-controlled MPU region results in a fault.
- 1 EL1-controlled MPU Background region enabled. For EL1 transactions that do not match an EL1-controlled MPU region, the EL1 Background region attributes are used and access is permitted subject to any stage 2 checks.

This bit only applies to EL1 accesses. An EL0 access that does not match an EL1-controlled MPU region always results in a Translation fault.

nTWI, bit [16]

Traps EL0 execution of WFI instructions to Undefined mode.

0 Any attempt to execute a WFI instruction at EL0 is trapped to Undefined mode, if the instruction would otherwise have caused the PE to enter a low-power state.

1 This control has no effect on the EL0 execution of WFI instructions.

The attempted execution of a conditional WFI instruction is only trapped if the instruction passes its condition code check.

————— Note —————

Since a WFE or WFI can complete at any time, even without a Wakeup event, the traps on WFE of WFI are not guaranteed to be taken, even if the WFE or WFI is executed when there is no Wakeup event. The only guarantee is that if the instruction does not complete in finite time in the absence of a Wakeup event, the trap will be taken.

Bits [15:13]

Reserved, RES0.

I, bit [12]

Instruction access Cacheability control, for accesses at EL1 and EL0:

0 All instruction access to Normal memory from EL1 and EL0 are Non-cacheable for all levels of instruction and unified cache.

If the value of SCTL.R.M is 0, instruction accesses from stage 1 of the EL1&0 translation regime are to Normal, Outer Shareable, Inner Non-cacheable, Outer Non-cacheable memory.

1 All instruction access to Normal memory from EL1 and EL0 can be cached at all levels of instruction and unified cache.

If the value of SCTL.R.M is 0, instruction accesses from stage 1 of the EL1&0 translation regime are to Normal, Outer Shareable, Inner Write-Through, Outer Write-Through memory.

Instruction accesses to Normal memory from EL1 and EL0 are Cacheable regardless of the value of the SCTL.R.I bit if the value of HCR.DC is 1.

Bit [11]

Reserved, RES1.

Bits [10:9]

Reserved, RES0.

SED, bit [8]

SETEND instruction disable. Disables SETEND instructions at EL0 and EL1.

0 SETEND instruction execution is enabled at EL0 and EL1.

1 SETEND instructions are UNDEFINED at EL0 and EL1.

If the implementation does not support mixed-endian operation at any Exception level, this bit is RES1.

ITD, bit [7]

IT Disable. Disables some uses of IT instructions at EL1 and EL0.

0 All IT instruction functionality is enabled at EL1 and EL0.

1 Any attempt at EL1 or EL0 to execute any of the following is UNDEFINED:

- All encodings of the IT instruction with hw1[3:0]!=1000.

- All encodings of the subsequent instruction with the following values for hw1:
11xxxxxxxxxxxx
All 32-bit instructions, and the 16-bit instructions B, UDF, SVC, LDM, and STM.
1011xxxxxxxxxxxx
All instructions in "Miscellaneous 16-bit instructions" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.
10100xxxxxxxxxxx
ADD Rd, PC, #imm
01001xxxxxxxxxxx
LDR Rd, [PC, #imm]
0100x1xxx1111xxx
ADD Rdn, PC; CMP Rn, PC; MOV Rd, PC; BX PC; BLX PC.
010001xx1xxx111
ADD PC, Rm; CMP PC, Rm; MOV PC, Rm. This pattern also covers UNPREDICTABLE cases with BLX Rn.

These instructions are always UNDEFINED, regardless of whether they would pass or fail the condition code check that applies to them as a result of being in an IT block. It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the IT instruction is treated as:

- A 16-bit instruction, that can only be followed by another 16-bit instruction.
- The first half of a 32-bit instruction.

This means that, for the situations that are UNDEFINED, either the second 16-bit instruction or the 32-bit instruction is UNDEFINED.

An implementation might vary dynamically as to whether IT is treated as a 16-bit instruction or the first half of a 32-bit instruction.

ITD is optional. If it is not implemented then this bit is RAZ/WI.

UNK, bit [6]

Writes to this bit are IGNORED. Reads of this bit return an UNKNOWN value.

CP15BEN, bit [5]

System instruction memory barrier enable. Enables accesses to the DMB, DSB, and ISB System instructions in the (coproc==1111) encoding space from EL1 and EL0:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | EL0 and EL1 execution of the CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions is UNDEFINED. |
| 1 | EL0 and EL1 execution of the CP15DMB, CP15DSB, and CP15ISB instructions is enabled. |

CP15BEN is optional. If it is not implemented then this bit is RAO/WI.

Bits [4:3]

Reserved, RES1.

C, bit [2]

Cacheability control, for data accesses at EL1 and EL0:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | All data access to Normal memory from EL1 and EL0 are Non-cacheable for all levels of data and unified cache. |
| 1 | All data access to Normal memory from EL1 and EL0 can be cached at all levels of data and unified cache. |

The PE ignores SCLTR.C and data accesses to Normal memory from EL1 and EL0 are Cacheable if the value of HCR.DC is 1.

A, bit [1]

Alignment check enable. This is the enable bit for Alignment fault checking at EL1 and EL0:

- 0 Alignment fault checking disabled when executing at EL1 or EL0.
Instructions that load or store one or more registers, other than load/store exclusive and load-acquire/store-release, do not check that the address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element or data elements being accessed.
- 1 Alignment fault checking enabled when executing at EL1 or EL0.
All instructions that load or store one or more registers have an alignment check that the address being accessed is aligned to the size of the data element or data elements being accessed. If this check fails it causes an Alignment fault, which is taken as a Data Abort exception.

Load/store exclusive and load-acquire/store-release instructions have an alignment check regardless of the value of the A bit.

M, bit [0]

MPU enable for EL1-controlled MPU. Possible values of this bit are:

- 0 EL1-controlled MPU disabled.
See the SCTL.R.I field for the behavior of instruction accesses to Normal memory.
- 1 EL1-controlled MPU enabled.

The PE behaves as if the value of the SCTL.R.M field is 0 for all purposes other than returning the value of a direct read of the field if the value of [HCR.TGE](#) is 1.

Accessing the SCTL.R

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c1, c0, 0	000	000	0001	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c1, c0, 0	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c1, c0, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HCR.TVM](#)==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HCR.TRVM](#)==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HSTR.T1](#)==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2 New System registers

This section contains the description of the System registers that are new in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A.

E2.2.1 HMPUIR, Hypervisor MPU Type Register

The HMPUIR characteristics are:

Purpose

Identifies the number of regions supported by the EL2-controlled MPU.

Configurations

This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

HMPUIR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HMPUIR bit assignments are:

31	8	7	0
RES0			REGION

Bits [31:8]

Reserved, RES0.

REGION, bits [7:0]

The number of EL2-controlled MPU regions implemented.

An EL2-controlled MPU region controls EL2 access and stage 2 of EL1 and EL0 access.

Accessing the HMPUIR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c0, c0, 4	100	100	0000	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c0, c0, 4	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c0, c0, 4	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T0==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.2 HPRBAR, Hypervisor Protection Region Base Address Register

The HPRBAR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides indirect access to the base address of the EL2-controlled MPU region currently defined by [HPRSELR](#).

Configurations


This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

HPRBAR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HPRBAR bit assignments are:



BASE, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with zeroes to form Address[31:0], the lower inclusive limit used as the base address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [5]

Reserved, RES0.

SH[1:0], bits [4:3]

Shareability attribute:

- 00 Non-shareable.
- 01 Reserved, CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE.
- 10 Outer Shareable.
- 11 Inner Shareable.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

AP[2:1], bits [2:1]

Access permissions attribute:

- 00 Read/write at EL2, no access at EL1 or EL0.
- 01 Read/write at EL2, EL1 and EL0.
- 10 Read-only at EL2, no access at EL1 or EL0.
- 11 Read-only at EL2, EL1 and EL0.

For accesses at EL1 or EL0, the access permission attribute applies only when the value of HCR.VM is 1, in which case these stage 2 permissions are combined with the stage 1 permissions for the access.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

XN, bit [0]

Execute never.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the HPRBAR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c3, 0	100	000	0110	1111	0011

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility			
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2	
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c3, 0	0	-	-	RW	
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c3, 0	1	-	n/a	RW	

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T6==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.3 HPRBAR<n>, Hypervisor Protection Region Base Address Registers, n = 0 - 31

The HPRBAR<n> characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides access to the base addresses for the first 32 defined EL2-controlled MPU regions.

Configurations


These registers are available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

HPRBAR<n> is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HPRBAR<n> bit assignments are:



BASE, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with zeroes to form Address[31:0], the lower inclusive limit used as the base address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [5]

Reserved, RES0.

SH[1:0], bits [4:3]

Shareability attribute:

- 00 Non-shareable.
- 01 Reserved, CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE.
- 10 Outer Shareable.
- 11 Inner Shareable.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

AP[2:1], bits [2:1]

Access permissions attribute:

- 00 Read/write at EL2, no access at EL1 or EL0.
- 01 Read/write at EL2, EL1 and EL0.
- 10 Read-only at EL2, no access at EL1 or EL0.
- 11 Read-only at EL2, EL1 and EL0.

For accesses at EL1 or EL0, the access permission attribute applies only when the value of HCR.VM is 1, in which case these stage 2 permissions are combined with the stage 1 permissions for the access.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

XN, bit [0]

Execute never.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the HPRBAR<n>

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>			0110	1111	

Direct access is provided to HPRBAR0-HPRBAR31. HPRBAR<n>, can be accessed via MCR/MRC p15,i,<Rt>,c6,cj,k where:

i = '00' : n[4]

j = '1' : n[3:1]

k = n[0] : '00'

Registers beyond the number of implemented regions are UNALLOCATED.

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	0	-	-	RW
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T10==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.4 HPRENR, Hypervisor Protection Region Enable Register

The HPRENR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides direct access to the [HPRLAR](#).EN bits for EL2-controlled MPU regions 0 to 31.

Configurations


This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

HPRENR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HPRENR bit assignments are:



ENABLE_bits, bits [31:0]

An alias of the [HPRLAR](#)[31:0].EN bits.

Bits associated with unimplemented regions are RAZ/WI.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the HPRENR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c1, 1	100	001	0110	1111	0001

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c1, 1	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c1, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T6==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.5 HPRLAR, Hypervisor Protection Region Limit Address Register

The HPRLAR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides indirect access to the limit address of the EL2-controlled MPU region currently defined by [HPRSEL](#).

Configurations

This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).


The AttrIndx[2:0] field is associated with the HMAIR0 and HMAIR1 registers.

Attributes

HPRLAR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HPRLAR bit assignments are:



LIMIT, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with the value 0x3F to form Address[31:0], the upper inclusive limit address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [5:4]

Reserved, RES0.

AttrIndx[2:0], bits [3:1]

Selects attributes from within the associated Hyp Memory Attribute Indirection Register:

000	Select the Attr0 field from HMAIR0.
001	Select the Attr1 field from HMAIR0.
010	Select the Attr2 field from HMAIR0.
011	Select the Attr3 field from HMAIR0.
100	Select the Attr4 field from HMAIR1.
101	Select the Attr5 field from HMAIR1.
110	Select the Attr6 field from HMAIR1.
111	Select the Attr7 field from HMAIR1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

EN, bit [0]

Region enable.

0 Region disabled.

1 Region enabled.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the HPRLAR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c3, 1	100	001	0110	1111	0011

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c3, 1	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c3, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T6==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.6 HPRLAR<n>, Hypervisor Protection Region Limit Address Registers, n = 0 - 31

The HPRLAR<n> characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides access to the limit addresses for the first 32 defined EL2-controlled MPU regions.

Configurations

These registers are available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).


The AttrIdx[2:0] field is associated with the HMAIR0 and HMAIR1 registers.

Attributes

HPRLAR<n> is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HPRLAR<n> bit assignments are:



LIMIT, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with the value 0x3F to form Address[31:0], the upper inclusive limit address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [5:4]

Reserved, RES0.

AttrIdx[2:0], bits [3:1]

Selects attributes from within the associated Hyp Memory Attribute Indirection Register:

000	Select the Attr0 field from HMAIR0.
001	Select the Attr1 field from HMAIR0.
010	Select the Attr2 field from HMAIR0.
011	Select the Attr3 field from HMAIR0.
100	Select the Attr4 field from HMAIR1.
101	Select the Attr5 field from HMAIR1.
110	Select the Attr6 field from HMAIR1.
111	Select the Attr7 field from HMAIR1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

EN, bit [0]

Region enable.

0 Region disabled.

1 Region enabled.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the HPRLAR<n>

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>			0110	1111	

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	0	-	-	RW
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	1	-	n/a	RW

Direct access is provided to HPRLAR0-HPRLAR31. HPRLAR<n>, can be accessed via MCR/MRC p15,i,<Rt>,c6,cj,k where:

i = '00' : n[4]

j = '1' : n[3:1]

k = n[0] : '00'

Registers beyond the number of implemented regions are UNALLOCATED.

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T10==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.7 HPRSEL, Hypervisor Protection Region Selector Register

The HPRSEL characteristics are:

Purpose

Selects the region number for the EL2-controlled MPU region associated with the [HPRBAR](#) and [HPRLAR](#) registers.

Configurations

This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

HPRSEL is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The HPRSEL bit assignments are:

31	8	7	0
RES0			REGION

Bits [31:8]

Reserved, RES0.

REGION, bits [7:0]

The region number, HPRSEL<N:0>, where the value is zero extended if $N < 7$.

The size of the region field, N, is $\text{Log}_2(\text{Number of regions supported})$, rounded up to an integer.

For X implemented regions, memory region numbering starts at 0 and increments by 1 to the value X-1.

Writing a value greater than or equal to X is UNPREDICTABLE.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the HPRSEL

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c2, 1	100	001	0110	1111	0010

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c2, 1	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c6, c2, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T6==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.8 MPUIR, MPU Type register

The MPUIR characteristics are:

Purpose

Identifies the number of regions supported by the EL1-controlled MPU.

Regions only support unified instruction and data address spaces; ARMv7 supported separate instruction and data regions controlled by bit 0.

Configurations

This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

MPUIR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The MPUIR bit assignments are:

31	16 15	8 7	0
RES0	REGION	RES0	

Bits [31:16]

Reserved, RES0.

REGION, bits [15:8]

The number of EL1-controlled MPU regions implemented.

An EL1-controlled MPU region controls EL1 and EL0 access.

Bits [7:0]

Reserved, RES0.

Accessing the MPUIR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c0, 4	000	100	0000	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c0, 4	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c0, c0, 4	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T0==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HCR](#).TID1==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.9 PRBAR, Protection Region Base Address Register

The PRBAR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides indirect access to the base address of the EL1-controlled MPU region currently defined by [PRSELR](#).

Configurations


This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

PRBAR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PRBAR bit assignments are:



BASE, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with zeroes to form Address[31:0], the lower inclusive limit used as the base address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [5]

Reserved, RES0.

SH[1:0], bits [4:3]

Shareability attribute:

- 00 Non-shareable.
- 01 Reserved, CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE.
- 10 Outer Shareable.
- 11 Inner Shareable.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

AP[2:1], bits [2:1]

Access permissions attribute:

- 00 Read/write at EL1, no access at EL0.
- 01 Read/write, at EL1 or EL0.
- 10 Read-only at EL1, no access at EL0.
- 11 Read-only at EL1 and EL0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

XN, bit [0]

Execute never.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the PRBAR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c3, 0	000	000	0110	1111	0011

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c3, 0	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c3, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HCR.TVM==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HCR.TRVM==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HSTR.T6==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.10 PRBAR<n>, Protection Region Base Address Registers, n = 0 - 31

The PRBAR<n> characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides access to the base addresses for the first 32 defined EL1-controlled MPU regions.

Configurations


These registers are available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

PRBAR<n> is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PRBAR<n> bit assignments are:



BASE, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with zeroes to form Address[31:0], the lower inclusive limit used as the base address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [5]

Reserved, RES0.

SH[1:0], bits [4:3]

Shareability attribute:

- 00 Non-shareable.
- 01 Reserved, CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE.
- 10 Outer Shareable.
- 11 Inner Shareable.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

AP[2:1], bits [2:1]

Access permissions attribute:

- 00 Read/write at EL1, no access at EL0.
- 01 Read/write, at EL1 or EL0.
- 10 Read-only at EL1, no access at EL0.
- 11 Read-only at EL1 and EL0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

XN, bit [0]

Execute never.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the PRBAR<n>

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>			0110	1111	

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	0	-	RW	RW
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	1	-	n/a	RW

Direct access is provided to PRBAR0-PRBAR31. PRBAR<n>, can be accessed via MCR/MRC p15,i,<Rt>,c6,cj,k where:

i = '00' : n[4]

j = '1' : n[3:1]

k = n[0] : '00'

Registers beyond the number of implemented regions are UNALLOCATED.

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HCR.TVM==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HCR.TRVM==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HSTR.T10==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.11 PRLAR, Protection Region Limit Address Register

The PRLAR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides indirect access to the limit address of the EL1-controlled MPU region currently defined by [PRSELR](#).

Configurations

This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).


The AttrIdx[2:0] field is associated with the MAIR0 and MAIR1 registers.

Attributes

PRLAR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PRLAR bit assignments are:



LIMIT, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with the value 0x3F to form Address[31:0], the upper inclusive limit address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [5:4]

Reserved, RES0.

AttrIdx[2:0], bits [3:1]

Selects attributes from within the associated Memory Attribute Indirection Register:

000	Select the Attr0 field from MAIR0.
001	Select the Attr1 field from MAIR0.
010	Select the Attr2 field from MAIR0.
011	Select the Attr3 field from MAIR0.
100	Select the Attr4 field from MAIR1.
101	Select the Attr5 field from MAIR1.
110	Select the Attr6 field from MAIR1.
111	Select the Attr7 field from MAIR1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

EN, bit [0]

Region enable:

0 Region disabled.

1 Region enabled.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the PRLAR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c3, 1	000	001	0110	1111	0011

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c3, 1	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c3, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HCR.TVM==1](#), write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HCR.TRVM==1](#), read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HSTR.T6==1](#), accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.12 PRLAR<n>, Protection Region Limit Address Registers, n = 0 - 31

The PRLAR<n> characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides access to the limit addresses for the first 32 defined EL1-controlled MPU regions.

Configurations

These registers are available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).


The AttrIdx[2:0] field is associated with the MAIR0 and MAIR1 registers.

Attributes

PRLAR<n> is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PRLAR<n> bit assignments are:



LIMIT, bits [31:6]

Address[31:6] concatenated with the value 0x3F to form Address[31:0], the upper inclusive limit address for the selected memory region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bits [5:4]

Reserved, RES0.

AttrIdx[2:0], bits [3:1]

Selects attributes from within the associated Memory Attribute Indirection Register:

000	Select the Attr0 field from MAIR0.
001	Select the Attr1 field from MAIR0.
010	Select the Attr2 field from MAIR0.
011	Select the Attr3 field from MAIR0.
100	Select the Attr4 field from MAIR1.
101	Select the Attr5 field from MAIR1.
110	Select the Attr6 field from MAIR1.
111	Select the Attr7 field from MAIR1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

EN, bit [0]

Region enable:

0 Region disabled.

1 Region enabled.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the PRLAR<n>

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>			0110	1111	

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	0	-	RW	RW
p15, <opc1>, <Rt>, c6, <CRm>, <opc2>	1	-	n/a	RW

Direct access is provided to PRLAR0-PRLAR31. PRLAR<n>, can be accessed via MCR/MRC p15,i,<Rt>,c6,cj,k where:

i = '00' : n[4]

j = '1' : n[3:1]

k = n[0] : '00'

Registers beyond the number of implemented regions are UNALLOCATED.

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HCR.TVM==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HCR.TRVM==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If HSTR.T10==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.13 PRSEL, Protection Region Selector Register

The PRSEL characteristics are:

Purpose

Selects the region number for the EL1-controlled MPU region associated with the [PRBAR](#) and [PRLAR](#) registers.

Configurations


This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

PRSEL is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PRSEL bit assignments are:



Bits [31:8]

Reserved, RES0.

REGION, bits [7:0]

The region number, PRSEL<N:0>, where the value is zero extended if $N < 7$.

The size of the region field, N, is $\text{Log}_2(\text{Number of regions supported})$, rounded up to an integer.

For X implemented regions, memory region numbering starts at 0 and increments by 1 to the value X-1.

Writing a value greater than or equal to X is UNPREDICTABLE.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the PRSEL

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c2, 1	000	001	0110	1111	0010

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c2, 1	0	-	RW	RW
p15, 0, <Rt>, c6, c2, 1	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If [HCR.TVM](#)==1, write accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HCR.TRVM](#)==1, read accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.
- If [HSTR.T6](#)==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

E2.2.14 VSCTLR, Virtualization System Control register

The VSCTLR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides control and configuration information for PMSA virtualization.

Configurations


This register is available in all implementations that support the ARMv8 Protected Management System Architecture (PMSA).

Attributes

VSCTLR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The VSCTLR bit assignments are:



Bits [31:24]

Reserved, RES0.

VMID, bits [23:16]

Virtual machine identifier.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bits [15:3]

Reserved, RES0.

S2NIE, bit [2]

Stage 2 Normal Interrupt Enable.

0 Feature disabled.

1 Feature enabled. Multi-word accesses are interruptible, regardless of stage 1 attributes, where the access:

- Uses base-restore addressing.
- Is executed at EL1 or EL0.
- Is an access to memory marked as Normal in the corresponding EL2-controlled MPU region.

In ARMv8-R, this field only has any effect when [HSCTLR.FI](#) == 1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

S2DMAD, bit [1]

Stage 2 Device Multiword Access Disable.

0 Feature disabled.

- 1 Feature enabled. Multi-word accesses at EL1 or EL0 that span an aligned 64-bit boundary generate a stage 2 Permission Fault if the memory region is marked as Device in the corresponding EL2-controlled MPU region.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Bit [0]

Reserved, RES0.

Accessing the VSCTLR

This register can be read using MRC with the following syntax:

MRC <syntax>

This register can be written using MCR with the following syntax:

MCR <syntax>

This syntax is encoded with the following settings in the instruction encoding:

<syntax>	opc1	opc2	CRn	coproc	CRm
p15, 4, <Rt>, c2, c0, 0	100	000	0010	1111	0000

Accessibility

The register is accessible in software as follows:

<syntax>	Control	Accessibility		
	TGE	EL0	EL1	EL2
p15, 4, <Rt>, c2, c0, 0	0	-	-	RW
p15, 4, <Rt>, c2, c0, 0	1	-	n/a	RW

Traps and Enables

For a description of the prioritization of any generated exceptions, see "Synchronous exception prioritization for exceptions taken to AArch32 state" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

When EL2 is implemented:

- If HSTR.T2==1, accesses to this register from EL1 are trapped to Hyp mode.

Part F

Differences in ARMv8-R Debug from ARMv8-A

Chapter F1

Differences in ARMv8-R Debug from ARMv8-A

This chapter describes the Debug features of the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile. It contains the following sections:

- *Differences from ARMv8-A invasive debug on page F1-186.*
- *Differences from ARMv8-A non-invasive debug on page F1-187.*
- *Differences from ARMv8-A external debug on page F1-188.*

F1.1 Differences from ARMv8-A invasive debug

Because ARMv8-R implements only AArch32 state:

- Self-hosted debug is always disabled at EL2.
- Self-hosted debug is always enabled at EL1 and EL0.
- EL2 can trap any attempted use of self-hosted debug to Hyp mode.
- The Software Step exception is not implemented.

F1.2 Differences from ARMv8-A non-invasive debug

When the value of [HDCR.HPMD](#) is 1, event counting by the following counters is prohibited at EL2:

- Counters in the range 0 - n, where n is one less than the value of [HDCR.HPMN](#).
- If the value of [PMCR.DP](#) is 1, [PMCCNTR](#).

Other counters are controlled by [HDCR.HPME](#). See [AArch32.CountEvents\(\)](#).

If [ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE, then the following apply:

- When the value of [HDCR.EPMAD](#) is 1, an external debugger cannot access counters in the range a-b, including the values a and b, where:
 - a is the value of [HDCR.HPMN](#).
 - b is one less than the value of [PMCR.N](#).
- For a counter x that is in this range, for accesses using the external debug interface:
 - [PMEVTYPEPER<n>](#) and [PMEVCNTR<n>](#) are RAZ/WI.
 - The register bits [PMOVSCLR_EL0](#), [PMOVSSET](#), [PMCNTENSET](#), [PMCNTENCLR](#), [PMINTENSET](#), and [PMINTENCLR](#) are RAZ/WI.
 - A write of 1 to [PMCR.P](#) does not reset [PMEVCNTR<n>](#) to 0.
- When the value of [HDCR.EPMAD](#) is 1, a read of [PMCFGR.N](#) using the external debug interface returns the value of [HDCR.HPMN](#).
- PC sample-based profiling and Trace are prohibited both:
 - At EL2.
 - When the value of [HCR.TGE](#) is 1.

If [ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE, the external debugger cannot access the PMU registers.

See also [AllowExternalPMUAccess\(\)](#) and [ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#).

F1.3 Differences from ARMv8-A external debug

This section describes how the authentication interface might prevent an external debugger from debugging software executing at

- EL2
- EL0 when the value of [HCR.TGE](#) is 1.

See also [HaltingAllowed\(\)](#).

F1.3.1 Required debug authentication

Any implementation must provide the debug authentication to control:

- Whether the PE can halt.
- Whether non-invasive debug is permitted.

The pseudocode functions, together with the following conditions, define the architectural requirements for debug authentication.

- If [ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE, then [ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE.
- If [ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE, then [ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE.
- If [ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns TRUE, then [ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns TRUE.
- If [ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns TRUE, then [ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns TRUE.

F1.3.2 Recommended authentication interface

The details of the debug authentication interface are IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED but ARM recommends the use of the CoreSight interface, which includes the following signals for external debug authentication:

- **DBGEN**.
- **HIDEN**.
- **NIDEN**.
- **HNIDEN**.

[shared/debug/authentication/Debug_authentication](#) defines the authentication signals **DBGEN**, **HIDEN**, **NIDEN**, and **HNIDEN**. See the *ARM® CoreSight™ v2.0 Architecture Specification*.

If EL2 is not implemented, **HIDEN** and **HNIDEN** are not implemented and the PE behaves as if these signals were tied LOW.

It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED how the authentication signals are driven. The architecture permits, but does not require, PEs within a cluster to have independent authentication interfaces. ARM recommends that any Trace extension has the same authentication interface as the PE it is connected to. For more information, see the *ARM® Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture Specification, ETMv4*.

[Table F1-1](#) shows the debug authentication pseudocode functions and the recommended implementations.

Table F1-1 Recommended implementation of debug authentication pseudocode functions

Pseudocode function	Implementation
ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()	(DBGEN OR NIDEN) AND (HIDEN OR HNIDEN)
ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()	(DBGEN AND HIDEN)
ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()	(DBGEN OR NIDEN)
ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled()	DBGEN

F1.3.3 Halting enabled and prohibited

When `ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()` returns FALSE:

- Halting is prohibited:
 - From EL2.
 - When the value of `HCR.TGE` is 1.
- Writes to `EDRCCR.CBRRQ` are ignored.
- Writes to `EDPRCCR.CWRR` are ignored.
- `EDSCR.TDA` is ignored at EL2.
- `EDSCR.INTdis` does not mask interrupts that are taken to EL2.

For information on behavioral restrictions in ARMv8-R when moving between [EL2 when `ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()` returns FALSE (halting is prohibited)] and [EL1 or EL0 when `ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled()` returns TRUE and the value of `HCR.TGE` is 0 (halting is allowed)], see the information in ARMv8-A about moving between [Secure state with `ExternalSecureInvasiveDebugEnabled()` returns FALSE (halting is prohibited)] and [Non-secure state with `ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled()` returns TRUE (halting is allowed)].

When the PE is in Non-debug state, `EDSCR.HDD` returns the inverse of the value that `ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()` returns.

F1.3.4 Behavior in Debug state

On entry to Debug state:

- If the PE is at EL2 or the value of `HCR.TGE` is 1, `EDSCR.HDD` is set to 0.
- Otherwise, `EDSCR.HDD` is set to the inverse of `ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()`.

When the PE is in Debug state, the value of `EDSCR.HDD` cannot change.

When the value of `EDSCR.HDD` is 1 in Debug state:

- DCPS2 is UNDEFINED.
- Instructions that are executed at EL1 or EL0 that are configured by an EL2 control register to trap to EL2 become UNDEFINED.
- Faults that are generated by the EL2 MPU that would be taken as an exception to EL2 are taken as an exception to EL1. The EL1 fault syndrome registers are updated as for any other exception that is taken to EL1 but the fault status in `DFSR.STATUS` or `DFSR.FS[4:0]` is set to Debug event.

F1.3.5 Halting Step Debug events

The following criteria determine the value that is written to `EDESR.SS` on taking an exception during stepping an instruction:

- Whether halting is allowed at the Exception level that the exception targets. If halting is allowed, the PE must step into the exception.
If halting is prohibited, it must step over it.
- If stepping over the exception, whether the exception handler will return to re-execute the instruction or return to the next instruction. That is, whether the preferred return address of the exception is the instruction itself or the next instruction.

This means that the behavior in the *active-not-pending* state is modified for ARMv8-R.

PE behavior in the active-not-pending state if an exception or debug event is generated

The PE sets `EDESR.SS` according to all of the following:

- The type of exception.
- The target Exception level of the exception.

- Depending on the result of [ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#), whether halting is prohibited at EL2.

If an exception or debug event is generated, the PE sets **EDES.R.SS** to 1 if one of the following applies:

- A synchronous exception is generated by the instruction and at least one of the following applies:
 - The exception is taken to EL1.
 - The exception is taken to EL2 and [ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns TRUE.
 - The exception is an HVC exception.
- An asynchronous exception is generated before executing an instruction, and either:
 - The exception is taken to EL1.
 - The exception is taken to EL2 and [ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns TRUE.

Otherwise **EDES.R.SS** is unchanged. These other cases are either:

- No instruction is executed because either:
 - An asynchronous exception is taken to EL2 and [ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE.
 - An asynchronous debug event caused entry to Debug state.
- An instruction is executed and either:
 - [ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE and the instruction generates a synchronous exception, other than an HVC exception, that is taken to EL2.
 - The instruction generates a synchronous debug event and causes entry to Debug state.

For more information about halting step, see section *Halting Step debug events* in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

Table F1-2 Summary of active-not-pending state behavior

Event	Target Exception level	ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()	Value written to EDES.R.SS
No exception or debug event	Not applicable	x	1
HVC exception	EL2	x	1
Reset	Highest	x	1
Exception, other than HVC exception	EL1	x	1
	EL2	TRUE	1
		FALSE	Unchanged
Debug event	Debug state	x	Unchanged

F1.3.6 Access to debug registers

HIDEN has no effect on the access permissions for debug registers. See [AllowExternalDebugAccess\(\)](#).

Software must be aware that if **HIDEN** is LOW and **DBGEN** is HIGH, an external debugger can modify breakpoint and watchpoint control registers. Self-hosted debug is disabled at EL2, so an untrusted debugger cannot impact software executing at EL2. However, it can impact software executing at EL0 when the value of **HCR.TGE** is 1. If **DBGEN** is HIGH, then such a debugger can also halt the processor at EL1 or EL0 when the value of **HCR.TGE** is 0.

Writes to **OSLAR_EL1** by an external debugger return an error when [ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled\(\)](#) returns FALSE.

Part G

ARMv8-R External Debug Registers

Chapter G1

ARMv8-R External Debug Registers

This chapter contains the description of the external debug registers that are new or redefined in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A. It contains the following section:

- [ARMv8-R external debug register list on page G1-194.](#)

G1.1 ARMv8-R external debug register list

The external debug interface register map is described by:

- [External debug interface register map](#).
- [Performance Monitors external register views on page G1-195](#).
- Cross-trigger interface registers in the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

All other locations are reserved. For information on the external debug registers that are unchanged with respect to ARMv8-A, see the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

Table G1-1 External debug interface register map

Offset	Mnemonic
0x020	EDESR
0x024	EDECR
0x030	EDWAR[31:0]
0x034	EDWAR[63:32]
0x080	DBGDTRRX_EL0
0x084	EDITR
0x088	EDSCR
0x08C	DGDTRTX_EL0
0x090	EDRCR
0x094	EDACR
0x098	EDECCR
0x0A0	EDPCSR
0x0A4	EDCIDS
0x0A8	EDVIDSR
0x300	OSLAR_EL1
0x310	EDPRCR
0x314	EDPRSR
0x400+16×n	DBGBVR<n>_EL1[31:0]
0x404+16×n	DBGBVR<n>_EL1[63:32]
0x408+16×n	DBGBCR<n>_EL1
0x800+16×n	DBGWVR<n>_EL1[31:0]
0x804+16×n	DBGWVR<n>_EL1[63:32]
0x808+16×n	DBGWCR<n>_EL1
0xC00–0xCFC	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
0xD00	MIDR_EL1
0xD20	EDPFR [31:0]
0xD24	EDPFR [63:32]

Table G1-1 External debug interface register map (continued)

Offset	Mnemonic
0xD28	EDDFR[31:0]
0xD2C	EDDFR[63:32]
0xD30	RAZ
0xD38	RAZ
0xD60	EDAA32PFR[31:0]
0xD64	EDAA32PFR[63:32]
0xE80-0xEFC	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
0xF00-0xFFC	Management registers, see Table G1-3 on page G1-196

Table G1-2 Performance Monitors external register views

Offset	Name
0x000+8×n	PMEVCNTR<n>_EL0
0x0F8	PMCCNTR_EL0[31:0]
0x0FC	PMCCNTR_EL0[63:32]
0x400+4×n	PMEVTYPER<n>_EL0
0x47C	PMCCFILTR_EL0
0x600-0x6FC	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
0xA00-0xBFC	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
0xC00	PMCNTENSET_EL0
0xC20	PMCNTENCLR_EL0
0xC40	PMINTENSET_EL1
0xC60	PMINTENCLR_EL1
0xC80	PMOVSCLR_EL0
0xCA0	PMSWINC_EL0
0xCC0	PMOVSSET_EL0
0xD80-0xDFC	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
0xE00	PMCFGR
0xE04	PMCR_EL0
0xE20	PMCEID0
0xE24	PMCEID1
0xE80-0xEFC	IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
0xF00-0xFFC	Management registers, see Table G1-3 on page G1-196

Table G1-3 shows the external management register maps for the following registers:

- ED** These are the external debug registers.
- CTI** These are the Cross-trigger interface registers.
- PMU** These are the Performance Monitors registers.

Some of these registers are required for compliance with the ARMv8 architecture and some are required for compliance with the CoreSight architecture. Other registers are optional. See the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile* for more information.

Table G1-3 CoreSight interface register map of management registers

Offset	Mnemonic		
	ED	CTI	PMU
0xF00	EDITCTRL	CTIITCTRL	PMITCTRL
0xFA0	DBGCLAIMSET_EL1	CTICLAIMSET	-
0xFA4	DBGCLAIMCLR_EL1	CTICLAIMCLR	-
0xFA8	EDDEVAFF0	CTIDEVAFF0	PMDEVAFF0
0xFAC	EDDEVAFF1	CTIDEVAFF1	PMDEVAFF1
0xFB0	EDLAR	CTILAR	PMLAR
0xFB4	EDLSR	CTILSR	PMSLR
0xFB8	DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1	CTIAUTHSTATUS	PMAUTHSTATUS
0xFBC	EDDEVARCH	CTIDEVARCH	PMDEVARCH
0xFC0	EDDEVID2	CTIDEVID2	-
0xFC4	EDDEVID1	CTIDEVID1	-
0xFC8	EDDEVID	CTIDEVID	-
0xFCC	EDDEVTYPE	CTIDEVTYPE	PMDEVTYPE

Chapter G2

Description of the Redefined External Debug Registers

This chapter contains the description of the external debug registers that are redefined in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A. It contains the following sections:

- [Redefined external debug registers on page G2-198.](#)

G2.1 Redefined external debug registers

This section contains the description of the external debug registers that are redefined in ARMv8-R from ARMv8-A.

G2.1.1 DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1, Debug Authentication Status register

The DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1 characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about the state of the IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED authentication interface for debug.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Default
RO

Configurations

External register DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1 is architecturally mapped to System register [DBGAUTHSTATUS](#).


DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1 is in the Debug power domain.

Attributes

DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1 is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1 bit assignments are:



Bits [31:12]

Reserved, RES0.

HNID, bits [11:10]

Hyp non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

- 00 Separate Hyp enable not implemented, or EL2 not implemented.
- 10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.
- 11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

For ARMv8-R:

- If EL2 is implemented, HNID[1] is RAO.
- If EL2 is not implemented, HNID[1:0] are RAZ.

HID, bits [9:8]

Hyp invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

- 00 Separate Hyp enable not implemented, or EL2 not implemented.
- 10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.
- 11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

For ARMv8-R:

- If EL2 is implemented, HID[1] is RAO.
- If EL2 is not implemented, HID[1:0] are RAZ.

SNID, bits [7:6]

Secure non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

SID, bits [5:4]

Secure invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

NSNID, bits [3:2]

Non-secure non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.

11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

NSID, bits [1:0]

Non-secure invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

10 Implemented and disabled. ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE.

11 Implemented and enabled. ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE.

Other values are reserved.

Accessing the DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1:

DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1 can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xFB8

G2.1.2 EDAA32PFR, External Debug AArch32 Processor Feature Register

The EDAA32PFR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about implemented PE features.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	Default
IMP DEF	IMP DEF	RO

Configurations


It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether EDAA32PFR is implemented in the Core power domain or in the Debug power domain.

Attributes

EDAA32PFR is a 64-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDAA32PFR bit assignments are:



Bits [63:16]

Reserved, RES0.

EL3, bits [15:12]

AArch32 EL3 Exception level handling. Defined values are:

0000 EL3 is not implemented.

0001 EL3 can be executed in AArch32 state only.

When the value of [EDPFR.EL3](#) is non-zero, this field must be 0000.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

———— Note ————

[EDPFR](#).{EL1, EL0} indicate whether EL1 and EL0 can only be executed in AArch32 state.

EL2, bits [11:8]

AArch32 EL2 Exception level handling. Defined values are:

0000 EL2 is not implemented.

0001 EL2 can be executed in AArch32 state only.

When the value of [EDPFR.EL2](#) is non-zero, this field must be 0000.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0001.

Note

[EDPFR](#).{EL1, EL0} indicate whether EL1 and EL0 can only be executed in AArch32 state.

PMSA, bits [7:4]

Indicates support for a PMSA. Defined values are:

0000 PMSA not supported.

0100 Support for an ARMv8-R PMSAv8-32.

All other values are reserved. In ARMv8-R, the only permitted value is 0100.

VMSA, bits [3:0]

Indicates support for a VMSA. When the PMSA field is nonzero, determines support for a VMSA. When the PMSA field is 0000, VMSA is supported. Defined values are:

0000 VMSA not supported.

All other values are reserved. In ARMv8-R, the only permitted value is 0000.

Accessing the EDAA32PFR:

EDAA32PFR can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xD60

G2.1.3 EDDEVARCH, External Debug Device Architecture register

The EDDEVARCH characteristics are:

Purpose

Identifies the programmers' model architecture of the external debug component.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Default

RO

Configurations

EDDEVARCH is in the Debug power domain.


Implementation of this register is OPTIONAL.

Attributes

EDDEVARCH is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDDEVARCH bit assignments are:



ARCHITECT, bits [31:21]

Defines the architecture of the component. For debug, this is ARM Limited.

Bits [31:28] are the JEP 106 continuation code, 0x4.

Bits [27:21] are the JEP 106 ID code, 0x3B.

PRESENT, bit [20]

When set to 1, indicates that the DEVARCH is present.

This field is 1 in ARMv8-R.

REVISION, bits [19:16]

Defines the architecture revision. For architectures defined by ARM this is the minor revision.

For debug, the revision defined by ARMv8-R is 0x0.

All other values are reserved.

ARCHID, bits [15:0]

Defines this part to be an ARMv8-R debug component. For architectures defined by ARM this is further subdivided.

For debug:

- Bits [15:12] are the architecture version, 0x6.
- Bits [11:0] are the architecture part number, 0xA05.

This corresponds to the ARMv8-R debug architecture version.

Accessing the EDDEVARCH:

EDDEVARCH can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xFBC

G2.1.4 EDDFR, External Debug Feature Register

The EDDFR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides top-level information about the debug system.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	Default
IMP DEF	IMP DEF	RO

Configurations


It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether EDDFR is implemented in the Core power domain or in the Debug power domain.

Attributes

EDDFR is a 64-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDDFR bit assignments are:



Bits [63:32]

Reserved, RES0.

CTX_CMPs, bits [31:28]

Number of breakpoints that are context-aware, minus 1. These are the highest numbered breakpoints.

Bits [27:24]

Reserved, RES0.

WRPs, bits [23:20]

Number of watchpoints, minus 1. The value of 0b0000 is reserved.

Bits [19:16]

Reserved, RES0.

BRPs, bits [15:12]

Number of breakpoints, minus 1. The value of 0b0000 is reserved.

PMUVer, bits [11:8]

Performance Monitors Extension version. Indicates whether System register interface to Performance Monitors Extension is implemented. Defined values are:

- | | |
|------|---|
| 0000 | Performance Monitors Extension System registers not implemented. |
| 0001 | Performance Monitors Extension System registers implemented, PMUv3. |

1111 IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED form of performance monitors supported, PMUv3 not supported.

All other values are reserved.

TraceVer, bits [7:4]

Trace support. Indicates whether System register interface to a trace macrocell is implemented. Defined values are:

0000 Trace macrocell System registers not implemented.

0001 Trace macrocell System registers implemented.

All other values are reserved.

A value of 0b0000 only indicates that no System register interface to a trace macrocell is implemented. A trace macrocell might nevertheless be implemented without a System register interface.

Bits [3:0]

Reserved, RES0.

Accessing the EDDFR:

EDDFR[31:0] can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xD28

EDDFR[63:32] can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xD2C

G2.1.5 EDPCSR, External Debug Program Counter Sample Register

The EDPCSR characteristics are:

Purpose

Holds a sampled instruction address value.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	OSLK	SLK	Default
Error	Error	Error	RO	RO

Configurations

EDPCSR is in the Core power domain. RW fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values. These apply only on a Cold reset. The register is not affected by a Warm reset and is not affected by an External Debug reset.


Implemented only if the OPTIONAL PC Sample-based Profiling Extension is implemented.

Attributes

EDPCSR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDPCSR bit assignments are:



Bits [31:0]

PC Sample word, EDPCSR. Bits [31:0] of the sampled instruction address value. The translation regime that EDPCSR samples is determined by [EDVIDSR.E2](#).

For a read of EDPCSR[31:0] from the memory-mapped interface, if EDLSR.SLK == 1, meaning the OPTIONAL Software Lock is locked, then the access has no side effects. Otherwise, Reading EDPCSR has the side-effect of updating EDCIDSR and [EDVIDSR](#). However:

- If the PE is in Debug state, or PC Sample-based Profiling is prohibited, EDPCSR reads as 0xFFFFFFFF and EDCIDSR and [EDVIDSR](#) become UNKNOWN.
- If the PE is in Reset state, the sampled value is unknown and EDCIDSR and [EDVIDSR](#) become UNKNOWN.
- If no instruction has been retired since the PE left Reset state, Debug state, or a state where PC Sample-based Profiling is prohibited, the sampled value is UNKNOWN and EDCIDSR and [EDVIDSR](#) become UNKNOWN.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the EDPCSR:

EDPCSR[31:0] can be accessed through its memory-mapped interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0x0A0

G2.1.6 EDPFR, External Debug Processor Feature Register

The EDPFR characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about implemented PE features.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	Default
IMP DEF	IMP DEF	RO

Configurations

It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether EDPFR is implemented in the Core power domain or in the Debug power domain.


For general information about the interpretation of the ID registers see "Principles of the ID scheme for fields in ID registers" in the ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile.

Attributes

EDPFR is a 64-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDPFR bit assignments are:



Bits [63:28]

Reserved, RES0.

GIC, bits [27:24]

System register GIC interface support. Defined values are:

0000 No System register interface to the GIC is supported.

0001 System register interface to version 3.0 of the GIC CPU interface is supported.

All other values are reserved.

AdvSIMD, bits [23:20]

Advanced SIMD. Defined values are:

0000 Advanced SIMD is implemented.

1111 Advanced SIMD is not implemented.

All other values are reserved.

FP, bits [19:16]

Floating-point. Defined values are:

0000 Floating-point is implemented.

1111 Floating-point is not implemented.

All other values are reserved.

EL3, bits [15:12]

AArch64 EL3 Exception level handling. Defined values are:

- 0000 EL3 is not implemented or cannot be executed in AArch64 state.
- 0001 EL3 can be executed in AArch64 state only.
- 0010 EL3 can be executed in either AArch64 or AArch32 state.

When the value of [EDAA32PFR.EL3](#) is non-zero, this field must be 0000.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

EL2, bits [11:8]

AArch64 EL2 Exception level handling. Defined values are:

- 0000 EL2 is not implemented or cannot be executed in AArch64 state.
- 0001 EL2 can be executed in AArch64 state only.
- 0010 EL2 can be executed in either AArch64 or AArch32 state.

When the value of [EDAA32PFR.EL2](#) is non-zero, this field must be 0000.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

EL1, bits [7:4]

AArch64 EL1 Exception level handling. Defined values are:

- 0000 EL1 can be executed in AArch32 state only.
- 0001 EL1 can be executed in AArch64 state only.
- 0010 EL1 can be executed in either AArch64 or AArch32 state.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

EL0, bits [3:0]

AArch64 EL0 Exception level handling. Defined values are:

- 0000 EL0 can be executed in AArch32 state only.
- 0001 EL0 can be executed in AArch64 state only.
- 0010 EL0 can be executed in either AArch64 or AArch32 state.

All other values are reserved.

In ARMv8-R the only permitted value is 0000.

Accessing the EDPFR:

EDPFR[31:0] can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xD20

EDPFR[63:32] can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0xD24

G2.1.7 EDRCR, External Debug Reserve Control Register

The EDRCR characteristics are:

Purpose

This register is used to allow imprecise entry to Debug state and clear sticky bits in [EDSCR](#).

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	OSLK	SLK	Default
Error	Error	Error	WI	WO

Configurations


EDRCR is in the Core power domain.

Attributes

EDRCR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDRCR bit assignments are:



Bits [31:5]

Reserved, RES0.

CBRRQ, bit [4]

Allow imprecise entry to Debug state. The actions on writing to this bit are:

0 No action.

1 Allow imprecise entry to Debug state, for example by canceling pending bus accesses.

Setting this bit to 1 allows a debugger to request imprecise entry to Debug state. An External Debug Request debug event must be pending before the debugger sets this bit to 1.

This feature is optional. If this feature is not implemented, writes to this bit are ignored.

Writes to this bit are also ignored if either:

- External debugging is not enabled (`ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE`).
- EL2 is implemented and Hyp mode external debugging is not enabled (`ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() == FALSE`).

CSPA, bit [3]

Clear Sticky Pipeline Advance. This bit is used to clear the [EDSCR](#).PipeAdv bit to 0. The actions on writing to this bit are:

0 No action.

- 1 Clear the [EDSCR](#).PipeAdv bit to 0.

CSE, bit [2]

Clear Sticky Error. Used to clear the [EDSCR](#) cumulative error bits to 0. The actions on writing to this bit are:

- 0 No action.
- 1 Clear the [EDSCR](#).{TXU, RXO, ERR} bits, and, if the PE is in Debug state, the [EDSCR](#).ITO bit, to 0.

Bits [1:0]

Reserved, RES0.

Accessing the EDRCR:

EDRCR can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0x090

G2.1.8 EDSCR, External Debug Status and Control Register

The EDSCR characteristics are:

Purpose

Main control register for the debug implementation.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	OSLK	SLK	Default
Error	Error	Error	RO	RW

Configurations


EDSCR is in the Core power domain. Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. These apply only on a Cold reset. The register is not affected by a Warm reset and is not affected by an External Debug reset.

Attributes

EDSCR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDSCR bit assignments are:



Bit [31]

Reserved, RES0.

RXfull, bit [30]

DTRRX full. This bit is RO.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TXfull, bit [29]

DTRTX full. This bit is RO.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

ITO, bit [28]

ITR overrun. This bit is RO.

If the PE is in Non-debug state, this bit is UNKNOWN. ITO is set to 0 on entry to Debug state.

RXO, bit [27]

DTRRX overrun. This bit is RO.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TXU, bit [26]

DTRTX underrun. This bit is RO.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

PipeAdv, bit [25]

Pipeline advance. This bit is RO. Set to 1 every time the PE pipeline retires one or more instructions. Cleared to 0 by a write to [EDRCR.CSPA](#).

The architecture does not define precisely when this bit is set to 1. It requires only that this happen periodically in Non-debug state to indicate that software execution is progressing.

ITE, bit [24]

ITR empty. This bit is RO.

If the PE is in Non-debug state, this bit is UNKNOWN. It is always valid in Debug state.

INTdis, bits [23:22]

Interrupt disable. Disables taking interrupts (including virtual interrupts, asynchronous Data Abort exceptions, and SError interrupts) in Non-Debug state.

If `ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() = FALSE`, the value of this field is ignored.

If `ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() = TRUE`, the possible values of this field are:

- | | |
|----|---|
| 00 | Do not disable interrupts. |
| 01 | Disable interrupts taken to EL1. |
| 10 | Reserved. |
| 11 | Disable interrupts taken to EL1. If <code>ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() == TRUE</code> , also disable all other interrupts. |

The value of INTdis does not affect whether an interrupt is a WFI wake-up event, but can mask an interrupt as a WFE wake-up event.

If EL2 is not implemented, the value 0b01 is reserved. If programmed with a reserved value the PE behaves as if INTdis has been programmed with a defined value, other than for a direct read of EDSCR, and the value returned by a read of EDSCR.INTdis is UNKNOWN.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

TDA, bit [21]

Traps accesses to `DBGBCR<n>`, `DBGBVR<n>`, `DBGBXVR<n>`, `DBGWCR<n>`, and `DBGWVR<n>`.

The possible values of this field are:

- | | |
|---|---|
| 0 | Accesses to the registers listed above do not generate a Software Access debug event. |
| 1 | Accesses to the registers listed above generate a Software Access debug event, if <code>OSLSR.OSLK</code> is 0 and if halting is allowed. |

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

MA, bit [20]

Memory access mode. Controls use of memory-access mode for accessing ITR and the DCC. This bit is ignored if in Non-debug state and set to zero on entry to Debug state.

Possible values of this field are:

- 0 Normal access mode.
- 1 Memory access mode.

Bit [19]

Reserved, RES0.

Bit [18]

Reserved, RES1.

Bit [17]

Reserved, RES0.

Bit [16]

Reserved, RES1.

HDD, bit [15]

Hyp debug disabled. This bit is RO. On entry to Debug state:

- If entering Debug state in Hyp mode, this bit is set to 0.
- Otherwise, this bit is set to the inverse of ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled().

In Debug state, the value of the HDD bit does not change, even if ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() changes.

In Non-debug state, HDD returns the inverse of ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled(). If the authentication signals that control ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() change, a context synchronization operation is required to guarantee their effect.

If EL2 is not implemented, this bit is RES0.

HDE, bit [14]

Halting debug enable. The possible values of this field are:

- 0 Halting disabled for Breakpoint, Watchpoint and Halt Instruction debug events.
- 1 Halting enabled for Breakpoint, Watchpoint and Halt Instruction debug events.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Bits [13:10]

Reserved, RES0.

EL, bits [9:8]

Exception level. Read-only. In Debug state, this gives the current EL of the PE.

In Non-debug state, this field is RAZ.

A, bit [7]

Asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt pending. Read-only. In Debug state, indicates whether an asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt is pending:

- If [HCR](#).{AMO, TGE} = {1, 0} and in EL0 or EL1, a virtual asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt.
 - Otherwise, a physical asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt.
- 0 No asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt pending.
 - 1 Asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt pending.

A debugger can read EDSCR to check whether an asynchronous Data Abort or SError interrupt is pending without having to execute further instructions. A pending asynchronous Data Abort or SError might indicate data from target memory is corrupted.

UNKNOWN in Non-debug state.

ERR, bit [6]

Cumulative error flag. This field is RO. It is set to 1 following exceptions in Debug state and on any signaled overrun or underrun on the DTR or EDITR.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

STATUS, bits [5:0]

Debug status flags. This field is RO.

The possible values of this field are:

- 000010 PE is in Non-debug state.
- 000001 PE is restarting, exiting Debug state.
- 000111 Breakpoint.
- 010011 External debug request.
- 011011 Halting step, normal.
- 011111 Halting step, exclusive.
- 100011 OS Unlock Catch.
- 100111 Reset Catch.
- 101011 Watchpoint.
- 101111 HLT instruction.
- 110011 Software access to debug register.
- 110111 Exception Catch.
- 111011 Halting step, no syndrome.

All other values of STATUS are reserved.

Accessing the EDSCR:

EDSCR can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0x088

G2.1.9 EDVIDSR, External Debug Virtual Context Sample Register

The EDVIDSR characteristics are:

Purpose

Contains sampled values captured on reading [EDPCSR](#).

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	OSLK	Default
Error	Error	Error	RO

Configurations


EDVIDSR is in the Core power domain.
Fields in this register reset to architecturally UNKNOWN values.
Required only if the OPTIONAL PC Sample-based Profiling Extension is implemented.

Attributes

EDVIDSR is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The EDVIDSR bit assignments are:



NS, bit [31]

Reserved, RAO.

E2, bit [30]

Exception level 2 status sample. Indicates whether the most recent [EDPCSR](#) sample was associated with EL2.
If EL2 is not implemented, this bit is RES0.
When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

E3, bit [29]

Exception level 3 status sample. RES0.

Bits [28:8]

Reserved, RES0.

VMID, bits [7:0]

VMID sample. The value of [VSCTLR](#).VMID associated with the most recent [EDPCSR](#) sample. If EDVIDSR.E2 == 1, this field is RAZ.
If EL2 is not implemented, this field is RES0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

Accessing the EDVIDSR:

EDVIDSR can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
Debug	0x0A8

G2.1.10 PMAUTHSTATUS, Performance Monitors Authentication Status register

The PMAUTHSTATUS characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides information about the state of the IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED authentication interface for Performance Monitors.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

SLK	Default
RO	RO

Configurations

PMAUTHSTATUS is in the Debug power domain.


This register is OPTIONAL, and is required for CoreSight compliance. ARM recommends that this register is implemented.

Attributes

PMAUTHSTATUS is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PMAUTHSTATUS bit assignments are:



Bits [31:12]

Reserved, RES0.

HNID, bits [11:10]

Holds the same value as [DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1.HNID](#).

HID, bits [9:8]

Hyp invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

SNID, bits [7:6]

Secure non-invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

SID, bits [5:4]

Secure invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

NSNID, bits [3:2]

Holds the same value as [DBGAUTHSTATUS_EL1.NSNID](#).

NSID, bits [1:0]

Non-secure invasive debug. Possible values of this field are:

00 Not implemented.

Other values are reserved.

Accessing the PMAUTHSTATUS:

PMAUTHSTATUS can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
PMU	0xFB8

G2.1.11 PMCR_EL0, Performance Monitors Control Register

The PMCR_EL0 characteristics are:

Purpose

Provides details of the Performance Monitors implementation, including the number of counters implemented, and configures and controls the counters.

Usage constraints

This register is accessible as follows:

Off	DLK	OSLK	EPMAD	SLK	Default
Error	Error	Error	Error	RO	RW

Configurations

External register PMCR_EL0[6:0] is architecturally mapped to System register **PMCR**[6:0].

PMCR_EL0 is in the Core power domain. Some or all RW fields of this register have defined reset values. These apply on a Warm or Cold reset. The register is not affected by an External Debug reset.

This register is only partially mapped to the internal **PMCR** System register. An external agent must use other means to discover the information held in **PMCR**[31:11], such as accessing PMCFGR and the ID registers.

Attributes

PMCR_EL0 is a 32-bit register.

Field descriptions

The PMCR EL0 bit assignments are:

31																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																																													
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Bits [31:11]

RAZ/WI. Hardware must implement this field as RAZ/WI. Software must not rely on the register reading as zero, and must use a read-modify-write sequence to write to the register.

Bits [10:7]

Reserved, RES0.

LC, bit [6]

Long cycle counter enable. Determines which PMCCNTR_EL0 bit generates an overflow recorded by PMOVSr[31].

0	Cycle counter overflow on increment that changes PMCCNTR_EL0[31] from 1 to 0.
---	---

1 Cycle counter overflow on increment that changes PMCCNTR_EL0[63] from 1 to 0.

ARM deprecates use of PMCR EL0.LC = 0.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to a value that is architecturally UNKNOWN.

DP, bit [5]

Disable cycle counter when event counting is prohibited. The possible values of this bit are:

0	PMCCNTR_EL0, if enabled, counts when event counting is prohibited.
---	--

1 PMCCNTR_EL0 does not count when event counting is prohibited.
If EL2 is not implemented, this field is RES0, otherwise it is an RW field.
When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

X, bit [4]

Enable export of events in an IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED event stream. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 Do not export events.
- 1 Export events where not prohibited.

This field enables the exporting of events over an event bus to another device, for example to an OPTIONAL trace macrocell. If the implementation does not include such an event bus then this field is RAZ/WI, otherwise it is an RW field.

In an implementation that includes an event bus, no events are exported when counting is prohibited.

This field does not affect the generation of Performance Monitors overflow interrupt requests or signaling to a cross-trigger interface (CTI) that can be implemented as signals exported from the PE.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, if this field is implemented as an RW field, it resets to 0.

D, bit [3]

Clock divider. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 When enabled, PMCCNTR_EL0 counts every clock cycle.
- 1 When enabled, PMCCNTR_EL0 counts once every 64 clock cycles.

If PMCR_EL0.LC == 1, this bit is ignored and the cycle counter counts every clock cycle.

ARM deprecates use of PMCR_EL0.D = 1.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

C, bit [2]

Cycle counter reset. This bit is WO. The effects of writing to this bit are:

- 0 No action.
- 1 Reset PMCCNTR_EL0 to zero.

This bit is always RAZ.

Resetting PMCCNTR_EL0 does not clear the PMCCNTR_EL0 overflow bit to 0.

P, bit [1]

Event counter reset. This bit is WO. The effects of writing to this bit are:

- 0 No action.
- 1 Reset all event counters, not including PMCCNTR_EL0, to zero.

This bit is always RAZ.

Resetting the event counters does not clear any overflow bits to 0.

If EL2 is implemented and HDCR.EPMAD is set to 1, a write of 1 to this bit does not reset event counters that HDCR.HPMN reserves for EL2 use.

E, bit [0]

Enable. The possible values of this bit are:

- 0 All counters that are accessible at EL1, including PMCCNTR, are disabled.
- 1 All counters that are accessible at EL1 are enabled by PMCNTENSET unless the value of HDCR.HPMD is 1, in which case event counting by the following counters is prohibited:
 - Counters in the range of 0-n, where n is one less than the value of HDCR.

- HPMN. PMCCNTR if the value of PMCR.DP is 1.

This bit is RW.

If EL2 is implemented, this bit does not affect the operation of event counters that [HDCR](#).HPMN reserves for EL2 use.

When this register has an architecturally defined reset value, this field resets to 0.

Accessing the PMCR_EL0:

PMCR_EL0 can be accessed through the external debug interface:

Component	Offset
PMU	0xE04

Part H

Architectural Pseudocode for ARMv8-R AArch32

Chapter H1

ARMv8-R AArch32 Pseudocode

This chapter contains pseudocode that describes many features of the ARMv8-R architecture. It contains the following sections:

- [*Pseudocode limitations in Issue A.b*](#) on page H1-228.
- [*Pseudocode for AArch32 operation*](#) on page H1-229.
- [*Shared pseudocode*](#) on page H1-287.

H1.1 Pseudocode limitations in Issue A.b

- Functions that address both AArch32 and AArch64 functionality might contain cases or comments that apply to only AArch64 state, EL3, Monitor mode, or Secure state and are therefore not applicable to the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile.
- Some functions and comments might contain information related to the Short-descriptor format that is not applicable to the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile.
- Tests might contain clauses that always return TRUE or FALSE in AArch32 state and therefore do not test the ARMv8-R AArch32 profile. For example in ARMv8-R AArch32:
 - `UsingAArch32()` always returns TRUE.
 - `IsSecure` always returns FALSE.
- Assertions that are not applicable to ARMv8-R AArch32 might be present. For example:
 - `assert ELUsingAArch32(S1ValidationRegime())`.
- Enumerations might contain values that are not applicable to ARMv8-R AArch32. For example:
 - `AccType_PTW`.
 - `Fault_TLBConflict`.

H1.2 Pseudocode for AArch32 operation

This section holds the pseudocode for execution in AArch32 state. Functions that are listed in this section are identified as `AArch32.FunctionName`. This section is organized by functional groups, with the functional groups being indicated by hierarchical path names, for example `aarch32/debug/breakpoint`.

The top-level sections of the AArch32 pseudocode hierarchy are:

- [aarch32/debug](#).
- [aarch32/exceptions](#) on page H1-235.
- [aarch32/functions](#) on page H1-249.
- [aarch32/translation](#) on page H1-273.

H1.2.1 aarch32/debug

aarch32/debug/VCRMatch/AArch32.VCRMatch

```
// AArch32.VCRMatch()
// =====

boolean AArch32.VCRMatch(bits(32) vaddress)

    if UsingAArch32() && ELUsingAArch32(EL1) && IsZero(vaddress<1:0>) && PSTATE.EL != EL2 then
        // Each bit position in this string corresponds to a bit in DBGVCR and an exception vector.
        match_word = Zeros(32);

        if vaddress<31:5> == ExcVectorBase()<31:5> then
            match_word<UInt(vaddress<4:2>)> = '1';
            mask = '00000000':'00000000':'00000000':'11011110'; // DBGVCR[31:8] are RES0

            match_word = match_word AND DBGVCR AND mask;
            match = !IsZero(match_word);

            // Check for UNPREDICTABLE case - match on Prefetch Abort and Data Abort vectors
            if !IsZero(match_word<4:3>) && DebugTarget() == PSTATE.EL then
                match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();
        else
            match = FALSE;

    return match;
```

aarch32/debug/breakpoint/AArch32.BreakpointMatch

```
// AArch32.BreakpointMatch()
// =====
// Breakpoint matching in an AArch32 translation regime.

(boolean,boolean) AArch32.BreakpointMatch(integer n, bits(32) vaddress, integer size)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(S1ValidationRegime());
    assert n <= UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs);

    enabled = DBGBCR[n].E == '1';
    ispriv = PSTATE.EL != EL0;
    linked = DBGBCR[n].BT == '0x01';
    isbreakpnt = TRUE;
    linked_to = FALSE;

    state_match = AArch32.StateMatch(DBGBCR[n].SSC, DBGBCR[n].HMC, DBGBCR[n].PMC,
                                      linked, DBGBCR[n].LBN, isbreakpnt, ispriv);
    (value_match, value_mismatch) = AArch32.BreakpointValueMatch(n, vaddress, linked_to);

    if size == 4 then // Check second halfword
        // If the breakpoint address and BAS of an Address breakpoint match the address of the
```

```

// second halfword of an instruction, but not the address of the first halfword, it is
// CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether or not this breakpoint generates a Breakpoint debug
// event.
(match_i, mismatch_i) = AArch32.BreakpointValueMatch(n, vaddress + 2, linked_to);
if !value_match && match_i then
    value_match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();
if value_mismatch && !mismatch_i then
    value_mismatch = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();

if vaddress<1> == '1' && DBGBCR[n].BAS == '1111' then
    // The above notwithstanding, if DBGBCR[n].BAS == '1111', then it is CONSTRAINED
    // UNPREDICTABLE whether or not a Breakpoint debug event is generated for an instruction
    // at the address DBGBCR[n].+2.
    if value_match then value_match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();
    if !value_mismatch then value_mismatch = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();

match = value_match && state_match && enabled;
mismatch = value_mismatch && state_match && enabled;

return (match, mismatch);

```

aarch32/debug/breakpoint/AArch32.BreakpointValueMatch

```

// AArch32.BreakpointValueMatch()
// =====
// The first result is whether an Address Match or Context breakpoint is programmed on the
// instruction at "address". The second result is whether an Address Mismatch breakpoint is
// programmed on the instruction, that is, whether the instruction should be stepped.

(boolean,boolean) AArch32.BreakpointValueMatch(integer n, bits(32) vaddress, boolean linked_to)

// "n" is the identity of the breakpoint unit to match against
// "vaddress" is the current instruction address, ignored if linked_to is TRUE and for Context
// matching breakpoints.
// "linked_to" is TRUE if this is a call from StateMatch for linking.

// If a non-existent breakpoint then it is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether this gives
// no match or the breakpoint is mapped to another UNKNOWN implemented breakpoint.
if n > UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs) then
    (c, n) = ConstrainUnpredictableInteger(0, UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs));
    assert c IN {Constraint_DISABLED, Constraint_UNKNOWN};
    if c == Constraint_DISABLED then return (FALSE,FALSE);

// If this breakpoint is not enabled, it cannot generate a match. (This could also happen on a
// call from StateMatch for linking.)
if DBGBCR[n].E == '0' then return (FALSE,FALSE);

context_aware = (n >= UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs) - UInt(DBGDIDR.CTX_CMPs));

// If BT is set to a reserved type, behaves either as disabled or as a not-reserved type.
type = DBGBCR[n].BT;

if (type IN {'011x', '11xx'}) || // Reserved
    (type == '010x' && HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint()) || // Address mismatch
    (type != '0x0x' && !context_aware) || // Context matching
    (type == '1xxx' && !HaveEL(EL2))) then // EL2 extension
    (c, type) = ConstrainUnpredictableBits();
    assert c IN {Constraint_DISABLED, Constraint_UNKNOWN};
    if c == Constraint_DISABLED then return (FALSE,FALSE);
    // Otherwise the value returned by ConstrainUnpredictableBits must be a not-reserved value

// Determine what to compare against.
match_addr = (type == '0x0x');
mismatch = (type == '010x');
match_vmid = (type == '10xx');
match_cid = (type == 'x01x');
linked = (type == 'xxx1');

```

```
// If this is a call from StateMatch, return FALSE if the breakpoint is not programmed for a
// VMID and/or context ID match, of if not context-aware. The above assertions mean that the
// code can just test for match_addr == TRUE to confirm all these things.
if linked_to && (!linked || match_addr) then return (FALSE,FALSE);

// If called from BreakpointMatch return FALSE for Linked context ID and/or VMID matches.
if !linked_to && linked && !match_addr then return (FALSE,FALSE);

// Do the comparison.
if match_addr then
    byte = UInt(vaddress<1:0>);
    assert byte IN {0,2}; // "vaddress" is halfword aligned.
    byte_select_match = (DBGBCR[n].BAS<byte> == '1');
    BVR_match = vaddress<31:2> == DBGBCR[n]<31:2> && byte_select_match;
elseif match_cid then
    BVR_match = (PSTATE.EL != EL2 && CONTEXTIDR == DBGBCR[n]<31:0>);
if match_vmid then
    vmid = VSCTLR.VMID;
    BXVR_match = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} &&
        vmid == DBGBCR[n]<7:0>);

bvr_match_valid = (match_addr || match_cid);
bxvr_match_valid = match_vmid;

match = (!bxvr_match_valid || BXVR_match) && (!bvr_match_valid || BVR_match);

return (match && !mismatch, !match && mismatch);
```

aarch32/debug/breakpoint/AArch32.StateMatch

```
// AArch32.StateMatch()
// =====
// Determine whether a breakpoint or watchpoint is enabled in the current mode and state.

boolean AArch32.StateMatch(bits(2) SSC, bit HMC, bits(2) PxC, boolean linked, bits(4) LBN,
    boolean isbreakpnt, boolean ispriv)
// "SSC", "HMC", "PxC" are the control fields from the DBGBCR[n] or DBGWCR[n] register.
// "linked" is TRUE if this is a linked breakpoint/watchpoint type.
// "LBN" is the linked breakpoint number from the DBGBCR[n] or DBGWCR[n] register.
// "isbreakpnt" is TRUE for breakpoints, FALSE for watchpoints.
// "ispriv" is valid for watchpoints, and selects between privileged and unprivileged accesses.

// If parameters are set to a reserved type, behaves as either disabled or a defined type
if ((HMC:SSC:PxC) IN {'011xx','100x0','x01xx','x10xx','11101','1111x'}) || // Reserved
    (HMC == '0' && PxC == '00' && !isbreakpnt) || // Usr/Svc/Sys
    (HMC == '1' && !HaveEL(EL2))) then // No EL2
    (c, <HMC,SSC,PxC>) = ConstrainUnpredictableBits();
    assert c IN {Constraint_DISABLED, Constraint_UNKNOWN};
    if c == Constraint_DISABLED then return FALSE;
    // Otherwise the value returned by ConstrainUnpredictableBits must be a not-reserved value

PL2_match = HaveEL(EL2) && HMC == '1';
PL1_match = PxC<0> == '1';
PL0_match = PxC<1> == '1';
SSU_match = isbreakpnt && HMC == '0' && PxC == '00' && SSC != '11';

if SSU_match then
    priv_match = PSTATE.M IN {M32_User,M32_Svc,M32_System};
else
    case PSTATE.EL of
        when EL3, EL1 priv_match = if ispriv then PL1_match else PL0_match;
        when EL2 priv_match = PL2_match;
        when EL0 priv_match = PL0_match;

    case SSC of
        when '00' security_state_match = TRUE; // Both
```

```

when '01' security_state_match = !IsSecure(); // Non-secure only
when '10' security_state_match = IsSecure(); // Secure only
when '11' security_state_match = TRUE;      // Both

if linked then
    // "LBN" must be an enabled context-aware breakpoint unit. If it is not context-aware then
    // it is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether this gives no match, or LBN is mapped to some
    // UNKNOWN breakpoint that is context-aware.
    lbn = UInt(LBN);
    first_ctx_cmp = (UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs) - UInt(DBGDIDR.CTX_CMPS));
    last_ctx_cmp = UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs);
    if (lbn < first_ctx_cmp || lbn > last_ctx_cmp) then
        (c, lbn) = ConstrainUnpredictableInteger(first_ctx_cmp, last_ctx_cmp);
        assert c IN {Constraint_DISABLED, Constraint_NONE, Constraint_UNKNOWN};
        case c of
            when Constraint_DISABLED return FALSE; // Disabled
            when Constraint_NONE linked = FALSE; // No linking
            // Otherwise ConstrainUnpredictableInteger returned a context-aware breakpoint

if linked then
    vaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    linked_to = TRUE;
    (linked_match, -) = AArch32.BreakpointValueMatch(lbn, vaddress, linked_to);

return priv_match && security_state_match && (!linked || linked_match);

```

aarch32/debug/enables/AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions

```

// AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions()
// =====

boolean AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions()
    return AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptionsFrom(PSTATE.EL, IsSecure());

```

aarch32/debug/enables/AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptionsFrom

```

// AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptionsFrom()
// =====

boolean AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptionsFrom(bits(2) from, boolean secure)

    if DBGOSLSR.OSLK == '1' || DoubleLockStatus() || Halted() then
        return FALSE;

    enabled = from != EL2;

    return enabled;

```

aarch32/debug/pmu/AArch32.CheckForPMUOverflow

```

// AArch32.CheckForPMUOverflow()
// =====
// Signal Performance Monitors overflow IRQ and CTI overflow events

boolean AArch32.CheckForPMUOverflow()

    pmuirq = (PMCR.E == '1' && PMINTENSET<31> == '1' && PMOVSSET<31> == '1');
    for n = 0 to UInt(PMCR.N) - 1
        if HaveEL(EL2) then
            hpmn = HDCR.HPMN;
            hpme = HDCR.HPME;
            E = (if n < UInt(hpmn) then PMCR.E else hpme);
        else
            E = PMCR.E;
        if E == '1' && PMINTENSET<n> == '1' && PMOVSSET<n> == '1' then pmuirq = TRUE;

```



```
SetInterruptRequestLevel(InterruptID_PMIIRQ, if pmuirq then HIGH else LOW);

CTI_SetEventLevel(CrossTriggerIn_PMUOverflow, if pmuirq then HIGH else LOW);

// The request remains set until the condition is cleared. (For example, an interrupt handler
// or cross-triggered event handler clears the overflow status flag by writing to PMOVSLR_EL0.)

return pmuirq;
```

aarch32/debug/pmu/AArch32.CountEvents

```
// AArch32.CountEvents()
// =====
// Return TRUE if counter "n" should count its event. For the cycle counter, n == 31.

boolean AArch32.CountEvents(integer n)
    assert (n == 31 || n < UInt(PMCR.N));

    // Event counting is disabled in Debug state
    debug = Halted();

    // In Non-secure state, some counters are reserved for EL2
    if HaveEL(EL2) then
        hpmn = HDCR.HPMN;
        hpme = HDCR.HPME;
        E = (if n < UInt(hpmn) || n == 31 then PMCR.E else hpme);
    else
        E = PMCR.E;
    enabled = (E == '1' && PMCNTENSET<n> == '1');

    if !IsSecure() then
        // Event counting is allowed unless all of:
        // * EL2 is implemented, and executing at EL2
        // * HPMD is implemented, PMNx is not reserved for Hyp, and HDCR.HPMD == 1
        if PSTATE.EL == EL2 && (n < UInt(hpmn) || n == 31) then
            prohibited = (HDCR.HPMD == '1');
        else
            prohibited = FALSE;
    else
        // Event counting in Secure state is prohibited unless any one of:
        // * EL3 is not implemented
        prohibited = FALSE;

    // For the cycle counter, PMCR_EL0.DP enables counting when otherwise prohibited
    if prohibited && n == 31 then prohibited = (PMCR.DP == '1');

    // Event counting can be filtered by the {P, U, NSK, NSU, NSH} bits
    filter = (if n == 31 then PMCCFILTR<31:27> else PMEVTYPER[n]<31:27>);

    H = if !HaveEL(EL2) then '0' else filter<0>;
    P = filter<4>; U = filter<3>;
    if !IsSecure() && HaveEL(EL3) then
        P = P EOR filter<2>; U = U EOR filter<1>;

    case PSTATE.EL of
        when EL0      filtered = U == '1';
        when EL1,EL3  filtered = P == '1';
        when EL2      filtered = H == '0';

    return !debug && enabled && !prohibited && !filtered;
```

aarch32/debug/takeexceptiondbg/AArch32.EnterHypModeInDebugState

```
// AArch32.EnterHypModeInDebugState()
// =====
// Take an exception in Debug state to Hyp mode.
```

```
AArch32.EnterHypModeInDebugState(ExceptionRecord exception)
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && ELUsingAArch32(EL2);

    AArch32.ReportHypEntry(exception);
    AArch32.WriteMode(M32_Hyp);
    SPSR[] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    ELR_hyp = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    // In Debug state, the PE always execute T32 instructions when in AArch32 state, and
    // PSTATE.{SS,A,I,F} are not observable so behave as UNKNOWN.
    PSTATE.T = '1'; // PSTATE.J is RES0
    PSTATE.<SS,A,I,F> = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    DLR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    DSPSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    PSTATE.E = HSCTLR.EE;
    PSTATE.IL = '0';
    PSTATE.IT = '00000000';
    EDSR.ERR = '1';
    UpdateEDSCRFIELDS();
    EndOfInstruction();
```

aarch32/debug/takeexceptiondbg/AArch32.EnterModeInDebugState

```
// AArch32.EnterModeInDebugState()
// =====
// Take an exception in Debug state to a mode other than Monitor and Hyp mode.

AArch32.EnterModeInDebugState(bits(5) target_mode)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(EL1) && PSTATE.EL != EL2;

    AArch32.WriteMode(target_mode);
    SPSR[] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    R[14] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    // In Debug state, the PE always execute T32 instructions when in AArch32 state, and
    // PSTATE.{SS,A,I,F} are not observable so behave as UNKNOWN.
    PSTATE.T = '1'; // PSTATE.J is RES0
    PSTATE.<SS,A,I,F> = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    DLR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    DSPSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    PSTATE.E = SCTLRR.EE;
    PSTATE.IL = '0';
    PSTATE.IT = '00000000';
    EDSR.ERR = '1';
    UpdateEDSCRFIELDS(); // Update EDSR processor state flags.
    EndOfInstruction();
```

aarch32/debug/watchpoint/AArch32.WatchpointByteMatch

```
// AArch32.WatchpointByteMatch()
// =====

boolean AArch32.WatchpointByteMatch(integer n, bits(32) vaddress)

    bottom = if DBGWVR[n]<2> == '1' then 2 else 3; // Word or doubleword
    byte_select_match = (DBGWCR[n].BAS<UInt(vaddress<bottom-1:0>)> != '0');
    mask = UInt(DBGWCR[n].MASK);

    // If DBGWCR[n].MASK is non-zero value and DBGWCR[n].BAS is not set to '1111111', or
    // DBGWCR[n].BAS specifies a non-contiguous set of bytes behavior is CONSTRAINED
    // UNPREDICTABLE.
    if mask > 0 && !IsOnes(DBGWCR[n].BAS) then
        byte_select_match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();
    else
        LSB = (DBGWCR[n].BAS AND NOT(DBGWCR[n].BAS - 1)); MSB = (DBGWCR[n].BAS + LSB);
        if !IsZero(MSB AND (MSB - 1)) then // Not contiguous
            byte_select_match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();
```

```

        bottom = 3;                                     // For the whole doubleword

// If the address mask is set to a reserved value, the behavior is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE.
if mask > 0 && mask <= 2 then
    (c, mask) = ConstrainUnpredictableInteger(3, 31);
    assert c IN {Constraint_DISABLED, Constraint_NONE, Constraint_UNKNOWN};
    case c of
        when Constraint_DISABLED return FALSE;          // Disabled
        when Constraint_NONE     mask = 0;              // No masking
        // Otherwise the value returned by ConstrainUnpredictableInteger is a not-reserved value

if mask > bottom then
    WVR_match = (vaddress<31:mask> == DBGWVR[n]<31:mask>);
    // If masked bits of DBGWVR_EL1[n] are not zero, the behavior is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE.
    if WVR_match && !IsZero(DBGWVR[n]<mask-1:bottom>) then
        WVR_match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();
else
    WVR_match = vaddress<31:bottom> == DBGWVR[n]<31:bottom>;

return WVR_match && byte_select_match;

```

aarch32/debug/watchpoint/AArch32.WatchpointMatch

```

// AArch32.WatchpointMatch()
// =====
// Watchpoint matching in an AArch32 translation regime.

boolean AArch32.WatchpointMatch(integer n, bits(32) vaddress, integer size, boolean ispriv,
                                boolean iswrite)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(SIValidationRegime());
    assert n <= UInt(DBGDIDR.WRPs);

    // "ispriv" is FALSE for LDRT/STRT instructions executed at EL1 and all
    // load/stores at EL0, TRUE for all other load/stores. "iswrite" is TRUE for stores, FALSE for
    // loads.
    enabled = DBGWCR[n].E == '1';
    linked = DBGWCR[n].WT == '1';
    isbreakpnt = FALSE;

    state_match = AArch32.StateMatch(DBGWCR[n].SSC, DBGWCR[n].HMC, DBGWCR[n].PAC,
                                     linked, DBGWCR[n].LBN, isbreakpnt, ispriv);

    ls_match = (DBGWCR[n].LSC<(if iswrite then 1 else 0)> == '1');

    value_match = FALSE;
    for byte = 0 to size - 1
        value_match = value_match || AArch32.WatchpointByteMatch(n, vaddress + byte);

    return value_match && state_match && ls_match && enabled;

```

H1.2.2 aarch32/exceptions

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.Abort

```

// AArch32.Abort()
// =====
// Abort and Debug exception handling in an AArch32 translation regime.

AArch32.Abort(bits(32) vaddress, FaultRecord fault)

    if fault.acctype == AccType_IFETCH then
        AArch32.TakePrefetchAbortException(vaddress, fault);
    else
        AArch32.TakeDataAbortException(vaddress, fault);

```

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.AbortSyndrome

```
// AArch32.AbortSyndrome()
// =====
// Creates an exception syndrome record for Abort exceptions taken to Hyp mode
// from an AArch32 translation regime.

ExceptionRecord AArch32.AbortSyndrome(Exception type, FaultRecord fault, bits(32) vaddress)

    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(type);

    d_side = type == Exception_DataAbort;

    exception.syndrome = FaultSyndrome(d_side, fault);
    exception.vaddress = ZeroExtend(vaddress);
    if IPValid(fault) then
        exception.ipvalid = TRUE;
        exception.ipaddress = ZeroExtend(fault.ipaddress);
    else
        exception.ipvalid = FALSE;

    return exception;
```

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.CheckPCAlignment

```
// AArch32.CheckPCAlignment()
// =====

AArch32.CheckPCAlignment()

    bits(32) pc = ThisInstrAddr();
    if (CurrentInstrSet() == InstrSet_A32 && pc<1> == '1') || pc<0> == '1' then

        // Generate an Alignment fault Prefetch Abort exception
        vaddress = pc;
        acctype = AccType_IFETCH;
        iswrite = FALSE;
        secondstage = FALSE;
        AArch32.Abort(vaddress, AArch32.AlignmentFault(acctype, iswrite, secondstage));
```

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.ReportDataAbort

```
// AArch32.ReportDataAbort()
// =====
// Report syndrome information for aborts taken to modes other than Hyp mode.

AArch32.ReportDataAbort(boolean route_to_monitor, FaultRecord fault, bits(32) vaddress)

    // The encoding used in the IFSR or DFSR can be Long-descriptor format or Short-descriptor
    // format. Normally, the current translation table format determines the format. For an abort
    // from Non-secure state to Monitor mode, the IFSR or DFSR uses the Long-descriptor format if
    // any of the following applies:
    // * The Secure TTBCR.EAE is set to 1.
    // * The abort is synchronous and either:
    //   - It is taken from Hyp mode.
    //   - It is taken from EL1 or EL0, and the Non-secure TTBCR.EAE is set to 1.
    // In the current implementation, PE supports PMSA at both EL1 and EL2.
    // v8R PMSA MPU follow Long-descriptor format
    long_format = TRUE;
    d_side = TRUE;
    if long_format then
        syndrome = AArch32.FaultStatusLD(d_side, fault);
    else
        syndrome = AArch32.FaultStatusSD(d_side, fault);

    if fault.acctype == AccType_IC then
```

```

if (!long_format &&
    boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "Report I-cache maintenance fault in IFSR") then
    i_syndrome = syndrome;
    syndrome<10,3:0> = EncodeSDFSC(Fault_ICacheMaint, 1);
else
    i_syndrome = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
if route_to_monitor then
    IFSR_S = i_syndrome;
else
    IFSR = i_syndrome;

if route_to_monitor then
    DFSR_S = syndrome;
    DFAR_S = vaddress;
else
    DFSR = syndrome;
    DFAR = vaddress;

return;

```

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.ReportPrefetchAbort

```

// AArch32.ReportPrefetchAbort()
// =====
// Report syndrome information for aborts taken to modes other than Hyp mode.

AArch32.ReportPrefetchAbort(boolean route_to_monitor, FaultRecord fault, bits(32) vaddress)
    // In the current implementation, PE supports PMSA at both EL1 and EL2.
    // v8R PMSA MPU follow Long-descriptor format
    long_format = TRUE;

    d_side = FALSE;
    if long_format then
        fsr = AArch32.FaultStatusLD(d_side, fault);
    else
        fsr = AArch32.FaultStatusSD(d_side, fault);

    if route_to_monitor then
        IFSR_S = fsr;
        IFAR_S = vaddress;
    else
        IFSR = fsr;
        IFAR = vaddress;

    return;

```

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.TakeDataAbortException

```

// AArch32.TakeDataAbortException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeDataAbortException(bits(32) vaddress, FaultRecord fault)
    route_to_monitor = FALSE;
    route_to_hyp = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0, EL1} &&
        (HCR.TGE == '1' || IsSecondStage(fault) ||
        (IsDebugException(fault) && HDCR.TDE == '1')));

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x10;
    lr_offset = 8;

    if IsDebugException(fault) then DBGDSCRExt.MOE = fault.debugmoe;
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
        exception = AArch32.AbortSyndrome(Exception_DataAbort, fault, vaddress);
        if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
            AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);

```

```

else
    AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
else
    AArch32.ReportDataAbort(route_to_monitor, fault, vaddress);
    AArch32.EnterMode(M32_Abort, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);

```

aarch32/exceptions/aborts/AArch32.TakePrefetchAbortException

```

// AArch32.TakePrefetchAbortException()
// =====

AArch32.TakePrefetchAbortException(bits(32) vaddress, FaultRecord fault)
    route_to_monitor = FALSE;
    route_to_hyp = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} &&
        (HCR.TGE == '1' || IsSecondStage(fault) ||
        (IsDebugException(fault) && HCR.TDE == '1')));

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x0C;
    lr_offset = 4;

    if IsDebugException(fault) then DBGDSCRext.MOE = fault.debugmoe;
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
        if fault.type == Fault_Alignment then // PC Alignment fault
            exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_PCAlignment);
            exception.vaddress = ThisInstrAddr();
        else
            exception = AArch32.AbortSyndrome(Exception_InstructionAbort, fault, vaddress);
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
    else
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
    else
        AArch32.ReportPrefetchAbort(route_to_monitor, fault, vaddress);
        AArch32.EnterMode(M32_Abort, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);

```

aarch32/exceptions/asynch/AArch32.TakePhysicalFIQException

```

// AArch32.TakePhysicalFIQException()
// =====

AArch32.TakePhysicalFIQException()

    route_to_monitor = FALSE;
    route_to_hyp = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} &&
        (HCR.TGE == '1' || HCR.FMO == '1'));
    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x1C;
    lr_offset = 4;
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
        exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_FIQ);
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
    else
        AArch32.EnterMode(M32_FIQ, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);

```

aarch32/exceptions/asynch/AArch32.TakePhysicalIRQException

```

// AArch32.TakePhysicalIRQException()
// =====
// Take an enabled physical IRQ exception.

AArch32.TakePhysicalIRQException()

    route_to_monitor = FALSE;
    route_to_hyp = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} &&
        (HCR.TGE == '1' || HCR.IMO == '1'));

```

```
bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
vect_offset = 0x18;
lr_offset = 4;
if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_IRQ);
    AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
else
    AArch32.EnterMode(M32_IRQ, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/asynch/AArch32.TakePhysicalSErrorException

```
// AArch32.TakePhysicalSErrorException()
// =====

AArch32.TakePhysicalSErrorException(boolean parity, bit extflag, boolean syndrome_valid,
                                     bits(24) full_syndrome)

    route_to_monitor = FALSE;
    route_to_hyp = (HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1} &&
                   (HCR.TGE == '1' || HCR.AMO == '1'));
    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x10;
    lr_offset = 8;

    fault = AArch32.AsynchExternalAbort(parity, extflag);
    vaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
        exception = AArch32.AbortSyndrome(Exception_DataAbort, fault, vaddress);
        if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
            AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
        else
            AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
    else
        AArch32.ReportDataAbort(route_to_monitor, fault, vaddress);
        AArch32.EnterMode(M32_Abort, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/asynch/AArch32.TakeVirtualFIQException

```
// AArch32.TakeVirtualFIQException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeVirtualFIQException()
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1};
    assert HCR.TGE == '0' && HCR.FMO == '1'; // Virtual IRQ enabled if TGE==0 and FMO==1

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x1C;
    lr_offset = 4;

    AArch32.EnterMode(M32_FIQ, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/asynch/AArch32.TakeVirtualIRQException

```
// AArch32.TakeVirtualIRQException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeVirtualIRQException()
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1};
    assert HCR.TGE == '0' && HCR.IMO == '1';

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x18;
    lr_offset = 4;

    AArch32.EnterMode(M32_IRQ, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/asynch/AArch32.TakeVirtualSErrorException

```
// AArch32.TakeVirtualSErrorException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeVirtualSErrorException()
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0,EL1};
    if ELUsingAArch32(EL2) then // Virtual SError enabled if TGE==0 and AMO==1
        assert HCR.TGE == '0' && HCR.AMO == '1';

    route_to_monitor = FALSE;

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x10;
    lr_offset = 8;

    vaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    parity = FALSE;
    extflag = bit IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "Virtual SError ExT bit";
    fault = AArch32.AsynchExternalAbort(parity, extflag);
    HCR.VA = '0';
    AArch32.ReportDataAbort(route_to_monitor, fault, vaddress);
    AArch32.EnterMode(M32_Abort, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/debug/AArch32.SoftwareBreakpoint

```
// AArch32.SoftwareBreakpoint()
// =====

AArch32.SoftwareBreakpoint(bits(16) immediate)

    vaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    acctype = AccType_IFETCH; // Take as a Prefetch Abort
    iswrite = FALSE;
    entry = DebugException_BKPT;

    fault = AArch32.DebugFault(acctype, iswrite, entry);
    AArch32.Abort(vaddress, fault);
```

aarch32/exceptions/debug/DebugException

```
constant bits(4) DebugException_Breakpoint = '0001';
constant bits(4) DebugException_BKPT      = '0011';
constant bits(4) DebugException_VectorCatch = '0101';
constant bits(4) DebugException_Watchpoint = '1010';
```

aarch32/exceptions/exceptions/AArch32.ExceptionClass

```
// AArch32.ExceptionClass()
// =====
// Return the Exception Class and Instruction Length fields for reported in HSR

(integer,bit) AArch32.ExceptionClass(Exception type)

    il = if ThisInstrLength() == 32 then '1' else '0';

    case type of
        when Exception_Uncategorized    ec = 0x00; il = '1';
        when Exception_WFxTrap          ec = 0x01;
        when Exception_CP15RTTTrap      ec = 0x03;
        when Exception_CP15RRTTrap      ec = 0x04;
        when Exception_CP14RTTTrap      ec = 0x05;
        when Exception_CP14DTTTrap      ec = 0x06;
        when Exception_AdvSIMDFPAccessTrap ec = 0x07;
        when Exception_FPIDTrap         ec = 0x08;
        when Exception_CP14RRTTrap      ec = 0x0C;
```



```

    when Exception_IllegalState      ec = 0x0E; il = '1';
    when Exception_SupervisorCall    ec = 0x11;
    when Exception_HypervisorCall    ec = 0x12;
    when Exception_MonitorCall       ec = 0x13;
    when Exception_InstructionAbort   ec = 0x20; il = '1';
    when Exception_PCAlignment       ec = 0x22; il = '1';
    when Exception_DataAbort          ec = 0x24;
    when Exception_FPTRappedException ec = 0x28;
    otherwise                          Unreachable();

    if ec IN {0x20,0x24} && PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        ec = ec + 1;

    return (ec,il);

```

aarch32/exceptions/exceptions/AArch32.ReportHypEntry

```

// AArch32.ReportHypEntry()
// =====
// Report syndrome information to Hyp mode registers.

AArch32.ReportHypEntry(ExceptionRecord exception)

    Exception type = exception.type;

    (ec,il) = AArch32.ExceptionClass(type);
    iss = exception.syndrome;

    // IL is not valid for Data Abort exceptions without valid instruction syndrome information
    if ec IN {0x24,0x25} && iss<24> == '0' then
        il = '1';

    HSR = ec<5:0>:il:iss;

    if type IN {Exception_InstructionAbort, Exception_PCAlignment} then
        HIFAR = exception.vaddress<31:0>;
        HDFAR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    elseif type == Exception_DataAbort then
        HIFAR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        HDFAR = exception.vaddress<31:0>;

    if exception.ipavalid then
        HPFAR<31:4> = exception.ipaddress<39:12>;
    else
        HPFAR<31:4> = bits(28) UNKNOWN;

    return;

```

aarch32/exceptions/exceptions/AArch32.ResetControlRegisters

```

// Resets System registers and memory-mapped control registers that have architecturally defined
// reset values to those values.
AArch32.ResetControlRegisters(boolean cold_reset);

```

aarch32/exceptions/exceptions/AArch32.TakeReset

```

// AArch32.TakeReset()
// =====
// Reset into AArch32 state

AArch32.TakeReset(boolean cold_reset)
    assert HighestELUsingAArch32();

    // Enter the highest implemented Exception level in AArch32 state
    if HaveEL(EL2) then
        AArch32.WriteMode(M32_Hyp);

```

```

else
    AArch32.WriteMode(M32_Svc);

// Reset the CP14 and CP15 registers and other system components
AArch32.ResetControlRegisters(cold_reset);
FPEXC.EN = '0';

// Reset all other PSTATE fields, including instruction set and endianness according to the
// SCTLAR values produced by the above call to ResetControlRegisters()
PSTATE.<A,I,F> = '111'; // All asynchronous exceptions masked
PSTATE.IT = '00000000'; // IT block state reset
PSTATE.T = SCTLAR.TE; // Instruction set: TE=0: A32, TE=1: T32. PSTATE.J is RES0.
PSTATE.E = SCTLAR.EE; // Endianness: EE=0: little-endian, EE=1: big-endian
PSTATE.IL = '0'; // Clear Illegal Execution state bit

// All registers, bits and fields not reset by the above pseudocode or by the BranchTo() call
// below are UNKNOWN bitstrings after reset. In particular, the return information registers
// R14 or ELR_hyp and SPSR have UNKNOWN values, so that it
// is impossible to return from a reset in an architecturally defined way.
AArch32.ResetGeneralRegisters();
AArch32.ResetSIMDFPRegisters();
AArch32.ResetSpecialRegisters();
ResetExternalDebugRegisters(cold_reset);

bits(32) rv; // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED reset vector

rv = RVBAR<31:1>:'0';
// The reset vector must be correctly aligned
assert rv<0> == '0' && (PSTATE.T == '1' || rv<1> == '0');

BranchTo(rv, BranchType_UNKNOWN);

```

aarch32/exceptions/exceptions/ExcVectorBase

```

// ExcVectorBase()
// =====

bits(32) ExcVectorBase()
    return VBAR;

```

aarch32/exceptions/ieeefp/AArch32.FPTrappedException

```

// AArch32.FPTrappedException()
// =====

AArch32.FPTrappedException(bits(8) accumulated_exceptions)
    FPEXC.DEX = '1';
    FPEXC.TFV = '1';
    FPEXC<7,4:0> = accumulated_exceptions<7,4:0>; // IDF,IXF,UFF,OFF,DZF,IOF

    AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException();

```

aarch32/exceptions/syscalls/AArch32.CallHypervisor

```

// AArch32.CallHypervisor()
// =====
// Performs a HVC call

AArch32.CallHypervisor(bits(16) immediate)
    assert HaveEL(EL2);

    AArch32.TakeHVCEXception(immediate);

```

aarch32/exceptions/syscalls/AArch32.CallSupervisor

```
// AArch32.CallSupervisor()
// =====
// Calls the Supervisor

AArch32.CallSupervisor(bits(16) immediate)

    if AArch32.CurrentCond() != '1110' then
        immediate = bits(16) UNKNOWN;
    AArch32.TakeSVCEException(immediate);
```

aarch32/exceptions/syscalls/AArch32.TakeHVCEException

```
// AArch32.TakeHVCEException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeHVCEException(bits(16) immediate)
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && ELUsingAArch32(EL2);

    AArch32.ITAdvance();
    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = NextInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x08;

    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_HypervisorCall);
    exception.syndrome<15:0> = immediate;

    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
    else
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
```

aarch32/exceptions/syscalls/AArch32.TakeSVCEException

```
// AArch32.TakeSVCEException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeSVCEException(bits(16) immediate)

    AArch32.ITAdvance();
    route_to_hyp = HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL == EL0 && HCR.TGE == '1';

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = NextInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x08;
    lr_offset = 0;

    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
        exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_SupervisorCall);
        exception.syndrome<15:0> = immediate;
        if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
            AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
        else
            AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
    else
        AArch32.EnterMode(M32_Svc, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/takeexception/AArch32.EnterHypMode

```
// AArch32.EnterHypMode()
// =====
// Take an exception to Hyp mode.

AArch32.EnterHypMode(ExceptionRecord exception, bits(32) preferred_exception_return,
    integer vect_offset)
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && ELUsingAArch32(EL2);
```

```

spsr = GetPSRFromPSTATE();
if !(exception.type IN {Exception_IRQ, Exception_FIQ}) then
    AArch32.ReportHypEntry(exception);
AArch32.WriteMode(M32_Hyp);
SPSR[] = spsr;
ELR_hyp = preferred_exception_return;
PSTATE.T = HSCTLR.TE; // PSTATE.J is RES0
PSTATE.SS = '0';
PSTATE.A = '1';
PSTATE.I = '1';
PSTATE.F = '1';
PSTATE.E = HSCTLR.EE;
PSTATE.IL = '0';
PSTATE.IT = '00000000';
BranchTo(HVBAR + vect_offset, BranchType_UNKNOWN);
EndOfInstruction();

```

aarch32/exceptions/takeexception/AArch32.EnterMode

```

// AArch32.EnterMode()
// =====
// Take an exception to a mode other than Monitor and Hyp mode.

AArch32.EnterMode(bits(5) target_mode, bits(32) preferred_exception_return, integer lr_offset,
                  integer vect_offset)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(EL1) && PSTATE.EL != EL2;

    spsr = GetPSRFromPSTATE();
    AArch32.WriteMode(target_mode);
    SPSR[] = spsr;
    R[14] = preferred_exception_return + lr_offset;
    PSTATE.T = SCTLR.TE; // PSTATE.J is RES0
    PSTATE.SS = '0';
    if target_mode == M32_FIQ then
        PSTATE.<A,I,F> = '111';
    elseif target_mode IN {M32_Abort, M32_IRQ} then
        PSTATE.<A,I> = '11';
    else
        PSTATE.I = '1';
    PSTATE.E = SCTLR.EE;
    PSTATE.IL = '0';
    PSTATE.IT = '00000000';
    BranchTo(ExcVectorBase() + vect_offset, BranchType_UNKNOWN);
    EndOfInstruction();

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrap

```

// AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrap()
// =====
// Trapped AArch32 System register access other than due to CPTR_EL2 or CPACR_EL1.

AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrap(bits(2) target_el, bits(32) instr)
    assert HaveEL(target_el) && target_el != EL0 && UInt(target_el) >= UInt(PSTATE.EL);

    assert target_el IN {EL1,EL2};

    if target_el == EL2 then
        exception = AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrapSyndrome(instr);
        AArch32.TakeHypTrapException(exception);
    else
        AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException();

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrapSyndrome

```
// AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrapSyndrome()
// =====
// Return the syndrome information for traps on AArch32 MCR, MCRR, MRC, MRRC, and VMRS instructions,
// other than traps that are due to HCPTR or CPACR.

ExceptionRecord AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrapSyndrome(bits(32) instr)

    ExceptionRecord exception;
    cpnum = UInt(instr<11:8>);

    bits(20) iss = Zeros();
    if instr<27:24> == '1110' && instr<4> == '1' && instr<31:28> != '1111' then
        // MRC/MCR
        case cpnum of
            when 10    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_FPIDTrap);
            when 14    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_CP14RTTTrap);
            when 15    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_CP15RTTTrap);
            otherwise  Unreachable();
        iss<19:17> = instr<7:5>;    // opc2
        iss<16:14> = instr<23:21>;  // opc1
        iss<13:10> = instr<19:16>;  // CRn
        iss<8:5>  = instr<15:12>;  // Rt
        iss<4:1>  = instr<3:0>;    // CRm
    elseif instr<27:21> == '1100010' && instr<31:28> != '1111' then
        // MRRC/MCRR
        case cpnum of
            when 14    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_CP14RRTTTrap);
            when 15    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_CP15RRTTTrap);
            otherwise  Unreachable();
        iss<19:16> = instr<7:4>;    // opc1
        iss<13:10> = instr<19:16>;  // Rt2
        iss<8:5>  = instr<15:12>;  // Rt
        iss<4:1>  = instr<3:0>;    // CRm
    elseif instr<27:25> == '110' && instr<31:28> != '1111' then
        // LDC/STC
        assert cpnum == 14;
        exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_CP14DTTTrap);
        iss<19:12> = instr<7:0>;    // imm8
        iss<4>    = instr<23>;      // U
        iss<2:1>  = instr<24,21>;  // P,W
        if instr<19:16> == '1111' then // Literal addressing
            iss<8:5> = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
            iss<3>  = '1';
        else
            iss<8:5> = instr<19:16>; // Rn
            iss<3>  = '0';
    else
        Unreachable();
    iss<0> = instr<20>;            // Direction

    exception.syndrome<24:20> = ConditionSyndrome();
    exception.syndrome<19:0> = iss;

    return exception;
```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled

```
// AArch32.CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled()
// =====
// Check against CPACR, FPEXC, HCPTR, NSACR, and CPTR_EL3.

AArch32.CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled(boolean fpexc_check, boolean advsimd)

    cpacr_asedis = CPACR.ASEDIS;
    cpacr_cp10 = CPACR.cp10;
```

```

if HaveEL(EL3) && !IsSecure() then
    // Check if access disabled in NSACR
    if NSACR.NSASEDIS == '1' then cpacr_asedis = '1';
    if NSACR.cp10 == '0' then cpacr_cp10 = '00';

if PSTATE.EL != EL2 then
    // Check if Advanced SIMD disabled in CPACR
    if advsimd && cpacr_asedis == '1' then UNDEFINED;

    // Check if access disabled in CPACR
    case cpacr_cp10 of
        when 'x0' disabled = TRUE;
        when '01' disabled = PSTATE.EL == EL0;
        when '11' disabled = FALSE;
    if disabled then UNDEFINED;

// If required, check FPEXC enabled bit.
if fpxc_check && FPEXC.EN == '0' then UNDEFINED;

AArch32.CheckFPAdvSIMDTrap(advsimd);    // Also check against HCPTR and CPTR_EL3

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.CheckFPAdvSIMDTrap

```

// AArch32.CheckFPAdvSIMDTrap()
// =====
// Check against CPTR_EL2 and CPTR_EL3.

AArch32.CheckFPAdvSIMDTrap(boolean advsimd)

if HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() then
    hcptr_tase = HCPTR.TASE;
    hcptr_cp10 = HCPTR.TCP10;

if HaveEL(EL3) && ELUsingAArch32(EL3) && !IsSecure() then
    // Check if access disabled in NSACR
    if NSACR.NSASEDIS == '1' then hcptr_tase = '1';
    if NSACR.cp10 == '0' then hcptr_cp10 = '1';

    // Check if access disabled in HCPTR
    if (advsimd && hcptr_tase == '1') || hcptr_cp10 == '1' then
        exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_AdvSIMDFPAccessTrap);
        exception.syndrome<24:20> = ConditionSyndrome();

        if advsimd then
            exception.syndrome<5> = '1';
        else
            exception.syndrome<5> = '0';
            exception.syndrome<3:0> = '1010';    // coproc field, always 0xA

        if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
            AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException(exception);
        else
            AArch32.TakeHypTrapException(exception);

return;

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.CheckForWFXTrap

```

// AArch32.CheckForWFXTrap()
// =====
// Check for trap on WFE or WFI instruction

AArch32.CheckForWFXTrap(bits(2) target_el, boolean is_wfe)
    assert HaveEL(target_el);

    case target_el of

```

```

when EL1 trap = (if is_wfe then SCTL.R.nTWE else SCTL.R.nTWI) == '0';
when EL2 trap = (if is_wfe then HCR.TWE else HCR.TWI) == '1';
if trap then
    if target_el == EL2 then
        exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_WFxTrap);
        exception.syndrome<24:20> = ConditionSyndrome();
        exception.syndrome<0> = if is_wfe then '1' else '0';
        AArch32.TakeHypTrapException(exception);
    else
        AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException();

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.CheckITEnabled

```

// AArch32.CheckITEnabled()
// =====
// Check whether the T32 IT instruction is disabled.

AArch32.CheckITEnabled(bits(4) mask)

    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        it_disabled = HSCTLR.ITD;
    else
        it_disabled = SCTL.R.ITD;

    if it_disabled == '1' then
        if mask != '1000' then UNDEFINED;

    // Otherwise whether the IT block is allowed depends on hw1 of the next instruction.
    next_instr = AArch32.MemSingle[NextInstrAddr(), 2, AccType_IFETCH, TRUE];

    if next_instr IN {'11xxxxxxxxxxxx', '1011xxxxxxxxxxxx', '10100xxxxxxxxxxxx',
                     '01001xxxxxxxxxxxx', '010001xxx1111xxx', '010001xx1xxx111'} then
        // It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the Undefined Instruction exception is
        // taken on the IT instruction or the next instruction. This is not reflected in
        // the pseudocode, which always takes the exception on the IT instruction. This
        // also does not take into account cases where the next instruction is UNPREDICTABLE.
        UNDEFINED;

return;

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.CheckIllegalState

```

// AArch32.CheckIllegalState()
// =====
// Check PSTATE.IL bit and generate Illegal Execution state exception if set.

AArch32.CheckIllegalState()

    if PSTATE.IL == '1' then
        route_to_hyp = HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL == EL0 && HCR.TGE == '1';

        bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
        vect_offset = 0x04;

        if PSTATE.EL == EL2 || route_to_hyp then
            exception = ExceptionSyndrome(Exception_IllegalState);
            if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
                AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
            else
                AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
        else
            AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException();

```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.CheckSETENDEnabled

```
// AArch32.CheckSETENDEnabled()
// =====
// Check whether the AArch32 SETEND instruction is disabled.

AArch32.CheckSETENDEnabled()

    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        setend_disabled = HSCTLR.SED;
    else
        setend_disabled = SCTLR.SED;

    if setend_disabled == '1' then
        UNDEFINED;

    return;
```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.TakeHypTrapException

```
// AArch32.TakeHypTrapException()
// =====
// Exceptions routed to Hyp mode as a Hyp Trap exception.

AArch32.TakeHypTrapException(ExceptionRecord exception)
    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && ELUsingAArch32(EL2);

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x14;

    AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException

```
// AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException()
    exception = ExceptionSyndrome(ExceptionUncategorized);
    AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException(exception);

// AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException()
// =====

AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException(ExceptionRecord exception)

    route_to_hyp = HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL == EL0 && HCR.TGE == '1';

    bits(32) preferred_exception_return = ThisInstrAddr();
    vect_offset = 0x04;
    lr_offset = if CurrentInstrSet() == InstrSet_A32 then 4 else 2;

    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, vect_offset);
    elseif route_to_hyp then
        AArch32.EnterHypMode(exception, preferred_exception_return, 0x14);
    else
        AArch32.EnterMode(M32_Undef, preferred_exception_return, lr_offset, vect_offset);
```

aarch32/exceptions/traps/AArch32.UndefinedFault

```
// AArch32.UndefinedFault()
// =====
```



```
AArch32.UndefinedFault()

AArch32.TakeUndefInstrException();
```

H1.2.3 aarch32/functions

aarch32/functions/aborts/AArch32.CreateFaultRecord

```
// AArch32.CreateFaultRecord()
// =====

FaultRecord AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault type, bits(32) ipaddress, bits(4) domain,
                                       integer level, AccType acctype, boolean write, bit extflag,
                                       bits(4) debugmoe, boolean secondstage, boolean s2fs1walk)

FaultRecord fault;
fault.type = type;
if (type != Fault_None && PSTATE.EL != EL2 && TTBCR.EAE == '0' && !secondstage && !s2fs1walk &&
    AArch32.DomainValid(type, level)) then
    fault.domain = domain;
else
    fault.domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
fault.debugmoe = debugmoe;
fault.ipaddress = ZeroExtend(ipaddress);
fault.level = level;
fault.acctype = acctype;
fault.write = write;
fault.extflag = extflag;
fault.secondstage = secondstage;
fault.s2fs1walk = s2fs1walk;

return fault;
```

aarch32/functions/aborts/AArch32.DomainValid

```
// AArch32.DomainValid()
// =====
// Returns TRUE if the Domain is valid for a Short-descriptor translation scheme.

boolean AArch32.DomainValid(Fault type, integer level)
    assert type != Fault_None;

    case type of
        when Fault_Domain
            return TRUE;
        when Fault_Translation, Fault_AccessFlag, Fault_SyncExternalOnWalk, Fault_SyncParityOnWalk
            return level == 2;
        otherwise
            return FALSE;
```

aarch32/functions/aborts/AArch32.FaultStatusLD

```
// AArch32.FaultStatusLD()
// =====
// Creates an exception fault status value for Abort and Watchpoint exceptions taken
// to Abort mode using AArch32 and Long-descriptor format.

bits(32) AArch32.FaultStatusLD(boolean d_side, FaultRecord fault)
    assert fault.type != Fault_None;

    bits(32) fsr = Zeros();
    if d_side then
        if fault.acctype IN {AccType_DC, AccType_IC, AccType_AT} then
```

```

        fsr<13> = '1'; fsr<11> = '1';
    else
        fsr<11> = if fault.write then '1' else '0';
    if IsExternalAbort(fault) then fsr<12> = fault.extflag;
    fsr<9> = '1';
    fsr<5:0> = EncodeLDFSC(fault.type, fault.level);

    return fsr;

```

aarch32/functions/aborts/AArch32.FaultStatusSD

```

// AArch32.FaultStatusSD()
// =====
// Creates an exception fault status value for Abort and Watchpoint exceptions taken
// to Abort mode using AArch32 and Short-descriptor format.

bits(32) AArch32.FaultStatusSD(boolean d_side, FaultRecord fault)
    assert fault.type != Fault_None;

    bits(32) fsr = Zeros();
    if d_side then
        if fault.acctype IN {AccType_DC, AccType_IC, AccType_AT} then
            fsr<13> = '1'; fsr<11> = '1';
        else
            fsr<11> = if fault.write then '1' else '0';
    if IsExternalAbort(fault) then fsr<12> = fault.extflag;
    fsr<9> = '0';
    fsr<10,3:0> = EncodeSDFSC(fault.type, fault.level);
    if d_side then
        fsr<7:4> = fault.domain; // Domain field (data fault only)

    return fsr;

```

aarch32/functions/aborts/EncodeSDFSC

```

// EncodeSDFSC()
// =====
// Function that gives the Short-descriptor FSR code for different types of Fault

bits(5) EncodeSDFSC(Fault type, integer level)

    bits(5) result;
    case type of
        when Fault_AccessFlag
            assert level IN {1,2};
            result = if level == 1 then '00011' else '00110';
        when Fault_Alignment
            result = '00001';
        when Fault_Permission
            assert level IN {1,2};
            result = if level == 1 then '01101' else '01111';
        when Fault_Domain
            assert level IN {1,2};
            result = if level == 1 then '01001' else '01011';
        when Fault_Translation
            assert level IN {1,2};
            result = if level == 1 then '00101' else '00111';
        when Fault_SyncExternal
            result = '01000';
        when Fault_SyncExternalOnWalk
            assert level IN {1,2};
            result = if level == 1 then '01100' else '01110';
        when Fault_SyncParity
            result = '11001';
        when Fault_SyncParityOnWalk
            assert level IN {1,2};

```

```

        result = if level == 1 then '11100' else '11110';
    when Fault_AsyncParity
        result = '11000';
    when Fault_AsyncExternal
        result = '10110';
    when Fault_Debug
        result = '00010';
    when Fault_TLBConflict
        result = '10000';
    when Fault_Lockdown
        result = '10100'; // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
    when Fault_Exclusive
        result = '10101'; // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
    when Fault_ICacheMaint
        result = '00100';
    otherwise
        Unreachable();

    return result;

```

aarch32/functions/common/A32ExpandImm

```

// A32ExpandImm()
// =====

bits(32) A32ExpandImm(bits(12) imm12)

    // PSTATE.C argument to following function call does not affect the imm32 result.
    (imm32, -) = A32ExpandImm_C(imm12, PSTATE.C);

    return imm32;

```

aarch32/functions/common/A32ExpandImm_C

```

// A32ExpandImm_C()
// =====

(bits(32), bit) A32ExpandImm_C(bits(12) imm12, bit carry_in)

    unrotated_value = ZeroExtend(imm12<7:0>, 32);
    (imm32, carry_out) = Shift_C(unrotated_value, SRTYPE_ROR, 2*UInt(imm12<11:8>), carry_in);

    return (imm32, carry_out);

```

aarch32/functions/common/DecodeImmShift

```

// DecodeImmShift()
// =====

(SRType, integer) DecodeImmShift(bits(2) type, bits(5) imm5)

    case type of
        when '00'
            shift_t = SRTYPE_LSL; shift_n = UInt(imm5);
        when '01'
            shift_t = SRTYPE_LSR; shift_n = if imm5 == '00000' then 32 else UInt(imm5);
        when '10'
            shift_t = SRTYPE_ASR; shift_n = if imm5 == '00000' then 32 else UInt(imm5);
        when '11'
            if imm5 == '00000' then
                shift_t = SRTYPE_RRX; shift_n = 1;
            else
                shift_t = SRTYPE_ROR; shift_n = UInt(imm5);

    return (shift_t, shift_n);

```

aarch32/functions/common/DecodeRegShift

```
// DecodeRegShift()
// =====

SRTYPE DecodeRegShift(bits(2) type)
case type of
  when '00' shift_t = SRTYPE_LSL;
  when '01' shift_t = SRTYPE_LSR;
  when '10' shift_t = SRTYPE_ASR;
  when '11' shift_t = SRTYPE_ROR;
return shift_t;
```

aarch32/functions/common/RRX

```
// RRX()
// =====

bits(N) RRX(bits(N) x, bit carry_in)
  (result, -) = RRX_C(x, carry_in);
  return result;
```

aarch32/functions/common/RRX_C

```
// RRX_C()
// =====

(bits(N), bit) RRX_C(bits(N) x, bit carry_in)
  result = carry_in : x<N-1:1>;
  carry_out = x<0>;
  return (result, carry_out);
```

aarch32/functions/common/SRTYPE

```
enumeration SRTYPE {SRTYPE_LSL, SRTYPE_LSR, SRTYPE_ASR, SRTYPE_ROR, SRTYPE_RRX};
```

aarch32/functions/common/Shift

```
// Shift()
// =====

bits(N) Shift(bits(N) value, SRTYPE type, integer amount, bit carry_in)
  (result, -) = Shift_C(value, type, amount, carry_in);
  return result;
```

aarch32/functions/common/Shift_C

```
// Shift_C()
// =====

(bits(N), bit) Shift_C(bits(N) value, SRTYPE type, integer amount, bit carry_in)
  assert !(type == SRTYPE_RRX && amount != 1);

  if amount == 0 then
    (result, carry_out) = (value, carry_in);
  else
    case type of
      when SRTYPE_LSL
        (result, carry_out) = LSL_C(value, amount);
      when SRTYPE_LSR
        (result, carry_out) = LSR_C(value, amount);
      when SRTYPE_ASR
        (result, carry_out) = ASR_C(value, amount);
      when SRTYPE_ROR
```

```
(result, carry_out) = ROR_C(value, amount);
when SRTYPE_RRX
    (result, carry_out) = RRX_C(value, carry_in);

return (result, carry_out);
```

aarch32/functions/common/T32ExpandImm

```
// T32ExpandImm()
// =====

bits(32) T32ExpandImm(bits(12) imm12)

    // PSTATE.C argument to following function call does not affect the imm32 result.
    (imm32, -) = T32ExpandImm_C(imm12, PSTATE.C);

    return imm32;
```

aarch32/functions/common/T32ExpandImm_C

```
// T32ExpandImm_C()
// =====

(bits(32), bit) T32ExpandImm_C(bits(12) imm12, bit carry_in)

    if imm12<11:10> == '00' then
        case imm12<9:8> of
            when '00'
                imm32 = ZeroExtend(imm12<7:0>, 32);
            when '01'
                imm32 = '00000000' : imm12<7:0> : '00000000' : imm12<7:0>;
            when '10'
                imm32 = imm12<7:0> : '00000000' : imm12<7:0> : '00000000';
            when '11'
                imm32 = imm12<7:0> : imm12<7:0> : imm12<7:0> : imm12<7:0>;
        carry_out = carry_in;
    else
        unrotated_value = ZeroExtend('1':imm12<6:0>, 32);
        (imm32, carry_out) = ROR_C(unrotated_value, UInt(imm12<11:7>));

    return (imm32, carry_out);
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/AArch32.CheckCP15InstrCoarseTraps

```
// AArch32.CheckCP15InstrCoarseTraps()
// =====
// Check for coarse-grained CP15 traps in HSTR and HCR.

boolean AArch32.CheckCP15InstrCoarseTraps(integer CRn, integer nreg, integer CRm)

    // Check for coarse-grained Hyp traps
    if HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0, EL1} then

        // Check for MCR, MRC, MCRR and MRRC disabled by HSTR<CRn/CRm>
        major = if nreg == 1 then CRn else CRm;
        if !(major IN {4, 14}) && HSTR<major> == '1' then
            return TRUE;

        // Check for MRC and MCR disabled by HCR.TIDCP
        if (HCR.TIDCP == '1' && nreg == 1 &&
            ((CRn == 9 && CRm IN {0, 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8}) ||
             (CRn == 10 && CRm IN {0, 1, 4, 8}) ||
             (CRn == 11 && CRm IN {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 15}))) then
            return TRUE;

    return FALSE;
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/AArch32.CheckSystemAccess

```
// AArch32.CheckSystemAccess()
// =====
// Check System register access instruction for enables and disables

AArch32.CheckSystemAccess(integer cp_num, bits(32) instr)
    assert cp_num == UInt(instr<11:8>) && (cp_num IN {14,15});

    // Decode the AArch32 System register access instruction
    if instr<31:28> != '1111' && instr<27:24> == '1110' && instr<4> == '1' then // MRC/MCR
        cpvt = TRUE; cpdt = FALSE; nreg = 1;
        opc1 = UInt(instr<23:21>);
        opc2 = UInt(instr<7:5>);
        CRn = UInt(instr<19:16>);
        CRm = UInt(instr<3:0>);
    elseif instr<31:28> != '1111' && instr<27:21> == '110010' then // MRRC/MCRR
        cpvt = TRUE; cpdt = FALSE; nreg = 2;
        opc1 = UInt(instr<7:4>);
        CRm = UInt(instr<3:0>);
    elseif instr<31:28> != '1111' && instr<27:25> == '110' && instr<22> == '0' then // LDC/STC
        cpvt = FALSE; cpdt = TRUE; nreg = 0;
        opc1 = 0;
        CRn = UInt(instr<15:12>);
    else
        allocated = FALSE;

    //
    // Coarse-grain decode into CP14 or CP15 encoding space. Each of the CPxxxInstrDecode functions
    // returns TRUE if the instruction is allocated at the current Exception level, FALSE otherwise.
    if cp_num == 14 then
        // LDC and STC only supported for c5 in CP14 encoding space
        if cpdt && CRn != 5 then
            allocated = FALSE;
        else
            // Coarse-grained decode of CP14 based on opc1 field
            case opc1 of
                when 0    allocated = CP14DebugInstrDecode(instr);
                when 1    allocated = CP14TraceInstrDecode(instr);
                when 7    allocated = CP14JazelleInstrDecode(instr); // JIDR only
                otherwise allocated = FALSE; // All other values are unallocated

    elseif cp_num == 15 then
        // LDC and STC not supported in CP15 encoding space
        if !cpvt then
            allocated = FALSE;
        else
            allocated = CP15InstrDecode(instr);

            // Coarse-grain traps to EL2 have a higher priority than exceptions generated because
            // the access instruction is UNDEFINED
            if AArch32.CheckCP15InstrCoarseTraps(CRn, nreg, CRm) then
                // For a coarse-grain trap, if it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether an access from
                // Non-secure User mode is UNDEFINED when the trap is disabled, then it is
                // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the same access is UNDEFINED or generates a trap
                // when the trap is enabled.
                if PSTATE.EL == EL0 && !IsSecure() && !allocated then
                    if boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "UNDEF unallocated CP15 access at NS EL0" then
                        UNDEFINED;
                    AArch32.AArch32SystemAccessTrap(EL2, instr);

    else
        allocated = FALSE;

    if !allocated then
        UNDEFINED;

    // If the instruction is not UNDEFINED, it might be disabled or trapped to a higher EL.
```

```
AArch32.CheckSystemAccessTraps(instr);

return;
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/AArch32.CheckSystemAccessTraps

```
// Check for configurable disables or traps to a higher EL of an System register access.
AArch32.CheckSystemAccessTraps(bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/CP14DebugInstrDecode

```
// Decodes an accepted access to a debug System register in the CP14 encoding space.
// Returns TRUE if the instruction is allocated at the current Exception level, FALSE otherwise.
boolean CP14DebugInstrDecode(bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/CP14JazelleInstrDecode

```
// Decodes an accepted access to a Jazelle System register in the CP14 encoding space.
// Returns TRUE if the instruction is allocated at the current Exception level, FALSE otherwise.
boolean CP14JazelleInstrDecode(bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/CP14TraceInstrDecode

```
// Decodes an accepted access to a trace System register in the CP14 encoding space.
// Returns TRUE if the instruction is allocated at the current Exception level, FALSE otherwise.
boolean CP14TraceInstrDecode(bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/coproc/CP15InstrDecode

```
// Decodes an accepted access to a System register in the CP15 encoding space.
// Returns TRUE if the instruction is allocated at the current Exception level, FALSE otherwise.
boolean CP15InstrDecode(bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/exclusive/AArch32.ExclusiveMonitorsPass

```
// AArch32.ExclusiveMonitorsPass()
// =====

// Return TRUE if the Exclusive Monitors for the current PE include all of the addresses
// associated with the virtual address region of size bytes starting at address.
// The immediately following memory write must be to the same addresses.

boolean AArch32.ExclusiveMonitorsPass(bits(32) address, integer size)

    // It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the detection of memory aborts happens
    // before or after the check on the local Exclusive Monitor. As a result a failure
    // of the local monitor can occur on some implementations even if the memory
    // access would give an memory abort.

    acctype = AccType_ATOMIC;
    iswrite = TRUE;
    aligned = (address == Align(address, size));

    if !aligned then
        secondstage = FALSE;
        AArch32.Abort(address, AArch32.AlignmentFault(acctype, iswrite, secondstage));

    passed = AArch32.IsExclusiveVA(address, ProcessorID(), size);
    if !passed then
        return FALSE;
    memaddrdesc = AArch32.ValidateAddress(address, acctype, iswrite, aligned, size);

    // Check for aborts or debug exceptions
```

```

if IsFault(memaddrdesc) then
    AArch32.Abort(address, memaddrdesc.fault);

passed = IsExclusiveLocal(memaddrdesc.paddress, ProcessorID(), size);

if passed then
    ClearExclusiveLocal(ProcessorID());
    if memaddrdesc.memattrs.shareable then
        passed = IsExclusiveGlobal(memaddrdesc.paddress, ProcessorID(), size);

return passed;

```

aarch32/functions/exclusive/AArch32.IsExclusiveVA

```

// An optional IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED test for an exclusive access to a virtual
// address region of size bytes starting at address.
//
// It is permitted (but not required) for this function to return FALSE and
// cause a store exclusive to fail if the virtual address region is not
// totally included within the region recorded by MarkExclusiveVA().
//
// It is always safe to return TRUE which will check the physical address only.
boolean AArch32.IsExclusiveVA(bits(32) address, integer processorid, integer size);

```

aarch32/functions/exclusive/AArch32.MarkExclusiveVA

```

// Optionally record an exclusive access to the virtual address region of size bytes
// starting at address for processorid.
AArch32.MarkExclusiveVA(bits(32) address, integer processorid, integer size);

```

aarch32/functions/exclusive/AArch32.SetExclusiveMonitors

```

// AArch32.SetExclusiveMonitors()
// =====

// Sets the Exclusive Monitors for the current PE to record the addresses associated
// with the virtual address region of size bytes starting at address.

AArch32.SetExclusiveMonitors(bits(32) address, integer size)

    acctype = AccType_ATOMIC;
    iswrite = FALSE;
    aligned = (address != Align(address, size));
    memaddrdesc = AArch32.ValidateAddress(address, acctype, iswrite, aligned, size);

    // Check for aborts or debug exceptions
    if IsFault(memaddrdesc) then
        return;

    if memaddrdesc.memattrs.shareable then
        MarkExclusiveGlobal(memaddrdesc.paddress, ProcessorID(), size);

    MarkExclusiveLocal(memaddrdesc.paddress, ProcessorID(), size);

    AArch32.MarkExclusiveVA(address, ProcessorID(), size);

```

aarch32/functions/float/CheckAdvSIMDEnabled

```

// CheckAdvSIMDEnabled()
// =====

CheckAdvSIMDEnabled()

    fpexc_check = TRUE;
    advsimd = TRUE;

```



```
AArch32.CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled(fpexc_check, advsimd);
// Return from CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled() occurs only if Advanced SIMD access is permitted

// Make temporary copy of D registers
// _Dclone[] is used as input data for instruction pseudocode
for i = 0 to 31
    _Dclone[i] = D[i];

return;
```

aarch32/functions/float/CheckAdvSIMDOrVFPEEnabled

```
// CheckAdvSIMDOrVFPEEnabled()
// =====

CheckAdvSIMDOrVFPEEnabled(boolean include_fpexc_check, boolean advsimd)
    AArch32.CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled(include_fpexc_check, advsimd);
    // Return from CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled() occurs only if VFP access is permitted
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/float/CheckCryptoEnabled32

```
// CheckCryptoEnabled32()
// =====

CheckCryptoEnabled32()
    CheckAdvSIMDEnabled();
    // Return from CheckAdvSIMDEnabled() occurs only if access is permitted
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/float/CheckVFPEEnabled

```
// CheckVFPEEnabled()
// =====

CheckVFPEEnabled(boolean include_fpexc_check)
    advsimd = FALSE;
    AArch32.CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled(include_fpexc_check, advsimd);
    // Return from CheckAdvSIMDOrFPEEnabled() occurs only if VFP access is permitted
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/float/FPHalvedSub

```
// FPHalvedSub()
// =====

bits(N) FPHalvedSub(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    rounding = FPRoundingMode(fpcr);
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPType_Infinity); inf2 = (type2 == FPType_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPType_Zero); zero2 = (type2 == FPType_Zero);
        if inf1 && inf2 && sign1 == sign2 then
            result = FPDefaultNaN();
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
        elseif (inf1 && sign1 == '0') || (inf2 && sign2 == '1') then
            result = FPInfinity('0');
        elseif (inf1 && sign1 == '1') || (inf2 && sign2 == '0') then
            result = FPInfinity('1');
        elseif zero1 && zero2 && sign1 != sign2 then
            result = FPZero(sign1);
```

```

else
    result_value = (value1 - value2) / 2.0;
    if result_value == 0.0 then // Sign of exact zero result depends on rounding mode
        result_sign = if rounding == FPRounding\_NEGINF then '1' else '0';
        result = FPZero(result_sign);
    else
        result = FPRound(result_value, fpcr);
return result;

```

aarch32/functions/float/FPRSqrtStep

```

// FPRSqrtStep()
// =====

bits(32) FPRSqrtStep(bits(32) op1, bits(32) op2)
    FPCRTType fpcr = StandardFPSCRValue();
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPTYPE\_Infinity); inf2 = (type2 == FPTYPE\_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPTYPE\_Zero); zero2 = (type2 == FPTYPE\_Zero);
        bits(32) product;
        if (inf1 && zero2) || (zero1 && inf2) then
            product = FPZero('0');
        else
            product = FPMul(op1, op2, fpcr);
            result = FPHalvedSub(FPTThree('0'), product, fpcr);
    return result;

```

aarch32/functions/float/FPRecipStep

```

// FPRecipStep()
// =====

bits(32) FPRecipStep(bits(32) op1, bits(32) op2)
    FPCRTType fpcr = StandardFPSCRValue();
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPTYPE\_Infinity); inf2 = (type2 == FPTYPE\_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPTYPE\_Zero); zero2 = (type2 == FPTYPE\_Zero);
        bits(32) product;
        if (inf1 && zero2) || (zero1 && inf2) then
            product = FPZero('0');
        else
            product = FPMul(op1, op2, fpcr);
            result = FPSub(FPTwo('0'), product, fpcr);
    return result;

```

aarch32/functions/float/StandardFPSCRValue

```

// StandardFPSCRValue()
// =====

FPCRTType StandardFPSCRValue()
    return '00000' : FPSCR.AHP : '11000000000000000000000000000000';

```

aarch32/functions/memory/AArch32.CheckAlignment

```

// AArch32.CheckAlignment()
// =====

boolean AArch32.CheckAlignment(bits(32) address, integer alignment, AccType acctype,

```

```

        boolean iswrite)

    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        A = HSCTLR.A;
    else
        A = SCTLR.A;
    aligned = (address == Align(address, alignment));

    // AccType_VEC is used for SIMD element alignment checks only
    check = (acctype == AccType_ATOMIC || acctype == AccType_ORDERED || acctype == AccType_VEC || A ==
'1');

    if check && !aligned then
        secondstage = FALSE;
        AArch32.Abort(address, AArch32.AlignmentFault(acctype, iswrite, secondstage));

    return aligned;

```

aarch32/functions/memory/AArch32.MemSingle

```

// AArch32.MemSingle[] - non-assignment (read) form
// =====
// Perform an atomic, little-endian read of 'size' bytes.

bits(size*8) AArch32.MemSingle[bits(32) address, integer size, AccType acctype, boolean wasaligned]
    assert size IN {1, 2, 4, 8, 16};
    assert address == Align(address, size);

    AddressDescriptor memaddrdesc;
    bits(size*8) value;
    iswrite = FALSE;

    // MMU or MPU
    memaddrdesc = AArch32.ValidateAddress(address, acctype, iswrite, wasaligned, size);
    // Check for aborts or debug exceptions
    if IsFault(memaddrdesc) then
        AArch32.Abort(address, memaddrdesc.fault);

    // Memory array access
    value = _Mem[memaddrdesc, size, acctype];
    return value;

// AArch32.MemSingle[] - assignment (write) form
// =====
// Perform an atomic, little-endian write of 'size' bytes.

AArch32.MemSingle[bits(32) address, integer size, AccType acctype, boolean wasaligned] = bits(size*8)
value
    assert size IN {1, 2, 4, 8, 16};
    assert address == Align(address, size);

    AddressDescriptor memaddrdesc;
    iswrite = TRUE;

    // MMU or MPU
    memaddrdesc = AArch32.ValidateAddress(address, acctype, iswrite, wasaligned, size);

    // Check for aborts or debug exceptions
    if IsFault(memaddrdesc) then
        AArch32.Abort(address, memaddrdesc.fault);

    // Effect on exclusives
    if memaddrdesc.memattrs.shareable then
        ClearExclusiveByAddress(memaddrdesc.paddress, ProcessorID(), size);

```

```
// Memory array access
_Mem[memaddrdesc, size, acctype] = value;
return;
```

aarch32/functions/memory/Hint_PreloadData

```
Hint_PreloadData(bits(32) address);
```

aarch32/functions/memory/Hint_PreloadDataForWrite

```
Hint_PreloadDataForWrite(bits(32) address);
```

aarch32/functions/memory/Hint_PreloadInstr

```
Hint_PreloadInstr(bits(32) address);
```

aarch32/functions/memory/MemA

```
// MemA[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(8*size) MemA(bits(32) address, integer size)
    acctype = AccType_ATOMIC;
    return Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype];

// MemA[] - assignment form
// =====

MemA(bits(32) address, integer size) = bits(8*size) value
    acctype = AccType_ATOMIC;
    Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype] = value;
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/memory/MemO

```
// MemO[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(8*size) MemO(bits(32) address, integer size)
    acctype = AccType_ORDERED;
    return Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype];

// MemO[] - assignment form
// =====

MemO(bits(32) address, integer size) = bits(8*size) value
    acctype = AccType_ORDERED;
    Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype] = value;
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/memory/MemU

```
// MemU[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(8*size) MemU(bits(32) address, integer size)
    acctype = AccType_NORMAL;
    return Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype];

// MemU[] - assignment form
// =====

MemU(bits(32) address, integer size) = bits(8*size) value
```

```
acctype = AccType_NORMAL;
Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype] = value;
return;
```

aarch32/functions/memory/MemU_unpriv

```
// MemU_unpriv[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(8*size) MemU_unpriv[bits(32) address, integer size]
    acctype = AccType_UNPRIV;
    return Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype];

// MemU_unpriv[] - assignment form
// =====

MemU_unpriv[bits(32) address, integer size] = bits(8*size) value
    acctype = AccType_UNPRIV;
    Mem_with_type[address, size, acctype] = value;
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/memory/Mem_with_type

```
// Mem_with_type[] - non-assignment (read) form
// =====
// Perform a read of 'size' bytes. The access byte order is reversed for a big-endian access.
// Instruction fetches would call AArch32.MemSingle directly.

bits(size*8) Mem_with_type[bits(32) address, integer size, AccType acctype]
    assert size IN {1, 2, 4, 8, 16};
    bits(size*8) value;
    integer i;
    boolean iswrite = FALSE;

    aligned = AArch32.CheckAlignment(address, size, acctype, iswrite);
    if !aligned then
        assert size > 1;
        value<7:0> = AArch32.MemSingle[address, 1, acctype, aligned];

        // For subsequent bytes it is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether an unaligned Device memory
        // access will generate an Alignment Fault, as to get this far means the first byte did
        // not, so we must be changing to a new translation page.
        c = ConstrainUnpredictable();
        assert c IN {Constraint_FAULT, Constraint_NONE};
        if c == Constraint_NONE then aligned = TRUE;

        for i = 1 to size-1
            value<8*i+7:8*i> = AArch32.MemSingle[address+i, 1, acctype, aligned];
    else
        value = AArch32.MemSingle[address, size, acctype, aligned];

    if BigEndian() then
        value = BigEndianReverse(value);
    return value;

// Mem_with_type[] - assignment (write) form
// =====
// Perform a write of 'size' bytes. The byte order is reversed for a big-endian access.

Mem_with_type[bits(32) address, integer size, AccType acctype] = bits(size*8) value
    integer i;
    boolean iswrite = TRUE;

    if BigEndian() then
        value = BigEndianReverse(value);
```

```
aligned = AArch32.CheckAlignment(address, size, acctype, iswrite);

if !aligned then
    assert size > 1;
    AArch32.MemSingle[address, 1, acctype, aligned] = value<7:0>;

    // For subsequent bytes it is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether an unaligned Device memory
    // access will generate an Alignment Fault, as to get this far means the first byte did
    // not, so we must be changing to a new translation page.
    c = ConstrainUnpredictable();
    assert c IN {Constraint_FAULT, Constraint_NONE};
    if c == Constraint_NONE then aligned = TRUE;

    for i = 1 to size-1
        AArch32.MemSingle[address+i, 1, acctype, aligned] = value<8*i+7:8*i>;
else
    AArch32.MemSingle[address, size, acctype, aligned] = value;
return;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/AArch32.ResetGeneralRegisters

```
// AArch32.ResetGeneralRegisters()
// =====

AArch32.ResetGeneralRegisters()

    for i = 0 to 7
        R[i] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    for i = 8 to 12
        Rmode[i, M32_User] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        Rmode[i, M32_FIQ] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    if HaveEL(EL2) then Rmode[13, M32_Hyp] = bits(32) UNKNOWN; // No R14_hyp
    for i = 13 to 14
        Rmode[i, M32_User] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        Rmode[i, M32_FIQ] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        Rmode[i, M32_IRQ] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        Rmode[i, M32_Svc] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        Rmode[i, M32_Abort] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        Rmode[i, M32_Undef] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        if HaveEL(EL3) then Rmode[i, M32_Monitor] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

return;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/AArch32.ResetSIMDFPRegisters

```
// AArch32.ResetSIMDFPRegisters()
// =====

AArch32.ResetSIMDFPRegisters()

    for i = 0 to 15
        Q[i] = bits(128) UNKNOWN;

return;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/AArch32.ResetSpecialRegisters

```
// AArch32.ResetSpecialRegisters()
// =====

AArch32.ResetSpecialRegisters()

    // AArch32 special registers
    SPSR_fiq = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    SPSR_irq = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    SPSR_svc = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
```

```
SPSR_abt = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
SPSR_und = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
if HaveEL(EL2) then
    SPSR_hyp = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    ELR_hyp = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
if HaveEL(EL3) then
    SPSR_mon = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

// External debug special registers
DLR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
DPSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

return;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/AArch32.ResetSystemRegisters

```
AArch32.ResetSystemRegisters(boolean cold_reset);
```

aarch32/functions/registers/ALUExceptionReturn

```
// ALUExceptionReturn()
// =====

ALUExceptionReturn(bits(32) address)
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        UNDEFINED;
    elseif PSTATE.M IN {M32_User, M32_System} then
        UNPREDICTABLE; // UNDEFINED or NOP
    else
        AArch32.ExceptionReturn(address, SPSR[]);
```

aarch32/functions/registers/ALUWritePC

```
// ALUWritePC()
// =====

ALUWritePC(bits(32) address)
    if CurrentInstrSet() == InstrSet_A32 then
        BXWritePC(address);
    else
        BranchWritePC(address);
```

aarch32/functions/registers/BXWritePC

```
// BXWritePC()
// =====

BXWritePC(bits(32) address)
    if address<0> == '1' then
        SelectInstrSet(InstrSet_T32);
        address<0> = '0';
    else
        SelectInstrSet(InstrSet_A32);
        // For branches to an unaligned PC counter in A32 state, the processor takes the branch
        // and does one of:
        // * Forces the address to be aligned
        // * Leaves the PC unaligned, meaning the target generates a PC Alignment fault.
        if address<1> == '1' && ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then
            address<1> = '0';
        BranchTo(address, BranchType_UNKNOWN);
```

aarch32/functions/registers/BranchWritePC

```
// BranchWritePC()
// =====

BranchWritePC(bits(32) address)
    if CurrentInstrSet() == InstrSet_A32 then
        address<1:0> = '00';
    else
        address<0> = '0';
    BranchTo(address, BranchType_UNKNOWN);
```

aarch32/functions/registers/D

```
// D[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(64) D[integer n]
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 31;
    base = (n MOD 2) * 64;
    return _V[n DIV 2]<base+63:base>;

// D[] - assignment form
// =====

D[integer n] = bits(64) value
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 31;
    base = (n MOD 2) * 64;
    _V[n DIV 2]<base+63:base> = value;
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/Din

```
// Din[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(64) Din[integer n]
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 31;
    return _Dclone[n];
```

aarch32/functions/registers/LR

```
// LR - assignment form
// =====

LR = bits(32) value
    R[14] = value;
    return;

// LR - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) LR
    return R[14];
```

aarch32/functions/registers/LoadWritePC

```
// LoadWritePC()
// =====

LoadWritePC(bits(32) address)
    BXWritePC(address);
```


aarch32/functions/registers/LookUpRIndex

```
// LookUpRIndex()
// =====

integer LookUpRIndex(integer n, bits(5) mode)
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 14;

    case n of // Select index by mode:    usr fiq irq svc abt und hyp
        when 8    result = RBankSelect(mode, 8, 24, 8, 8, 8, 8, 8);
        when 9    result = RBankSelect(mode, 9, 25, 9, 9, 9, 9, 9);
        when 10   result = RBankSelect(mode, 10, 26, 10, 10, 10, 10, 10);
        when 11   result = RBankSelect(mode, 11, 27, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11);
        when 12   result = RBankSelect(mode, 12, 28, 12, 12, 12, 12, 12);
        when 13   result = RBankSelect(mode, 13, 29, 17, 19, 21, 23, 15);
        when 14   result = RBankSelect(mode, 14, 30, 16, 18, 20, 22, 14);
        otherwise result = n;

    return result;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/Monitor_mode_registers

```
bits(32) SP_mon;
bits(32) LR_mon;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/PC

```
// PC - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) PC
    return R[15]; // This includes the offset from AArch32 state
```

aarch32/functions/registers/PCStoreValue

```
// PCStoreValue()
// =====

bits(32) PCStoreValue()
    // This function returns the PC value. On architecture versions before ARMv7, it
    // is permitted to instead return PC+4, provided it does so consistently. It is
    // used only to describe A32 instructions, so it returns the address of the current
    // instruction plus 8 (normally) or 12 (when the alternative is permitted).
    return PC;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/Q

```
// Q[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(128) Q[integer n]
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 15;
    return _V[n];

// Q[] - assignment form
// =====

Q[integer n] = bits(128) value
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 15;
    _V[n] = value;
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/Qin

```
// Qin[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(128) Qin[integer n]
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 15;
    return Din[2*n+1]:Din[2*n];
```

aarch32/functions/registers/R

```
// R[] - assignment form
// =====

R[integer n] = bits(32) value
    Rmode[n, PSTATE.M] = value;
    return;

// R[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) R[integer n]
    if n == 15 then
        offset = (if CurrentInstrSet() == InstrSet_A32 then 8 else 4);
        return _PC<31:0> + offset;
    else
        return Rmode[n, PSTATE.M];
```

aarch32/functions/registers/RBankSelect

```
// RBankSelect()
// =====

integer RBankSelect(bits(5) mode, integer usr, integer fiq, integer irq,
                    integer svc, integer abt, integer und, integer hyp)

    case mode of
        when M32_User    result = usr; // User mode
        when M32_FIQ     result = fiq; // FIQ mode
        when M32_IRQ     result = irq; // IRQ mode
        when M32_Svc     result = svc; // Supervisor mode
        when M32_Abort    result = abt; // Abort mode
        when M32_Hyp     result = hyp; // Hyp mode
        when M32_Undef    result = und; // Undefined mode
        when M32_System   result = usr; // System mode uses User mode registers
        otherwise        Unreachable(); // Monitor mode

    return result;
```

aarch32/functions/registers/Rmode

```
// Rmode[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) Rmode[integer n, bits(5) mode]
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 14;

    // Check for attempted use of Monitor mode in Non-secure state.
    if !IsSecure() then assert mode != M32_Monitor;
    assert !BadMode(mode);

    if mode == M32_Monitor then
        if n == 13 then return SP_mon;
        elseif n == 14 then return LR_mon;
        else return _R[n]<31:0>;
    else
```

```

        return _R[LookUpRIndex(n, mode)]<31:0>;

// Rmode[] - assignment form
// =====

Rmode[integer n, bits(5) mode] = bits(32) value
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 14;

    // Check for attempted use of Monitor mode in Non-secure state.
    if !IsSecure() then assert mode != M32_Monitor;
    assert !BadMode(mode);

    if mode == M32_Monitor then
        if n == 13 then SP_mon = value;
        elseif n == 14 then LR_mon = value;
        else _R[n]<31:0> = value;
    else
        // It is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether the upper 32 bits of the X
        // register are unchanged or set to zero. This is also tested for on
        // exception entry, as this applies to all AArch32 registers.
        if !HighestELUsingAArch32() && ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then
            _R[LookUpRIndex(n, mode)] = ZeroExtend(value);
        else
            _R[LookUpRIndex(n, mode)]<31:0> = value;

    return;

```

aarch32/functions/registers/S

```

// S[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) S[integer n]
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 31;
    base = (n MOD 4) * 32;
    return _V[n DIV 4]<base+31:base>;

// S[] - assignment form
// =====

S[integer n] = bits(32) value
    assert n >= 0 && n <= 31;
    base = (n MOD 4) * 32;
    _V[n DIV 4]<base+31:base> = value;
    return;

```

aarch32/functions/registers/SP

```

// SP - assignment form
// =====

SP = bits(32) value
    R[13] = value;
    return;

// SP - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) SP
    return R[13];

```

aarch32/functions/registers/_Dclone

```

array bits(64) _Dclone[0..31];

```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.ExceptionReturn

```
// AArch32.ExceptionReturn()
// =====

AArch32.ExceptionReturn(bits(32) new_pc, bits(32) spsr)

    // Attempts to change to an illegal mode or state will invoke the Illegal Execution state
    // mechanism
    SetPSTATEFromPSR(spsr);
    ClearExclusiveLocal(ProcessorID());
    EventRegisterSet();

    // Align PC[1:0] according to the target instruction set state
    if spsr<5> == '1' then // T32
        new_pc = Align(new_pc, 2);
    else // A32
        new_pc = Align(new_pc, 4);

    BranchTo(new_pc, BranchType_UNKNOWN);
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.ITAdvance

```
// AArch32.ITAdvance()
// =====

AArch32.ITAdvance()
    if PSTATE.IT<2:0> == '000' then
        PSTATE.IT = '00000000';
    else
        PSTATE.IT<4:0> = LSL(PSTATE.IT<4:0>, 1);
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.SysRegRead

```
// Read from a 32-bit AArch32 System register and return the register's contents.
bits(32) AArch32.SysRegRead(integer cp_num, bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.SysRegRead64

```
// Read from a 64-bit AArch32 System register and return the register's contents.
bits(64) AArch32.SysRegRead64(integer cp_num, bits(32) instr);
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.SysRegReadCanWriteAPSR

```
// AArch32.SysRegReadCanWriteAPSR()
// =====
// Determines whether the AArch32 System register read instruction can write to APSR flags.

boolean AArch32.SysRegReadCanWriteAPSR(integer cp_num, bits(32) instr)
    assert UsingAArch32();
    assert (cp_num IN {14,15});
    assert cp_num == UInt(instr<11:8>);

    opc1 = UInt(instr<23:21>);
    opc2 = UInt(instr<7:5>);
    CRn = UInt(instr<19:16>);
    CRm = UInt(instr<3:0>);

    if cp_num == 14 && opc1 == 0 && CRn == 0 && CRm == 1 && opc2 == 0 then // DBGDSCRint
        return TRUE;

    return FALSE;
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.SysRegWrite

```
// Write to a 32-bit AArch32 System register.
AArch32.SysRegWrite(integer cp_num, bits(32) instr, bits(32) val);
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.SysRegWrite64

```
// Write to a 64-bit AArch32 System register.
AArch32.SysRegWrite64(integer cp_num, bits(32) instr, bits(64) val);
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.WriteMode

```
// AArch32.WriteMode()
// =====
// Function for dealing with writes to PSTATE.M from AArch32 state only.
// This ensures that PSTATE.EL and PSTATE.SP are always valid.

AArch32.WriteMode(bits(5) mode)
    (valid,e1) = ELFromM32(mode);
    assert valid;
    PSTATE.M = mode;
    PSTATE.EL = e1;
    PSTATE.nRW = '1';
    PSTATE.SP = (if mode IN {M32_User,M32_System} then '0' else '1');
    return;
```

aarch32/functions/system/AArch32.WriteModeByInstr

```
// AArch32.WriteModeByInstr()
// =====
// Function for dealing with writes to PSTATE.M from an AArch32 instruction, and ensuring that
// illegal state changes are correctly flagged in PSTATE.IL.

AArch32.WriteModeByInstr(bits(5) mode)
    (valid,e1) = ELFromM32(mode);

    // 'valid' is set to FALSE if 'mode' is invalid for this implementation or the current value
    // of SCR.NS/SCR_EL3.NS. Additionally, it is illegal for an instruction to write 'mode' to
    // PSTATE.EL if it would result in any of:
    // * A change to a mode that would cause entry to a higher Exception level.
    if UInt(e1) > UInt(PSTATE.EL) then
        valid = FALSE;

    // * A change to or from Hyp mode.
    if (PSTATE.M == M32_Hyp || mode == M32_Hyp) && PSTATE.M != mode then
        valid = FALSE;

    if !valid then
        PSTATE.IL = '1';
    else
        AArch32.WriteMode(mode);
```

aarch32/functions/system/BadMode

```
// BadMode()
// =====

boolean BadMode(bits(5) mode)
    // Return TRUE if 'mode' encodes a mode that is not valid for this implementation
    case mode of
        when M32_Hyp
            valid = HaveEL(EL2);
        when M32_FIQ, M32_IRQ, M32_Svc, M32_Abort, M32_Undef, M32_System
            valid = TRUE;
        when M32_User
```

```

        valid = TRUE;
    otherwise
        valid = FALSE;          // Passed an illegal mode value
    return !valid;

```

aarch32/functions/system/BankedRegisterAccessValid

```

// BankedRegisterAccessValid()
// =====
// Checks for MRS (Banked register) or MSR (Banked register) accesses to registers
// other than the SPSRs that are invalid. This includes ELR_hyp accesses.

BankedRegisterAccessValid(bits(5) SYSm, bits(5) mode)

case SYSm of
    when '000xx', '00100'                // R8_usr to R12_usr
        if mode != M32_FIQ then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '00101'                          // SP_usr
        if mode == M32_System then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '00110'                          // LR_usr
        if mode IN {M32_Hyp, M32_System} then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '010xx', '0110x', '01110'       // R8_fiq to R12_fiq, SP_fiq, LR_fiq
        if mode == M32_FIQ then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '1000x'                          // LR_irq, SP_irq
        if mode == M32_IRQ then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '1001x'                          // LR_svc, SP_svc
        if mode == M32_Svc then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '1010x'                          // LR_abt, SP_abt
        if mode == M32_Abort then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '1011x'                          // LR_und, SP_und
        if mode == M32_Undef then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '1110x'                          // LR_mon, SP_mon
        if !HaveEL(EL3) || !IsSecure() || mode == M32_Monitor then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '11110'                          // ELR_hyp, only from Monitor or Hyp mode
        if !HaveEL(EL2) || !(mode IN {M32_Monitor, M32_Hyp}) then UNPREDICTABLE;
    when '11111'                          // SP_hyp, only from Monitor mode
        if !HaveEL(EL2) || mode != M32_Monitor then UNPREDICTABLE;
    otherwise
        UNPREDICTABLE;

return;

```

aarch32/functions/system/CPSRWriteByInstr

```

// CPSRWriteByInstr()
// =====
// Update PSTATE.<N,Z,C,V,Q,GE,E,A,I,F,M> from a CPSR value written by an MSR instruction.

CPSRWriteByInstr(bits(32) value, bits(4) bytemask)
    privileged = PSTATE.EL != EL0;          // PSTATE.<A,I,F,M> are not writable at EL0

    // Write PSTATE from 'value', ignoring bytes masked by 'bytemask'
    if bytemask<3> == '1' then
        PSTATE.<N,Z,C,V,Q> = value<31:27>;
        // Bits <26:24> are ignored

    if bytemask<2> == '1' then
        // Bits <23:20> are RES0
        PSTATE.GE = value<19:16>;
    if bytemask<1> == '1' then
        // Bits <15:10> are RES0
        PSTATE.E = value<9>;                // PSTATE.E is writable at EL0
        if privileged then
            PSTATE.A = value<8>;

    if bytemask<0> == '1' then

```

```

    if privileged then
        PSTATE.<I,F> = value<7:6>;
        // Bit <5> is RES0
        // AArch32.WriteModeByInstr() sets PSTATE.IL to 1 if this is an illegal mode change.
        AArch32.WriteModeByInstr(value<4:0>);

    return;

```

aarch32/functions/system/ConditionPassed

```

// ConditionPassed()
// =====

boolean ConditionPassed()
    return ConditionHolds(AArch32.CurrentCond());

```

aarch32/functions/system/CurrentCond

```

bits(4) AArch32.CurrentCond();

```

aarch32/functions/system/InITBlock

```

// InITBlock()
// =====

boolean InITBlock()
    if CurrentInstrSet() == InstrSet_T32 then
        return PSTATE.IT<3:0> != '0000';
    else
        return FALSE;

```

aarch32/functions/system/LastInITBlock

```

// LastInITBlock()
// =====

boolean LastInITBlock()
    return (PSTATE.IT<3:0> == '1000');

```

aarch32/functions/system/SPSRWriteByInstr

```

// SPSRWriteByInstr()
// =====

SPSRWriteByInstr(bits(32) value, bits(4) bytemask)

    new_spsr = SPSR[];

    if bytemask<3> == '1' then
        new_spsr<31:24> = value<31:24>; // N,Z,C,V,Q flags, IT[1:0],J bits

    if bytemask<2> == '1' then
        new_spsr<23:16> = value<23:16>; // IL bit, GE[3:0] flags

    if bytemask<1> == '1' then
        new_spsr<15:8> = value<15:8>; // IT[7:2] bits, E bit, A interrupt mask

    if bytemask<0> == '1' then
        new_spsr<7:0> = value<7:0>; // I,F interrupt masks, T bit, Mode bits

    SPSR[] = new_spsr; // UNPREDICTABLE if User or System mode

    return;

```

aarch32/functions/system/SPSRAccessValid

```
// SPSRAccessValid()
// =====
// Checks for MRS (Banked register) or MSR (Banked register) accesses to the SPSRs
// that are UNPREDICTABLE

SPSRAccessValid(bits(5) SYSm, bits(5) mode)
    case SYSm of
        when '01110' // SPSR_fiq
            if mode == M32_FIQ then UNPREDICTABLE;
        when '10000' // SPSR_irq
            if mode == M32_IRQ then UNPREDICTABLE;
        when '10010' // SPSR_svc
            if mode == M32_Svc then UNPREDICTABLE;
        when '10100' // SPSR_abt
            if mode == M32_Abort then UNPREDICTABLE;
        when '10110' // SPSR_und
            if mode == M32_Undef then UNPREDICTABLE;
        when '11100' // SPSR_mon
            if !HaveEL(EL3) || mode == M32_Monitor || !IsSecure() then UNPREDICTABLE;
        when '11110' // SPSR_hyp
            if !HaveEL(EL2) || mode != M32_Monitor then UNPREDICTABLE;
        otherwise
            UNPREDICTABLE;

    return;
```

aarch32/functions/system/SelectInstrSet

```
// SelectInstrSet()
// =====

SelectInstrSet(InstrSet iset)
    assert CurrentInstrSet() IN {InstrSet_A32, InstrSet_T32};
    assert iset IN {InstrSet_A32, InstrSet_T32};

    PSTATE.T = if iset == InstrSet_A32 then '0' else '1';

    return;
```

aarch32/functions/v6simd/Sat

```
// Sat()
// =====

bits(N) Sat(integer i, integer N, boolean unsigned)
    result = if unsigned then UnsignedSat(i, N) else SignedSat(i, N);
    return result;
```

aarch32/functions/v6simd/SignedSat

```
// SignedSat()
// =====

bits(N) SignedSat(integer i, integer N)
    (result, -) = SignedSatQ(i, N);
    return result;
```

aarch32/functions/v6simd/UnsignedSat

```
// UnsignedSat()
// =====
```



```
bits(N) UnsignedSat(integer i, integer N)
    (result, -) = UnsignedSatQ(i, N);
    return result;
```

H1.2.4 aarch32/translation

aarch32/translation/attrs/AArch32.InstructionDevice

```
// AArch32.InstructionDevice()
// =====
// Instruction fetches from memory marked as Device but not execute-never might generate a
// Permission Fault but are otherwise treated as if from Normal Non-cacheable memory.

AddressDescriptor AArch32.InstructionDevice(AddressDescriptor addrdesc, bits(32) vaddress,
                                             bits(32) ipaddress, integer level, bits(4) domain,
                                             AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage,
                                             boolean s2fs1walk)

    c = ConstrainUnpredictable();
    assert c IN {Constraint_NONE, Constraint_FAULT};

    if c == Constraint_FAULT then
        addrdesc.fault = AArch32.PermissionFault(ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,
                                                  secondstage, s2fs1walk);
    else
        addrdesc.memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        addrdesc.memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
        addrdesc.memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_No;
        addrdesc.memattrs.outer = addrdesc.memattrs.inner;
        addrdesc.memattrs = MemAttrDefaults(addrdesc.memattrs);

    return addrdesc;
```

aarch32/translation/attrs/AArch32.ValidateAddressS1Off

```
// AArch32.ValidateAddressS1Off()
// =====
// Called for getting default attributes when stage 1 validation is disabled.

MPURecord AArch32.ValidateAddressS1Off(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite)

    MPURecord result;
    boolean secondstage = FALSE;
    result.br_enabled = FALSE;
    default_cacheable = HasS2Validation() && (HCR.DC == '1');

    if default_cacheable then
        // Use default cacheability settings
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_WB; // Write-back
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_RWA;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.shareable = FALSE;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.outershareable = FALSE;

    elseif acctype != AccType_IFETCH then
        // Background memory map for data access
        result.addrdesc.memattrs = BackgroundMemoryAttr(address, secondstage);

    else
        // Background memory map for instruction fetch
        // Check for instruction fetch from execute-never memory address range
        if address<31> == '1' then
            result.perms.ap = bits(3) UNKNOWN;
            result.perms.xn = '1';
```

```

    result.perms.pxn = '0';
    result.addrdesc.address.physicaladdress = address;

    // Instruction fetch from execute-never memory address range should be
    // marked as permission fault and return.
    result.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.PermissionFault(address, bits(4) UNKNOWN, integer UNKNOWN,
                                                    acctype, iswrite, secondstage, FALSE);

    return result;

else
    // Instruction cacheability controlled by SCTL/HSCTLR.I
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        cacheable = HSCTLR.I == '1';
    else
        cacheable = SCTL.I == '1';

    result.addrdesc.memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
    if cacheable then
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_WT;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_RA;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.shareable = FALSE;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.outershareable = FALSE;
    else
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_No;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.shareable = TRUE;
        result.addrdesc.memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;

    // Use outer attributes as same as inner attributes
    // If no faults, populate rest of memattrs.
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.outer = result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs = MemAttrDefaults(result.addrdesc.memattrs);

    // Update permission information
    result.perms.ap = bits(3) UNKNOWN;
    result.perms.xn = '0';
    result.perms.pxn = '0';

    result.addrdesc.address.physicaladdress = address;
    result.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.NoFault();
    return result;

```

aarch32/translation/attrs/AArch32.ValidateAddressS2Off

```

// AArch32.ValidateAddressS2Off()
// =====
// Called for getting default attributes when stage 2 validation is disabled.

MPUREcord AArch32.ValidateAddressS2Off(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite)

MPUREcord result;
boolean secondstage = TRUE;
result.br_enabled = FALSE;

if acctype != AccType_IFETCH then
    // Background memory map for data access
    result.addrdesc.memattrs = BackgroundMemoryAttr(address, secondstage);
else
    // Background memory map for instruction fetch
    // Check for instruction fetch from execute-never memory address range
    if address<31> == '1' then
        result.perms.ap = bits(3) UNKNOWN;
        result.perms.xn = '1';
        result.perms.pxn = '0';
        result.addrdesc.address.physicaladdress = address;

```

```

// Instruction fetch from execute-never memory address range should be
// marked as permission fault and return.
result.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.PermissionFault(address, bits(4) UNKNOWN, integer UNKNOWN,
                                                acctype, iswrite, secondstage, FALSE);

return result;

else
// Stage2 validation happens for transactions from EL0/EL1 on PL2 MPU.
cacheable = HSCTLR.I == '1';

result.addrdesc.memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
if cacheable then
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_WT;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_RA;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.shareable = FALSE;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.outershareable = FALSE;
else
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_No;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.shareable = TRUE;
    result.addrdesc.memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;

// Use outer attributes as same as inner attributes
// If no faults, populate rest of memattrs.
result.addrdesc.memattrs.outer = result.addrdesc.memattrs.inner;
result.addrdesc.memattrs = MemAttrDefaults(result.addrdesc.memattrs);

// Update permission information
result.perms.ap = bits(3) UNKNOWN;
result.perms.xn = '0';
result.perms.pxn = '0';

result.addrdesc.paddress.physicaladdress = address;
result.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.NoFault();
return result;

```

aarch32/translation/checks/AArch32.CheckPermission

```

// AArch32.CheckPermission()
// =====
// Function used for permission checking from AArch32 stage 1 translations

FaultRecord AArch32.CheckPermission(Permissions perms, bits(32) vaddress, integer level,
                                      bits(4) domain, bit NS, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite)
assert ELUsingAArch32(S1ValidationRegime());

if PSTATE.EL != EL2 then
    wxn = SCTLR.WXN == '1';
    // v8R PMSA MPU follow Long-descriptor format
    priv_r = TRUE;
    priv_w = perms.ap<2> == '0';
    user_r = perms.ap<1> == '1';
    user_w = perms.ap<2:1> == '01';
    uwxn = SCTLR.UWXN == '1';

    user_xn = !user_r || perms.xn == '1' || (user_w && wxn);
    priv_xn = (!priv_r || perms.xn == '1' || perms.pxn == '1' ||
              (priv_w && wxn) || (user_w && uwxn));
    ispriv = PSTATE.EL != EL0 && acctype != AccType_UNPRIV;

    if ispriv then
        (r, w, xn) = (priv_r, priv_w, priv_xn);
    else
        (r, w, xn) = (user_r, user_w, user_xn);
else
    // Access from EL2
    wxn = HSCTLR.WXN == '1';

```

```

    r = TRUE;
    w = perms.ap<2> == '0';
    xn = perms.xn == '1' || (w && wxn);

    // Restriction on Secure instruction fetch

    if acctype == AccType_IFETCH then
        fail = xn;
    elseif iswrite then
        fail = !w;
        failedread = FALSE;
    else
        fail = !r;
        failedread = TRUE;

    if fail then
        secondstage = FALSE;
        s2fs1walk = FALSE;
        ipaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        return AArch32.PermissionFault(ipaddress, domain, level, acctype,
                                         !failedread, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
    else
        return AArch32.NoFault();

```

aarch32/translation/checks/AArch32.CheckS2Permission

```

// AArch32.CheckS2Permission()
// =====
// Function used for permission checking from AArch32 stage 2 translations

FaultRecord AArch32.CheckS2Permission(Permissions perms, bits(32) vaddress, bits(32) ipaddress,
                                       integer level, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite,
                                       boolean s2fs1walk)

    assert HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && ELUsingAArch32(EL2) && HasS2Validation();

    r = perms.ap<1> == '1';
    w = perms.ap<2> == '1';
    xn = !r || perms.xn == '1';

    // Stage 1 walk is checked as a read, regardless of the original type
    if acctype == AccType_IFETCH && !s2fs1walk then
        fail = xn;
    elseif iswrite && !s2fs1walk then
        fail = !w;
        failedread = FALSE;
    else
        fail = !r;
        failedread = !iswrite;

    if fail then
        domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
        secondstage = TRUE;
        return AArch32.PermissionFault(ipaddress, domain, level, acctype,
                                         !failedread, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
    else
        return AArch32.NoFault();

```

aarch32/translation/debug/AArch32.CheckBreakpoint

```

// AArch32.CheckBreakpoint()
// =====
// Called before executing the instruction of length "size" bytes at "vaddress" in an AArch32
// translation regime.
// The breakpoint can in fact be evaluated well ahead of execution, for example, at instruction
// fetch. This is the simple sequential execution of the program.

```

```

FaultRecord AArch32.CheckBreakpoint(bits(32) vaddress, integer size)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(S1ValidationRegime());
    assert size IN {2,4};

    match = FALSE;
    mismatch = FALSE;

    for i = 0 to UInt(DBGDIDR.BRPs)
        (match_i, mismatch_i) = AArch32.BreakpointMatch(i, vaddress, size);
        match = match || match_i;
        mismatch = mismatch || mismatch_i;

    if match && HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint() then
        reason = DebugHalt_Breakpoint;
        Halt(reason);
    elseif (match || mismatch) && DBGDSCRExt.MDBGGen == '1' && AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions() then
        acctype = AccType_IFETCH;
        iswrite = FALSE;
        debugmoe = DebugException_Breakpoint;
        return AArch32.DebugFault(acctype, iswrite, debugmoe);
    else
        return AArch32.NoFault();

```

aarch32/translation/debug/AArch32.CheckDebug

```

// AArch32.CheckDebug()
// =====
// Called on each access to check for a debug exception or entry to Debug state.

FaultRecord AArch32.CheckDebug(bits(32) vaddress, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, integer size)

    FaultRecord fault = AArch32.NoFault();

    d_side = (acctype != AccType_IFETCH);
    generate_exception = AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions() && DBGDSCRExt.MDBGGen == '1';
    halt = HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint();
    // Relative priority of Vector Catch and Breakpoint exceptions not defined in the architecture
    vector_catch_first = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();

    if !d_side && vector_catch_first && generate_exception then
        fault = AArch32.CheckVectorCatch(vaddress, size);

    if fault.type == Fault_None && (generate_exception || halt) then
        if d_side then
            fault = AArch32.CheckWatchpoint(vaddress, acctype, iswrite, size);
        else
            fault = AArch32.CheckBreakpoint(vaddress, size);

    if fault.type == Fault_None && !d_side && !vector_catch_first && generate_exception then
        return AArch32.CheckVectorCatch(vaddress, size);

    return fault;

```

aarch32/translation/debug/AArch32.CheckVectorCatch

```

// AArch32.CheckVectorCatch()
// =====
// Called before executing the instruction of length "size" bytes at "vaddress" in an AArch32
// translation regime.
// Vector Catch can in fact be evaluated well ahead of execution, for example, at instruction
// fetch. This is the simple sequential execution of the program.

FaultRecord AArch32.CheckVectorCatch(bits(32) vaddress, integer size)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(S1ValidationRegime());

```

```

match = AArch32.VCRMatch(vaddress);
if size == 4 && !match && AArch32.VCRMatch(vaddress + 2) then
    match = ConstrainUnpredictableBool();

if match && DBGDSCRext.MDBGGen == '1' && AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions() then
    acctype = AccType_IFETCH;
    iswrite = FALSE;
    debugmoe = DebugException_VectorCatch;
    return AArch32.DebugFault(acctype, iswrite, debugmoe);
else
    return AArch32.NoFault();

```

aarch32/translation/debug/AArch32.CheckWatchpoint

```

// AArch32.CheckWatchpoint()
// =====
// Called before accessing the memory location of "size" bytes at "address".

FaultRecord AArch32.CheckWatchpoint(bits(32) vaddress, AccType acctype,
                                     boolean iswrite, integer size)
    assert ELUsingAArch32(S1ValidationRegime());

    match = FALSE;
    ispriv = PSTATE.EL != EL0 && !(PSTATE.EL == EL1 && acctype == AccType_UNPRIV);

    for i = 0 to UInt(DBGDIDR.WRPs)
        match = match || AArch32.WatchpointMatch(i, vaddress, size, ispriv, iswrite);

    if match && HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint() then
        reason = DebugHalt_Watchpoint;
        Halt(reason);
    elseif match && DBGDSCRext.MDBGGen == '1' && AArch32.GenerateDebugExceptions() then
        debugmoe = DebugException_Watchpoint;
        return AArch32.DebugFault(acctype, iswrite, debugmoe);
    else
        return AArch32.NoFault();

```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.AccessFlagFault

```

// AArch32.AccessFlagFault()
// =====

FaultRecord AArch32.AccessFlagFault(bits(32) ipaddress, bits(4) domain, integer level,
                                     AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage,
                                     boolean s2fslwalk)

    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_AccessFlag, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,
                                     extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fslwalk);

```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.AddressSizeFault

```

// AArch32.AddressSizeFault()
// =====

FaultRecord AArch32.AddressSizeFault(bits(32) ipaddress, bits(4) domain, integer level,
                                     AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage,
                                     boolean s2fslwalk)

    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_AddressSize, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,
                                     extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fslwalk);

```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.AlignmentFault

```
// AArch32.AlignmentFault()
// =====

FaultRecord AArch32.AlignmentFault(AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage)

    ipaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    level = integer UNKNOWN;
    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    s2fs1walk = boolean UNKNOWN;

    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_Alignment, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,
                                     extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.AsynchExternalAbort

```
// AArch32.AsynchExternalAbort()
// =====
// Wrapper function for asynchronous external aborts

FaultRecord AArch32.AsynchExternalAbort(boolean parity, bit extflag)

    type = if parity then Fault_AsyncParity else Fault_AsyncExternal;
    ipaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    level = integer UNKNOWN;
    acctype = AccType_NORMAL;
    iswrite = boolean UNKNOWN;
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    secondstage = FALSE;
    s2fs1walk = FALSE;

    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(type, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite, extflag,
                                     debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.BackgroundFault

```
// AArch32.BackgroundFault()
// =====

FaultRecord AArch32.BackgroundFault(bits(32) ipaddress, bits(4) domain, integer level,
                                     AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage,
                                     boolean s2fs1walk)

    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_Background, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,
                                     extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.DebugFault

```
// AArch32.DebugFault()
// =====

FaultRecord AArch32.DebugFault(AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, bits(4) debugmoe)

    ipaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    level = integer UNKNOWN;
    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;
    secondstage = FALSE;
    s2fs1walk = FALSE;
```

```
return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_Debug, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,  
                                extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.DomainFault

```
// AArch32.DomainFault()  
// =====  
  
FaultRecord AArch32.DomainFault(bits(4) domain, integer level, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite)  
  
    ipaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;  
    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;  
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;  
    secondstage = FALSE;  
    s2fs1walk = FALSE;  
  
    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_Domain, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,  
                                    extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.NoFault

```
// AArch32.NoFault()  
// =====  
  
FaultRecord AArch32.NoFault()  
  
    ipaddress = bits(32) UNKNOWN;  
    domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;  
    level = integer UNKNOWN;  
    acctype = AccType_NORMAL;  
    iswrite = boolean UNKNOWN;  
    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;  
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;  
    secondstage = FALSE;  
    s2fs1walk = FALSE;  
  
    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_None, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,  
                                    extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.PermissionFault

```
// AArch32.PermissionFault()  
// =====  
  
FaultRecord AArch32.PermissionFault(bits(32) ipaddress, bits(4) domain, integer level,  
                                    AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage,  
                                    boolean s2fs1walk)  
  
    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;  
    debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;  
    return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_Permission, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,  
                                    extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fs1walk);
```

aarch32/translation/faults/AArch32.TranslationFault

```
// AArch32.TranslationFault()  
// =====  
  
FaultRecord AArch32.TranslationFault(bits(32) ipaddress, bits(4) domain, integer level,  
                                    AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage,  
                                    boolean s2fs1walk)  
  
    extflag = bit UNKNOWN;
```



```
debugmoe = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
return AArch32.CreateFaultRecord(Fault_Translation, ipaddress, domain, level, acctype, iswrite,
                                extflag, debugmoe, secondstage, s2fslwalk);
```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.AttrDecode

```
// AArch32.AttrDecode()
// =====
// Converts the attribute fields, using the HMAIR/MAIR, to orthogonal attributes and hints.

MemoryAttributes AArch32.AttrDecode(bits(2) SH, bits(3) attr, AccType acctype,
                                    boolean secondstage)

    MemoryAttributes memattrs;

    if !secondstage && PSTATE.EL != EL2 then
        mair = MAIR1:MAIR0;
    else
        mair = HMAIR1:HMAIR0;

    index = 8 * UInt(attr);
    attrfield = mair<index+7:index>;

    if ((attrfield<7:4> != '0000' && attrfield<3:0> == '0000') ||
        (attrfield<7:4> == '0000' && attrfield<3:0> != 'xx00')) then
        // Reserved, maps to an allocated value
        (-, attrfield) = ConstrainUnpredictableBits();

    if attrfield<7:4> == '0000' then // Device
        memattrs.type = MemType_Device;
        case attrfield<3:0> of
            when '0000' memattrs.device = DeviceType_nGnRnE;
            when '0100' memattrs.device = DeviceType_nGnRE;
            when '1000' memattrs.device = DeviceType_nGRE;
            when '1100' memattrs.device = DeviceType_GRE;
            otherwise Unreachable(); // Reserved, handled above

    elsif attrfield<3:0> != '0000' then // Normal
        memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        memattrs.outer = LongConvertAttrHints(attrfield<7:4>, acctype, secondstage);
        memattrs.inner = LongConvertAttrHints(attrfield<3:0>, acctype, secondstage);
        memattrs.shareable = SH<1> == '1';
        memattrs.outershareable = SH == '10';

    else
        Unreachable(); // Reserved, handled above

    return MemAttrDefaults(memattrs);
```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.CheckAddress

```
// AArch32.CheckAddress()
// =====
// Returns the result of address checks.

MPURRecord AArch32.CheckAddress(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite,
                                boolean secondstage)

    S1 = MPUCheck(address, acctype, iswrite, secondstage);
    return S1;
```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.FirstStageValidate

```
// AArch32.FirstStageValidate()
// =====
// Perform stage 1 validation for the memory access.
```

```

AddressDescriptor AArch32.FirstStageValidate(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite,
                                             boolean wasaligned)
    // Check whether stage 1 is enabled
    if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then
        s1_enabled = HCTL.R.M == '1';
    elseif HaveEL(EL2) then
        tge = HCR.TGE;
        dc = HCR.DC;
        s1_enabled = tge == '0' && SCTL.R.M == '1';
    else
        dc = HCR.DC;
        s1_enabled = && SCTL.R.M == '1';

    secondstage = FALSE;
    if s1_enabled then
        // First stage enabled
        S1 = AArch32.CheckAddress(address, acctype, iswrite, secondstage);
        permissioncheck = TRUE;

    // Check whether to use background memory map or default cacheability
    if !s1_enabled || S1.br_enabled then
        S1 = AArch32.ValidateAddressS10ff(address, acctype, iswrite);
        permissioncheck = FALSE;

    // Check for unaligned data accesses to Device memory
    if (!wasaligned && !IsFault(S1.addrdesc) && S1.addrdesc.memattrs.type == MemType_Device &&
        acctype != AccType_IFETCH) then
        S1.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.AlignmentFault(acctype, iswrite, secondstage);

    if !IsFault(S1.addrdesc) && permissioncheck then
        S1.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.CheckPermission(S1.perms, address, integer UNKNOWN,
                                                    bits(4) UNKNOWN, '1',
                                                    acctype, iswrite);

    // Check for instruction fetches from Device memory not marked as execute-never. If there has
    // not been a Permission Fault then the memory is not marked execute-never.
    if (!IsFault(S1.addrdesc) && S1.addrdesc.memattrs.type == MemType_Device &&
        acctype == AccType_IFETCH) then
        S1.addrdesc = AArch32.InstructionDevice(S1.addrdesc, bits(32) UNKNOWN, address, integer UNKNOWN,
                                                    bits(4) UNKNOWN, acctype, iswrite, secondstage, FALSE);

    return S1.addrdesc;

```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.FullValidate

```

// AArch32.FullValidate()
// =====
// Perform both stage 1 and stage 2 address validation for the current memory access regime.

AddressDescriptor AArch32.FullValidate(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite,
                                       boolean wasaligned, integer size)
    // First Stage Validation
    S1 = AArch32.FirstStageValidate(address, acctype, iswrite, wasaligned);

    // Second Stage Validation
    if !IsFault(S1) && HasS2Validation() then
        result = AArch32.SecondStageValidate(S1, address, acctype, iswrite, wasaligned, size);
    else
        result = S1;

    return result;

```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.MPUCheck

```
// AArch32.MPUCheck()
// =====
// Returns the result of MPU checks on the address.

MPURecord MPUCheck(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean secondstage)

MPURecord memrecord;
memrecord.br_enabled = FALSE;

if !secondstage && PSTATE.EL != EL2 then
    // Access controlled by EL1-controlled MPU
    pl2mpu = FALSE;
    br = SCTL.R.BR == '1';
    num_regions = (UInt(MPUIR.REGION) - 1);
else
    // Access controlled by EL2-controlled MPU
    pl2mpu = TRUE;
    br = HSCTL.R.BR == '1';
    num_regions = (UInt(HMPUIR.REGION) - 1);

regionMatched = FALSE;
for r = 0 to num_regions
    if pl2mpu then
        rbar = HPRBAR[r];
        rlar = HPRLAR[r];
    else
        rbar = PRBAR[r];
        rlar = PRLAR[r];

    // MPU region enable check
    if rlar.EN == '1' then
        // Checking for a matching MPU region
        if ((UInt(address) >= UInt(rbar.BASE : '00000')) &&
            (UInt(address) <= UInt(rlar.LIMIT : '11111'))) then

            // More than one region match will generate a translation fault
            if regionMatched then
                memrecord.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.TranslationFault(address,
                    bits(4) UNKNOWN, integer UNKNOWN,
                    acctype, iswrite, secondstage,
                    boolean UNKNOWN);

                memrecord.perms = Permissions UNKNOWN;
                return memrecord;

            else
                regionMatched = TRUE;
                memrecord.perms.ap = rbar.AP:'0';
                memrecord.perms.xn = rbar.XN;
                memrecord.perms.pxn = '0';

                memrecord.addrdesc.paddress.physicaladdress = address;
                SH = rbar.SH;
                attr = rlar.AttrIdx;
                memrecord.addrdesc.memattrs = AArch32.AttrDecode(SH, attr, acctype,
                    secondstage);

// Check for single MPU region match
if regionMatched then
    memrecord.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.NoFault();

// In case of no match, check whether use of background memory region
// enabled. If not, raise background fault
elseif !br then
    memrecord.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.BackgroundFault(address, bits(4) UNKNOWN,
        integer UNKNOWN, acctype, iswrite,
        secondstage, boolean UNKNOWN);
```

```
// if background region is enabled, i.e. br = TRUE, check whether mpu background
// region matching is enabled for the current memory access regime.
// Check whether EL1-controlled MPU background region enabled
elseif !p12mpu && PSTATE.EL == EL1 then
    memrecord.br_enabled = TRUE;
// Check whether EL2-controlled MPU background region enabled
elseif p12mpu && PSTATE.EL==EL2 then
    memrecord.br_enabled = TRUE;
// else, raise translation fault
else
    memrecord.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.TranslationFault(address, bits(4) UNKNOWN,
                                                         integer UNKNOWN, acctype, iswrite,
                                                         secondstage, boolean UNKNOWN);

return memrecord;
```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.SecondStageValidate

```
// AArch32.SecondStageValidate()
// =====
// Perform a stage 2 validation for memory access.

AddressDescriptor AArch32.SecondStageValidate(AddressDescriptor S1, bits(32) address,
                                              AccType acctype, boolean iswrite, boolean wasaligned,
                                              integer size)

assert HasS2Validation();
s2_enabled = HCR.VM == '1' || HCR.DC == '1';
secondstage = TRUE;

// Second stage enabled
if s2_enabled then
    // Check whether stage2 MPU is enabled
    if HSCTLR.M == '1' then
        S2 = AArch32.CheckAddress(address, acctype, iswrite, secondstage);
        permissioncheck = TRUE;
    else
        // if stage2 MPU is disabled and HCR.VM == 1, then stage2 validation uses background
        // memory map
        S2 = AArch32.ValidateAddressS20ff(address, acctype, iswrite);
        permissioncheck = FALSE;

    // Check for unaligned data accesses to Device memory
    if (!wasaligned && !IsFault(S2.addrdesc) && S2.addrdesc.memattrs.type == MemType_Device &&
        acctype != AccType_IFETCH) then
        S2.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.AlignmentFault(acctype, iswrite, secondstage);

    if !IsFault(S2.addrdesc) && permissioncheck then
        S2.addrdesc.fault = AArch32.CheckS2Permission(S2.perms, bits(32) UNKNOWN, address,
                                                         integer UNKNOWN, acctype,
                                                         iswrite, FALSE);

    // Check for instruction fetches from Device memory not marked as execute-never. As there
    // has not been a Permission Fault then the memory is not marked execute-never.
    if (!IsFault(S2.addrdesc) && S2.addrdesc.memattrs.type == MemType_Device &&
        acctype == AccType_IFETCH) then
        domain = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
        S2.addrdesc = AArch32.InstructionDevice(S2.addrdesc, bits(32) UNKNOWN, address,
                                                         integer UNKNOWN, bits(4) UNKNOWN,
                                                         acctype, iswrite, secondstage, FALSE);

    result = CombineS1S2Desc(S1, S2.addrdesc);
else
    result = S1;

return result;
```

aarch32/translation/validation/AArch32.ValidateAddress

```
// AArch32.ValidateAddress()
// =====
// Main entry point for validating address for current memory access regime.

AddressDescriptor AArch32.ValidateAddress(bits(32) address, AccType acctype, boolean iswrite,
                                          boolean wasaligned, integer size)
    result = AArch32.FullValidate(address, acctype, iswrite, wasaligned, size);

    if !(acctype IN {AccType_IC}) && !IsFault(result) then
        result.fault = AArch32.CheckDebug(address, acctype, iswrite, size);

    return result;
```

aarch32/translation/validation/BackgroundMemoryAttr

```
// BackgroundMemoryAttr()
// =====
// Called for getting background memory map attributes for a given address.

MemoryAttributes BackgroundMemoryAttr(bits(32) address, boolean secondstage)

    MemoryAttributes memattrs;
    memregion = UInt(address<31:28>);

    if PSTATE.EL != EL2 then {use SCTL.R.C}
    else {use HSCTLR.C}

    // memory attributes not set here will be filled by MemAttrDefaults().
    if memregion >= UInt('1100') then
        // mpu region : 0xC0000000 - 0xFFFFFFFF
        memattrs.type = MemType_Device;
        memattrs.device = DeviceType_nGnRnE;

    elseif memregion >= UInt('1000') then
        // mpu region : 0x80000000 - 0xBFFFFFFF
        memattrs.type = MemType_Device;
        memattrs.device = DeviceType_nGnRE;

    elseif memregion >= UInt('0110') then
        // mpu region : 0x60000000 - 0x7FFFFFFF
        memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
        memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_No;
        memattrs.shareable = TRUE;
        memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;

    elseif memregion >= UInt('0100') then
        // mpu region : 0x40000000 - 0x5FFFFFFF
        memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        if cacheable then
            memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_WT;
            memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_RA;
            memattrs.shareable = FALSE;
            memattrs.outershareable = FALSE;
        else
            memattrs.inner.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
            memattrs.inner.hints = MemHint_No;
            memattrs.shareable = TRUE;
            memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;

    else
        // mpu region : 0x00000000 - 0x3FFFFFFF
        memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        if cacheable then
```

```
        memattrs.inner.attrs    = MemAttr_WB;
        memattrs.inner.hints    = MemHint_RWA;
        memattrs.shareable      = FALSE;
        memattrs.outershareable = FALSE;

    else
        memattrs.inner.attrs    = MemAttr_NC;
        memattrs.inner.hints    = MemHint_No;
        memattrs.shareable      = TRUE;
        memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;

    return memattrs;
```

H1.3 Shared pseudocode

This section holds the pseudocode that is common to execution in AArch64 state and in AArch32 state. ARMv8-R does not support AArch64 state but for ease of correlating this manual with that on the ARMv8-A profile, this manual follows the structure of the *ARM® Architecture Reference Manual, ARMv8, for ARMv8-A architecture profile*.

Functions listed in this section are identified only by a `FunctionName`, without an AArch64. or AArch32. prefix. This section is organized by functional groups, with the functional groups being indicated by hierarchical path names, for example `shared/debug/DebugTarget`.

The top-level sections of the shared pseudocode hierarchy are:

- [shared/debug](#).
- [shared/exceptions](#) on page H1-299.
- [shared/functions](#) on page H1-301.
- [shared/translation](#) on page H1-346.

H1.3.1 shared/debug

shared/debug/ClearStickyErrors/ClearStickyErrors

```
// ClearStickyErrors()
// =====

ClearStickyErrors()
    EDSCR.TXU = '0';           // Clear TX underrun flag
    EDSCR.RXO = '0';           // Clear RX overrun flag
    if Halted() then           // in Debug state
        EDSCR.ITO = '0';       // Clear ITR overrun flag
    EDSCR.ERR = '0';           // Clear cumulative error flag
    return;
```

shared/debug/DebugTarget/DebugTarget

```
// DebugTarget()
// =====
// Returns the debug exception target Exception level

bits(2) DebugTarget()
    return (if HPCR.TDE == '1' || HPCR.TGE == '1' then EL2 else EL1);
```

shared/debug/DoubleLockStatus/DoubleLockStatus

```
// DoubleLockStatus()
// =====
// Returns the state of the OS Double Lock.
// FALSE if OSDLR_EL1.DLK == 0 or DBGPRCR_EL1.CORENPDRQ == 1 or the PE is in Debug state.
// TRUE if OSDLR_EL1.DLK == 1 and DBGPRCR_EL1.CORENPDRQ == 0 and the PE is in Non-debug state.

boolean DoubleLockStatus()
    return DBGOSDLR.DLK == '1' && DBGPRCR.CORENPDRQ == '0' && !Halted();
```

shared/debug/FindWatchpoint/FindWatchpoint

```
// FindWatchpoint()
// =====

integer FindWatchpoint()
    address = FAR[];
    base = Align(address, ZVAGranuleSize());
```

```
limit = base + ZVAGranuleSize();
repeat
    for i = 0 to UInt(ID_AA64DFR0_EL1.WRPs)
        if WatchpointByteMatch(i, address) then // Candidate found
            return i;
        address = address + 1;
    if address == limit then address = base; // Wrap round, as this must be a DC ZVA
while address != FAR[];
return -1; // No candidate found (should not happen)
```

shared/debug/authentication/AllowExternalDebugAccess

```
// AllowExternalDebugAccess()
// =====
// Returns the status of EDPRSR.EDAD.

boolean AllowExternalDebugAccess()
    // The access may also be subject to OS lock, power-down, etc.
    return ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled();
```

shared/debug/authentication/AllowExternalPMUAccess

```
// AllowExternalPMUAccess()
// =====
// If the first return value is FALSE, then the access returns an error response. Otherwise, the second
// return value specifies a bit mask. In this bit mask, each zero bit is RAZ/WI in the access.
// If "indexed" == TRUE then this is a PMEVCNTR<n> or PMEVTYPER<n> register and "n" is the index of the
// event counter. If "mask" == TRUE then this is one of PMCNSET/CLR, PMINTENSET/CLR, or PMOVSSET/CLR.

(boolean, bits(32)) AllowExternalPMUAccess(boolean indexed, integer n, boolean mask)
    // The access may also be subject to OS lock, power-down, etc.
    if ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() then
        if HaveEL(EL2) && !ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() && HDCR.EPMAD == '1' then
            if mask then
                return (TRUE, '1':ZeroExtend(Ones(UInt(HDCR.HPMN)), 31));
            elseif indexed && n >= UInt(HDCR.HPMN) then
                return (TRUE, Zeros(32));
            return (TRUE, Ones());
    else
        return (FALSE, bits(32) UNKNOWN);
```

shared/debug/authentication/Debug_authentication

```
signal DBGEN;
signal NIDEN;
signal HIDEN;
signal HNIDEN;
```

shared/debug/authentication/ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled

```
// ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()
// =====

boolean ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled()
    // In the recommended interface, ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled returns the state of the
    // (DBGEN AND HIDEN) signal.
    return ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() && HIDEN == HIGH;
```

shared/debug/authentication/ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled

```
// ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()
// =====

boolean ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()
```



```
// In the recommended interface, ExternalHypNoninvasiveDebugEnabled returns the state of the
// (DBGEN OR NIDEN) AND (HIDEN OR HNIDEN) signal.
return ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() && (HIDEN == HIGH || HNIDEN == HIGH);
```

shared/debug/authentication/ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled

```
// ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled()
// =====

boolean ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled()
// In the recommended interface, ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled returns the state of the DBGEN
// signal.
return DBGEN == HIGH;
```

shared/debug/authentication/ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled

```
// ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()
// =====

boolean ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()
// Return TRUE if Trace and Sample-based profiling are allowed
return ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled();
```

shared/debug/authentication/ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled

```
// ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()
// =====

boolean ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled()
// In the recommended interface, ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled returns the state of the (DBGEN
// OR NIDEN) signal.
return ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled() || NIDEN == HIGH;
```

shared/debug/cti/CTI_SetEventLevel

```
// Set a Cross Trigger multi-cycle input event trigger to the specified level.
CTI_SetEventLevel(CrossTriggerIn id, signal level);
```

shared/debug/cti/CTI_SignalEvent

```
// Signal a discrete event on a Cross Trigger input event trigger.
CTI_SignalEvent(CrossTriggerIn id);
```

shared/debug/cti/CrossTrigger

```
enumeration CrossTriggerOut {CrossTriggerOut_DebugRequest, CrossTriggerOut_RestartRequest,
                             CrossTriggerOut_IRQ,          CrossTriggerOut_RSVD3,
                             CrossTriggerOut_TraceExtIn0,    CrossTriggerOut_TraceExtIn1,
                             CrossTriggerOut_TraceExtIn2,    CrossTriggerOut_TraceExtIn3};

enumeration CrossTriggerIn {CrossTriggerIn_CrossHalt,       CrossTriggerIn_PMUOverflow,
                             CrossTriggerIn_RSVD2,          CrossTriggerIn_RSVD3,
                             CrossTriggerIn_TraceExtOut0,    CrossTriggerIn_TraceExtOut1,
                             CrossTriggerIn_TraceExtOut2,    CrossTriggerIn_TraceExtOut3};
```

shared/debug/dccanditr/CheckForDCCInterrupts

```
// CheckForDCCInterrupts()
// =====

CheckForDCCInterrupts()
    commrx = (EDSCR.RXfull == '1');
    commtx = (EDSCR.TXfull == '0');
```

```
// COMMRX and COMMTX support is optional and not recommended for new designs.
// SetInterruptRequestLevel(InterruptID_COMMRX, if commrx then HIGH else LOW);
// SetInterruptRequestLevel(InterruptID_COMMTX, if commtx then HIGH else LOW);

// The value to be driven onto the common COMMIRQ signal.
commirq = ((commrx && DBGDCCINT.RX == '1') ||
            (commtx && DBGDCCINT.TX == '1'));
SetInterruptRequestLevel(InterruptID_COMMIRQ, if commirq then HIGH else LOW);

return;
```

shared/debug/dccanditr/DBGDTRRX_EL0

```
// DBGDTRRX_EL0[] (external write)
// =====
// Called on writes to debug register 0x08C.

DBGDTRRX_EL0[boolean memory_mapped] = bits(32) value

if EDPRSR<6:5,0> != '001' then // Check DLK, OSLK and PU bits
    IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "signal slave-generated error";
    return;

if EDSCR.ERR == '1' then return; // Error flag set: ignore write

// The Software lock is OPTIONAL.
if memory_mapped && EDLSR.SLK == '1' then return; // Software lock locked: ignore write

if EDSCR.RXfull == '1' || (Halted() && EDSCR.MA == '1' && EDSCR.ITE == '0') then
    EDSCR.RXO = '1'; EDSCR.ERR = '1'; // Overrun condition: ignore write
    return;

EDSCR.RXfull = '1';
DTRRX = value;

if Halted() && EDSCR.MA == '1' then
    EDSCR.ITE = '0'; // See comments in EDITR[] (external write)

ExecuteT32(0xEE10<15:0> /*hw1*/, 0x1E15<15:0> /*hw2*/); // T32 "MRS R1,DBGDTRRXint"
ExecuteT32(0xF840<15:0> /*hw1*/, 0x1B04<15:0> /*hw2*/); // T32 "STR R1,[R0],#4"
R[1] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

// If the store aborts, the Data Abort exception is taken and EDSCR.ERR is set to 1
if EDSCR.ERR == '1' then
    EDSCR.RXfull = bit UNKNOWN;
    DBGDTRRX_EL0 = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
else
    // "MRS X1,DBGDTRRX_EL0" calls DBGDTR_EL0[] (read) which clears RXfull.
    assert EDSCR.RXfull == '0';

    EDSCR.ITE = '1'; // See comments in EDITR[] (external write)
    return;

// DBGDTRRX_EL0[] (external read)
// =====

bits(32) DBGDTRRX_EL0[boolean memory_mapped]
return DTRRX;
```

shared/debug/dccanditr/DBGDTRTX_EL0

```
// DBGDTRTX_EL0[] (external read)
// =====
// Called on reads of debug register 0x080.
```

```

bits(32) DBGDTRTX_EL0[boolean memory_mapped]

if EDPRSR<6:5,0> != '001' then // Check DLK, OSLK and PU bits
    IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "signal slave-generated error";
    return bits(32) UNKNOWN;

underrun = EDSCR.TXfull == '0' || (Halted() && EDSCR.MA == '1' && EDSCR.ITE == '0');
value = if underrun then bits(32) UNKNOWN else DTRTX;

if EDSCR.ERR == '1' then return value; // Error flag set: no side-effects

// The Software lock is OPTIONAL.
if memory_mapped && EDLSR.SLK == '1' then // Software lock locked: no side-effects
    return value;

if underrun then
    EDSCR.TXU = '1'; EDSCR.ERR = '1'; // Underrun condition: block side-effects
    return value; // Return UNKNOWN

EDSCR.TXfull = '0';

if Halted() && EDSCR.MA == '1' then // See comments in EDITR[] (external write)
    EDSCR.ITE = '0';

    ExecuteT32(0xF850<15:0> /*hw1*/, 0x1B04<15:0> /*hw2*/); // T32 "LDR R1,[R0],#4"
    // If the load aborts, the Data Abort exception is taken and EDSCR.ERR is set to 1
    if EDSCR.ERR == '1' then
        EDSCR.TXfull = bit UNKNOWN;
        DBGDTRTX_EL0 = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
    else
        ExecuteT32(0xEE00<15:0> /*hw1*/, 0x1E15<15:0> /*hw2*/); // T32 "MSR DBGDTRTXint,R1"
        // "MSR DBGDTRTX_EL0,X1" calls DBGDTR_EL0[] (write) which sets TXfull.
        assert EDSCR.TXfull == '1';

    R[1] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

    EDSCR.ITE = '1'; // See comments in EDITR[] (external write)

    return value;

// DBGDTRTX_EL0[] (external write)
// =====

DBGDTRTX_EL0[boolean memory_mapped] = bits(32) value
// The Software lock is OPTIONAL.
if memory_mapped && EDLSR.SLK == '1' then return; // Software lock locked: ignore write
DTRTX = value;
return;

```

shared/debug/dccanditr/DBGDTR_EL0

```

// DBGDTR_EL0[] (write)
// =====
// System register writes to DBGDTR_EL0, DBGDTRTX_EL0 (AArch64) and DBGDTRTXint (AArch32)

DBGDTR_EL0[] = bits(N) value
// For MSR DBGDTRTX_EL0,<Rt> N=32, value=X[t]<31:0>, X[t]<63:32> is ignored
// For MSR DBGDTR_EL0,<Xt> N=64, value=X[t]<63:0>
assert N IN {32,64};
if EDSCR.TXfull == '1' then
    value = bits(N) UNKNOWN;
// On a 64-bit write, implement a half-duplex channel
if N == 64 then DTRRX = value<63:32>;
DTRTX = value<31:0>; // 32-bit or 64-bit write
EDSCR.TXfull = '1';
return;

```

```
// DBGDTR_EL0[] (read)
// =====
// System register reads of DBGDTR_EL0, DBGDTRRX_EL0 (AArch64) and DBGDTRRXint (AArch32)

bits(N) DBGDTR_EL0[]
    // For MRS <Rt>,DBGDTRTX_EL0 N=32, X[t]=Zeros(32):result
    // For MRS <Xt>,DBGDTR_EL0 N=64, X[t]=result
    assert N IN {32,64};
    bits(N) result;
    if EDSCR.RXfull == '0' then
        result = bits(N) UNKNOWN;
    else
        // On a 64-bit read, implement a half-duplex channel
        // NOTE: the word order is reversed on reads with regards to writes
        if N == 64 then result<63:32> = DTRTX;
        result<31:0> = DTRRX;
    EDSCR.RXfull = '0';
    return result;
```

shared/debug/dccanditr/DTR

```
bits(32) DTRRX;
bits(32) DTRTX;
```

shared/debug/dccanditr/EDITR

```
// EDITR[] (external write)
// =====
// Called on writes to debug register 0x084.

EDITR[boolean memory_mapped] = bits(32) value
    if EDPRSR<6:5,0> != '001' then // Check DLK, OSLK and PU bits
        IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "signal slave-generated error";
        return;

    if EDSCR.ERR == '1' then return; // Error flag set: ignore write

    // The Software lock is OPTIONAL.
    if memory_mapped && EDLSR.SLK == '1' then return; // Software lock locked: ignore write

    if !Halted() then return; // Non-debug state: ignore write

    if EDSCR.ITE == '0' || EDSCR.MA == '1' then
        EDSCR.ITO = '1'; EDSCR.ERR = '1'; // Overrun condition: block write
        return;

    // ITE indicates whether the processor is ready to accept another instruction; the processor
    // may support multiple outstanding instructions. Unlike the "InstrCompl" flag in [v7A] there
    // is no indication that the pipeline is empty (all instructions have completed). In this
    // pseudocode, the assumption is that only one instruction can be executed at a time,
    // meaning ITE acts like "InstrCompl".
    EDSCR.ITE = '0';

    if !UsingAArch32() then
        ExecuteA64(value);
    else
        ExecuteT32(value<15:0> /*hw1*/, value<31:16> /*hw2*/);

    EDSCR.ITE = '1';

    return;
```

shared/debug/halting/DCPSInstruction

```
// DCPSInstruction()
// =====
// Operation of the DCPS instruction in Debug state

DCPSInstruction(bits(2) target_el)

    SynchronizeContext();

    case target_el of
        when EL1
            if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then handle_el = PSTATE.EL;
            elseif HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() && HCR.TGE == '1' then UNDEFINED;
            else handle_el = EL1;

        when EL2
            if !HaveEL(EL2) || EDSCR.HDD == '1' then UNDEFINED;
            else handle_el = EL2;
        otherwise
            UNDEFINED;

    if ELUsingAArch32(handle_el) then
        assert UsingAArch32(); // Cannot move from AArch64 to AArch32
        case handle_el of
            when EL1
                AArch32.WriteMode(M32_Svc);
            when EL2
                AArch32.WriteMode(M32_Hyp);
        if handle_el == EL2 then
            ELR_hyp = bits(32) UNKNOWN; HSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
        else
            LR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
            SPSR[] = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
            if handle_el == EL2 then
                PSTATE.E = HSCTLR.EE;
            else
                PSTATE.E = SCTLR.EE;
            DLR = bits(32) UNKNOWN; DSPSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

        UpdateEDSCRFields(); // Update EDSCR PE state flags.
    return;
```

shared/debug/halting/DRPSInstruction

```
// DRPSInstruction()
// =====
// Operation of the A64 DRPS and T32 ERET instructions in Debug state

DRPSInstruction()

    SynchronizeContext();

    SetPSTATEFromPSR(SPSR[]);

    // PSTATE.{N,Z,C,V,Q,GE,SS,D,A,I,F} are not observable and ignored in Debug state, so
    // behave as if UNKNOWN.
    if UsingAArch32() then
        PSTATE.<N,Z,C,V,Q,GE,SS,A,I,F> = bits(13) UNKNOWN;
        // In AArch32, all instructions are T32 and unconditional.
        PSTATE.IT = '00000000'; PSTATE.T = '1'; // PSTATE.J is RES0
        DLR = bits(32) UNKNOWN; DSPSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;

    UpdateEDSCRFields(); // Update EDSCR PE state flags.

    return;
```

shared/debug/halting/DebugHalt

```
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_Breakpoint    = '000111';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_EDBGRQ       = '010011';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_Step_Normal  = '011011';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_Step_Exclusive = '011111';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_OSUnlockCatch = '100011';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_ResetCatch    = '100111';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_Watchpoint    = '101011';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_HaltInstruction = '101111';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_SoftwareAccess = '110011';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_ExceptionCatch = '110111';
constant bits(6) DebugHalt_Step_NoSyndrome = '111011';
```

shared/debug/halting/DisableITRAndResumeInstructionPrefetch

```
DisableITRAndResumeInstructionPrefetch();
```

shared/debug/halting/ExecuteA64

```
// Execute an A64 instruction in Debug state.
ExecuteA64(bits(32) instr);
```

shared/debug/halting/ExecuteT32

```
// Execute a T32 instruction in Debug state.
ExecuteT32(bits(16) hw1, bits(16) hw2);
```

shared/debug/halting/ExitDebugState

```
// ExitDebugState()
// =====

ExitDebugState()
    assert Halted();
    SynchronizeContext();

    // Although EDSCR.STATUS signals that the PE is restarting, debuggers must use EDPRSR.SDR to
    // detect that the PE has restarted.
    EDSCR.STATUS = '000001'; // Signal restarting
    EDESR<2:0> = '000'; // Clear any pending Halting debug events

    bits(64) new_pc;
    bits(32) spsr;

    new_pc = ZeroExtend(DLR);
    spsr = DSPSR;
    // If this is an illegal return, SetPSTATEFromPSR() will set PSTATE.IL.
    SetPSTATEFromPSR(spsr); // Can update privileged bits, even at EL0.

    if UsingAArch32() then
        if ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then new_pc<0> = '0';
        BranchTo(new_pc<31:0>, BranchType_UNKNOWN); // AArch32 branch
    else
        // If targeting AArch32 then possibly zero the 32 most significant bits of the target PC
        if spsr<4> == '1' && ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then
            new_pc<63:32> = Zeros();
            BranchTo(new_pc, BranchType_DBGEXIT); // A type of branch that is never predicted

    (EDSCR.STATUS, EDPRSR.SDR) = ('000010', '1'); // Atomically signal restarted
    UpdateEDSCRFields(); // Stop signalling PE state.
    DisableITRAndResumeInstructionPrefetch();

    return;
```

shared/debug/halting/Halt

```

// Halt()
// =====

Halt(bits(6) reason)

    CTI_SignalEvent(CrossTriggerIn_CrossHalt); // Trigger other cores to halt
    DLR = ThisInstrAddr();
    DSPSR = GetPSRFromPSTATE();

    EDSCR.ITE = '1'; EDSCR.ITO = '0';
    if HaveEL(EL2) && (PSTATE.EL == EL2 || HCR.TGE == '1') then
        EDSCR.HDD = '0'; // If entered in Hyp or with TGE set, allow debug
    elseif HaveEL(EL2) then
        EDSCR.HDD = (if ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled() then '0' else '1');
    else
        assert EDSCR.HDD == '1'; // Otherwise EDSCR.HDD is RES1
    EDSCR.MA = '0';
    // PSTATE.{A,I,F} are not observable and ignored in Debug state, so behave as if
    // UNKNOWN. PSTATE.{N,Z,C,V,Q,GE} are also not observable, but since these are not changed on
    // exception entry, this function also leaves them unchanged. PSTATE.{E,M,nRW,EL,SP} are
    // unchanged. PSTATE.IL is set to 0.
    PSTATE.<A,I,F> = bits(3) UNKNOWN;
    // In AArch32, all instructions are T32 and unconditional.
    PSTATE.IT = '00000000'; PSTATE.T = '1'; // PSTATE.J is RES0
    PSTATE.IL = '0';

    StopInstructionPrefetchAndEnableITR();
    EDSCR.STATUS = reason; // Signal entered Debug state
    UpdateEDSCRFields(); // Update EDSCR PE state flags.

return;

```

shared/debug/halting/HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint

```

// HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint()
// =====
// Returns TRUE if the Breakpoint and Watchpoint debug events should be considered for Debug
// state entry, FALSE if they should be considered for a debug exception.

boolean HaltOnBreakpointOrWatchpoint()
    return HaltingAllowed() && EDSCR.HDE == '1' && DBGOSLSR.OSLK == '0';

```

shared/debug/halting/Halted

```

// Halted()
// =====

boolean Halted()
    return !(EDSCR.STATUS IN {'000001', '000010'}); // Halted

```

shared/debug/halting/HaltingAllowed

```

// HaltingAllowed()
// =====
// Returns TRUE if halting is currently allowed, FALSE if halting is prohibited.

boolean HaltingAllowed()
    if Halted() || DoubleLockStatus() then
        return FALSE;
    elseif HaveEL(EL2) && (PSTATE.EL == EL2 || HCR.TGE == '1') then
        return ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled();
    else
        return ExternalInvasiveDebugEnabled();

```

shared/debug/halting/Restarting

```
// Restarting()
// =====

boolean Restarting()
    return EDCSR.STATUS == '000001';           // Restarting
```

shared/debug/halting/StopInstructionPrefetchAndEnableITR

```
StopInstructionPrefetchAndEnableITR();
```

shared/debug/halting/UpdateEDSCRFIELDS

```
// UpdateEDSCRFIELDS()
// =====
// Update EDCSR PE state fields

UpdateEDSCRFIELDS()

    if !Halted() then
        EDCSR.EL = '00';
    else
        EDCSR.EL = PSTATE.EL;
    return;
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckExceptionCatch

```
// CheckExceptionCatch()
// =====
// Check whether an Exception Catch debug event is set on the current Exception level

CheckExceptionCatch()
    // Called after taking an exception, that is, such that IsSecure() and PSTATE.EL are correct
    // for the exception target.
    base = if IsSecure() then 0 else 4;
    if HaltingAllowed() && EDECCR<UInt>(PSTATE.EL) + base> == '1' then
        Halt(DebugHalt_ExceptionCatch);
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckHaltingStep

```
// CheckHaltingStep()
// =====
// Check whether EDESR.SS has been set by Halting Step

CheckHaltingStep()
    if HaltingAllowed() && EDESR.SS == '1' then
        // The STATUS code depends on how we arrived at the state where EDESR.SS == 1.
        if HaltingStep_DidNotStep() then
            Halt(DebugHalt_Step_NoSyndrome);
        elseif HaltingStep_SteppedEX() then
            Halt(DebugHalt_Step_Exclusive);
        else
            Halt(DebugHalt_Step_Normal);
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckOSUnlockCatch

```
// CheckOSUnlockCatch()
// =====
// Called on unlocking the OS Lock to pend an OS Unlock Catch debug event

CheckOSUnlockCatch()
    if EDECR.OSUCE == '1' && !Halted() then EDESR.OSUC = '1';
```


shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckPendingOSUnlockCatch

```
// CheckPendingOSUnlockCatch()
// =====
// Check whether EDESR.OSUC has been set by an OS Unlock Catch debug event

CheckPendingOSUnlockCatch()
    if HaltingAllowed() && EDESR.OSUC == '1' then
        Halt(DebugHalt_OSUnlockCatch);
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckPendingResetCatch

```
// CheckPendingResetCatch()
// =====
// Check whether EDESR.RC has been set by a Reset Catch debug event

CheckPendingResetCatch()
    if HaltingAllowed() && EDESR.RC == '1' then
        Halt(DebugHalt_ResetCatch);
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckResetCatch

```
// CheckResetCatch()
// =====
// Called after reset

CheckResetCatch()
    if EDECR.RCE == '1' then
        EDESR.RC = '1';
        // If halting is allowed then halt immediately
        if HaltingAllowed() then Halt(DebugHalt_ResetCatch);
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/CheckSoftwareAccessToDebugRegisters

```
// CheckSoftwareAccessToDebugRegisters()
// =====
// Check for access to Breakpoint and Watchpoint registers.

CheckSoftwareAccessToDebugRegisters()
    if HaltingAllowed() && EDSCR.TDA == '1' && DBGOSLSR.OSLK == '0' then
        Halt(DebugHalt_SoftwareAccess);
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/ExternalDebugRequest

```
// ExternalDebugRequest()
// =====

ExternalDebugRequest()
    if HaltingAllowed() then
        Halt(DebugHalt_EDBGRQ);
    // Otherwise the CTI continues to assert the debug request until it is taken.
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/HaltingStep_DidNotStep

```
// Returns TRUE if the previously executed instruction was executed in the inactive state, that is,
// if it was not itself stepped.
boolean HaltingStep_DidNotStep();
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/HaltingStep_SteppedEX

```
// Returns TRUE if the previously executed instruction was a Load-Exclusive class instruction
// executed in the active-not-pending state.
boolean HaltingStep_SteppedEX();
```

shared/debug/haltingevents/RunHaltingStep

```
// RunHaltingStep()
// =====

RunHaltingStep(boolean exception_generated, bits(2) exception_target, boolean syscall,
               boolean reset)
    // "exception_generated" is TRUE if the previous instruction generated a synchronous exception
    // or was cancelled by an asynchronous exception.
    // if "exception_generated" is TRUE then "exception_target" is the target of the exception, and
    // "syscall" is TRUE if the exception is a synchronous exception where the preferred return
    // address is the instruction following that which generated the exception.
    // "reset" is TRUE if exiting reset state into the highest EL.

    if reset then assert !Halted();                // Cannot come out of reset halted
    active = EDECR.SS == '1' && !Halted();

    if active && reset then                          // Coming out of reset with EDECR.SS set.
        EDESR.SS = '1';
    elseif active && HaltingAllowed() then
        if exception_generated && exception_target == EL2 then
            advance = syscall || ExternalHypInvasiveDebugEnabled();
        else
            advance = TRUE;
        if advance then EDESR.SS = '1';

    return;
```

shared/debug/interrupts/InterruptID

```
enumeration InterruptID {InterruptID_PMUIRQ, InterruptID_COMMIQ, InterruptID_CTIIRQ,
                        InterruptID_COMMRX, InterruptID_COMMTX};
```

shared/debug/interrupts/SetInterruptRequestLevel

```
// Set a level-sensitive interrupt to the specified level.
SetInterruptRequestLevel(InterruptID id, signal level);
```

shared/debug/samplebasedprofiling/CreatePCSample

```
// CreatePCSample()
// =====

CreatePCSample()
    // In a simple sequential execution of the program, CreatePCSample is executed each time the PE
    // executes an instruction that can be sampled. An implementation is not constrained such that
    // reads of EDPCSR return the current values of PC, etc.

    pc_sample.valid = ExternalNoninvasiveDebugEnabled() && !Halted();
    pc_sample.pc = ThisInstrAddr();
    pc_sample.el = PSTATE.EL;
    pc_sample.contextidr = CONTEXTIDR;
    if HaveEL(EL2) && !IsSecure() then
        pc_sample.vmid = VSCTLR.VMID;
    return;
```

shared/debug/samplebasedprofiling/EDPCSR

```
// EDPCSR[] (read)
// =====

bits(32) EDPCSR[boolean memory_mapped]

    if EDPRSR<6:5,0> != '001' then                // Check DLK, OSLK and PU bits
        IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "signal slave-generated error";
```

```

    return bits(32) UNKNOWN;

// The Software lock is OPTIONAL.
update = !memory_mapped || EDLSR.SLK == '0';          // Software locked: no side-effects

if pc_sample.valid then
    sample = pc_sample.pc<31:0>;
    if update then
        EDCIDSR = pc_sample.contextidr;
        EDVIDSR.VMID = (if HaveEL(EL2) && pc_sample.el IN {EL1,EL0}
                        then pc_sample.vmid else Zeros(8));
        EDVIDSR.E2 = (if pc_sample.el == EL2 then '1' else '0');
    else
        sample = Ones(32);
        if update then
            EDCIDSR = bits(32) UNKNOWN;
            EDVIDSR = (bits(4) UNKNOWN):Zeros(20):(bits(8) UNKNOWN);

return sample;

```

shared/debug/samplebasedprofiling/PCSample

```

type PCSample is (
    boolean valid,
    bits(32) pc,
    bits(2) el,
    bits(32) contextidr,
    bits(8) vmid
)

PCSample pc_sample;

```

H1.3.2 shared/exceptions

shared/exceptions/exceptions/ConditionSyndrome

```

// ConditionSyndrome()
// =====
// Return CV and COND fields of instruction syndrome

bits(5) ConditionSyndrome()

bits(5) syndrome;

if UsingAArch32() then
    cond = AArch32.CurrentCond();
    if PSTATE.T == '0' then          // A32
        syndrome<4> = '1';
        // A conditional A32 instruction that is known to pass its condition code check
        // can be presented either with COND set to 0xE, the value for unconditional, or
        // the COND value held in the instruction.
        if ConditionHolds(cond) && ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then
            syndrome<3:0> = '1110';
        else
            syndrome<3:0> = cond;
    else                             // T32
        // When a T32 instruction is trapped, it is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether:
        // * CV set to 0 and COND is set to an UNKNOWN value
        // * CV set to 1 and COND is set to the condition code for the condition that
        //   applied to the instruction.
        if boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "Condition valid for trapped T32" then
            syndrome<4> = '1';
            syndrome<3:0> = cond;
        else

```

```

        syndrome<4> = '0';
        syndrome<3:0> = bits(4) UNKNOWN;
    else
        syndrome<4> = '1';
        syndrome<3:0> = '1110';

    return syndrome;

```

shared/exceptions/exceptions/Exception

```

enumeration Exception {Exception_Uncategorized,    // Uncategorized or unknown reason
                        Exception_WFxTrap,         // Trapped WFI or WFE instruction
                        Exception_CP15RTTTrap,      // Trapped AArch32 MCR or MRC access to CP15
                        Exception_CP15RRTTTrap,     // Trapped AArch32 MCRR or MRRC access to CP15
                        Exception_CP14RTTTrap,      // Trapped AArch32 MCR or MRC access to CP14
                        Exception_CP14DTTTrap,      // Trapped AArch32 LDC or STC access to CP14
                        Exception_AdvSIMDFPAccessTrap, // HCPTR-trapped access to SIMD or FP
                        Exception_FPIDTTrap,        // Trapped access to SIMD or FP ID register
                        // Trapped BXJ instruction not supported in ARMv8
                        Exception_CP14RRTTTrap,     // Trapped MRRC access to CP14 from AArch32
                        Exception_IllegalState,     // Illegal Execution state
                        Exception_SupervisorCall,   // Supervisor Call
                        Exception_HypervisorCall,   // Hypervisor Call
                        Exception_MonitorCall,      // Monitor Call or Trapped SMC instruction
                        Exception_SystemRegisterTrap, // Trapped MRS or MSR system register access
                        Exception_InstructionAbort,  // Instruction Abort or Prefetch Abort
                        Exception_PCAAlignment,     // Misaligned PC
                        Exception_DataAbort,        // Data Abort
                        Exception_SPAAlignment,     // Misaligned SP
                        Exception_FPtrappedException, // IEEE trapped FP exception
                        Exception_SError,           // SError interrupt
                        Exception_Breakpoint,       // (Hardware) Breakpoint
                        Exception_SoftwareStep,     // Software Step
                        Exception_Watchpoint,      // Watchpoint
                        Exception_SoftwareBreakpoint, // Software Breakpoint Instruction
                        Exception_VectorCatch,      // AArch32 Vector Catch
                        Exception_IRQ,              // IRQ interrupt
                        Exception_FIQ};             // FIQ interrupt

```

shared/exceptions/exceptions/ExceptionRecord

```

type ExceptionRecord is (Exception type,          // Exception class
                        bits(25) syndrome,         // Syndrome record
                        bits(64) vaddress,         // Virtual fault address
                        boolean ipavalid,          // Physical fault address is valid
                        bits(48) ipaddress);       // Physical fault address for second stage faults

```

shared/exceptions/exceptions/ExceptionSyndrome

```

// ExceptionSyndrome()
// =====
// Return a blank exception syndrome record for an exception of the given type.

ExceptionRecord ExceptionSyndrome(Exception type)

    ExceptionRecord r;

    r.type = type;

    // Initialize all other fields
    r.syndrome = Zeros();
    r.vaddress = Zeros();
    r.ipavalid = FALSE;
    r.ipaddress = Zeros();

    return r;

```

H1.3.3 shared/functions**shared/functions/aborts/EncodeLDFSC**

```
// EncodeLDFSC()
// =====
// Function that gives the Long-descriptor FSC code for types of Fault

bits(6) EncodeLDFSC(Fault type, integer level)

    bits(6) result;
    case type of
        when Fault_AddressSize      result = '0000':level<1:0>; assert level IN {0,1,2,3};
        when Fault_AccessFlag       result = '0010':level<1:0>; assert level IN {1,2,3};
        when Fault_Permission       result = '0011':level<1:0>; assert level IN {1,2,3};
        when Fault_Translation      result = '0001':level<1:0>; assert level IN {0,1,2,3};
        when Fault_SyncExternal     result = '010000';
        when Fault_SyncExternalOnWalk result = '0101':level<1:0>; assert level IN {0,1,2,3};
        when Fault_SyncParity       result = '011000';
        when Fault_SyncParityOnWalk result = '0111':level<1:0>; assert level IN {0,1,2,3};
        when Fault_AsyncParity      result = '011001';
        when Fault_AsyncExternal    result = '010001';
        when Fault_Alignment        result = '100001';
        when Fault_Debug            result = '100010';
        when Fault_TLBConflict      result = '110000';
        when Fault_Lockdown         result = '110100'; // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
        when Fault_Exclusive        result = '110101'; // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED
        otherwise                   Unreachable();

    return result;
```

shared/functions/aborts/FaultSyndrome

```
// FaultSyndrome()
// =====
// Creates an exception syndrome value for Abort and Watchpoint exceptions taken to
// AArch32 Hyp mode or an Exception Level using AArch64.

bits(25) FaultSyndrome(boolean d_side, FaultRecord fault)
    assert fault.type != Fault_None;

    bits(25) iss = Zeros();
    if d_side then
        if IsSecondStage(fault) && !fault.s2fs1walk then iss<24:14> = LSInstructionSyndrome();
        if fault.acctype IN {AccType_DC, AccType_IC, AccType_AT} then
            iss<8> = '1'; iss<6> = '1';
        else
            iss<6> = if fault.write then '1' else '0';
        if IsExternalAbort(fault) then iss<9> = fault.extflag;
        iss<7> = if fault.s2fs1walk then '1' else '0';
        iss<5:0> = EncodeLDFSC(fault.type, fault.level);

    return iss;
```

shared/functions/aborts/IPAValid

```
// IPAValid()
// =====
// Return TRUE if the IPA is reported for the abort

boolean IPAValid(FaultRecord fault)
    assert fault.type != Fault_None;

    if fault.s2fs1walk then
```

```
        return fault.type IN {Fault_AccessFlag, Fault_Permission, Fault_Translation,
                               Fault_AddressSize};
    elseif fault.secondstage then
        return fault.type IN {Fault_AccessFlag, Fault_Translation, Fault_AddressSize};
    else
        return FALSE;
```

shared/functions/aborts/IsDebugException

```
// IsDebugException()
// =====

boolean IsDebugException(FaultRecord fault)
    assert fault.type != Fault_None;
    return fault.type == Fault_Debug;
```

shared/functions/aborts/IsExternalAbort

```
// IsExternalAbort()
// =====
// Returns TRUE if the abort currently being processed is an external abort and FALSE otherwise.

boolean IsExternalAbort(Fault type)
    assert type != Fault_None;

    return (type IN {Fault_SyncExternal, Fault_SyncParity, Fault_AsyncExternal, Fault_AsyncParity,
                    Fault_SyncExternalOnWalk, Fault_SyncParityOnWalk});

// IsExternalAbort()
// =====

boolean IsExternalAbort(FaultRecord fault)
    return IsExternalAbort(fault.type);
```

shared/functions/aborts/IsFault

```
// IsFault()
// =====
// Return TRUE if a fault is associated with an address descriptor

boolean IsFault(AddressDescriptor addrdesc)
    return addrdesc.fault.type != Fault_None;
```

shared/functions/aborts/IsSErrorInterrupt

```
// IsSErrorInterrupt()
// =====
// Returns TRUE if the abort currently being processed is an SError interrupt, and FALSE
// otherwise.

boolean IsSErrorInterrupt(Fault type)
    assert type != Fault_None;

    return (type IN {Fault_AsyncExternal, Fault_AsyncParity});

// IsSErrorInterrupt()
// =====

boolean IsSErrorInterrupt(FaultRecord fault)
    return IsSErrorInterrupt(fault.type);
```

shared/functions/aborts/IsSecondStage

```
// IsSecondStage()
// =====

boolean IsSecondStage(FaultRecord fault)
    assert fault.type != Fault_None;

    return fault.secondstage;
```

shared/functions/aborts/LSInstructionSyndrome

```
bits(11) LSInstructionSyndrome();
```

shared/functions/common/ASR

```
// ASR()
// =====

bits(N) ASR(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift >= 0;
    if shift == 0 then
        result = x;
    else
        (result, -) = ASR_C(x, shift);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/common/ASR_C

```
// ASR_C()
// =====

(bits(N), bit) ASR_C(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift > 0;
    extended_x = SignExtend(x, shift+N);
    result = extended_x<shift+N-1:shift>;
    carry_out = extended_x<shift-1>;
    return (result, carry_out);
```

shared/functions/common/Abs

```
// Abs()
// =====

integer Abs(integer x)
    return if x >= 0 then x else -x;

// Abs()
// =====

real Abs(real x)
    return if x >= 0.0 then x else -x;
```

shared/functions/common/Align

```
// Align()
// =====

integer Align(integer x, integer y)
    return y * (x DIV y);

// Align()
// =====
```

```
bits(N) Align(bits(N) x, integer y)
    return Align(UInt(x), y)<N-1:0>;
```

shared/functions/common/BitCount

```
// BitCount()
// =====

integer BitCount(bits(N) x)
    integer result = 0;
    for i = 0 to N-1
        if x<i> == '1' then
            result = result + 1;
    return result;
```

shared/functions/common/CountLeadingSignBits

```
// CountLeadingSignBits()
// =====

integer CountLeadingSignBits(bits(N) x)
    return CountLeadingZeroBits(x<N-1:1> EOR x<N-2:0>);
```

shared/functions/common/CountLeadingZeroBits

```
// CountLeadingZeroBits()
// =====

integer CountLeadingZeroBits(bits(N) x)
    return N - 1 - HighestSetBit(x);
```

shared/functions/common/Elem

```
// Elem[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(size) Elem(bits(N) vector, integer e, integer size)
    assert e >= 0 && (e+1)*size <= N;
    return vector<e*size+size-1 : e*size>;

// Elem[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(size) Elem(bits(N) vector, integer e]
    return Elem[vector, e, size];

// Elem[] - assignment form
// =====

Elem[bits(N) &vector, integer e, integer size] = bits(size) value
    assert e >= 0 && (e+1)*size <= N;
    vector<(e+1)*size-1:e*size> = value;
    return;

// Elem[] - assignment form
// =====

Elem[bits(N) &vector, integer e] = bits(size) value
    Elem[vector, e, size] = value;
    return;
```


shared/functions/common/Extend

```
// Extend()
// =====

bits(N) Extend(bits(M) x, integer N, boolean unsigned)
    return if unsigned then ZeroExtend(x, N) else SignExtend(x, N);

// Extend()
// =====

bits(N) Extend(bits(M) x, boolean unsigned)
    return Extend(x, N, unsigned);
```

shared/functions/common/HighestSetBit

```
// HighestSetBit()
// =====

integer HighestSetBit(bits(N) x)
    for i = N-1 downto 0
        if x<i> == '1' then return i;
    return -1;
```

shared/functions/common/Int

```
// Int()
// =====

integer Int(bits(N) x, boolean unsigned)
    result = if unsigned then UInt(x) else SInt(x);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/common/IsOnes

```
// IsOnes()
// =====

boolean IsOnes(bits(N) x)
    return x == Ones(N);
```

shared/functions/common/IsZero

```
// IsZero()
// =====

boolean IsZero(bits(N) x)
    return x == Zeros(N);
```

shared/functions/common/IsZeroBit

```
// IsZeroBit()
// =====

bit IsZeroBit(bits(N) x)
    return if IsZero(x) then '1' else '0';
```

shared/functions/common/LSL

```
// LSL()
// =====

bits(N) LSL(bits(N) x, integer shift)
```

```
assert shift >= 0;
if shift == 0 then
    result = x;
else
    (result, -) = LSL_C(x, shift);
return result;
```

shared/functions/common/LSL_C

```
// LSL_C()
// =====

(bits(N), bit) LSL_C(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift > 0;
    extended_x = x : Zeros(shift);
    result = extended_x<N-1:0>;
    carry_out = extended_x<N>;
    return (result, carry_out);
```

shared/functions/common/LSR

```
// LSR()
// =====

bits(N) LSR(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift >= 0;
    if shift == 0 then
        result = x;
    else
        (result, -) = LSR_C(x, shift);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/common/LSR_C

```
// LSR_C()
// =====

(bits(N), bit) LSR_C(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift > 0;
    extended_x = ZeroExtend(x, shift+N);
    result = extended_x<shift+N-1:shift>;
    carry_out = extended_x<shift-1>;
    return (result, carry_out);
```

shared/functions/common/LowestSetBit

```
// LowestSetBit()
// =====

integer LowestSetBit(bits(N) x)
    for i = 0 to N-1
        if x<i> == '1' then return i;
    return N;
```

shared/functions/common/Max

```
// Max()
// =====

integer Max(integer a, integer b)
    return if a >= b then a else b;

// Max()
// =====
```

```
real Max(real a, real b)
    return if a >= b then a else b;
```

shared/functions/common/Min

```
// Min()
// =====

integer Min(integer a, integer b)
    return if a <= b then a else b;

// Min()
// =====

real Min(real a, real b)
    return if a <= b then a else b;
```

shared/functions/common/NOT

```
bits(N) NOT(bits(N) x);
```

shared/functions/common/Ones

```
// Ones()
// =====

bits(N) Ones(integer N)
    return Replicate('1',N);

// Ones()
// =====

bits(N) Ones()
    return Ones(N);
```

shared/functions/common/ROR

```
// ROR()
// =====

bits(N) ROR(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift >= 0;
    if shift == 0 then
        result = x;
    else
        (result, -) = ROR_C(x, shift);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/common/ROR_C

```
// ROR_C()
// =====

(bits(N), bit) ROR_C(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift != 0;
    m = shift MOD N;
    result = LSR(x,m) OR LSL(x,N-m);
    carry_out = result<N-1>;
    return (result, carry_out);
```

shared/functions/common/Replicate

```
// Replicate()
// =====

bits(N) Replicate(bits(M) x)
    assert N MOD M == 0;
    return Replicate(x, N DIV M);

bits(M*N) Replicate(bits(M) x, integer N);
```

shared/functions/common/RoundDown

```
integer RoundDown(real x);
```

shared/functions/common/RoundTowardsZero

```
// RoundTowardsZero()
// =====

integer RoundTowardsZero(real x)
    return if x == 0.0 then 0 else if x >= 0.0 then RoundDown(x) else RoundUp(x);
```

shared/functions/common/RoundUp

```
integer RoundUp(real x);
```

shared/functions/common/SInt

```
// SInt()
// =====

integer SInt(bits(N) x)
    result = 0;
    for i = 0 to N-1
        if x<i> == '1' then result = result + 2i;
    if x<N-1> == '1' then result = result - 2N;
    return result;
```

shared/functions/common/SignExtend

```
// SignExtend()
// =====

bits(N) SignExtend(bits(M) x, integer N)
    assert N >= M;
    return Replicate(x<M-1>, N-M) : x;

// SignExtend()
// =====

bits(N) SignExtend(bits(M) x)
    return SignExtend(x, N);
```

shared/functions/common/UInt

```
// UInt()
// =====

integer UInt(bits(N) x)
    result = 0;
```

```

for i = 0 to N-1
    if x<i> == '1' then result = result + 2Λi;
return result;

```

shared/functions/common/ZeroExtend

```

// ZeroExtend()
// =====

bits(N) ZeroExtend(bits(M) x, integer N)
    assert N >= M;
    return Zeros(N-M) : x;

// ZeroExtend()
// =====

bits(N) ZeroExtend(bits(M) x)
    return ZeroExtend(x, N);

```

shared/functions/common/Zeros

```

// Zeros()
// =====

bits(N) Zeros(integer N)
    return Replicate('0',N);

// Zeros()
// =====

bits(N) Zeros()
    return Zeros(N);

```

shared/functions/crc/BitReverse

```

// BitReverse()
// =====

bits(N) BitReverse(bits(N) data)
    bits(N) result;
    for i = 0 to N-1
        result<N-i-1> = data<i>;
    return result;

```

shared/functions/crc/HaveCRCExt

```

// HaveCRCExt()
// =====

boolean HaveCRCExt()
    return boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "Have CRC extension";

```

shared/functions/crc/Poly32Mod2

```

// Poly32Mod2()
// =====

// Poly32Mod2 on a bitstring does a polynomial Modulus over {0,1} operation

bits(32) Poly32Mod2(bits(N) data, bits(32) poly)
    assert N > 32;
    for i = N-1 downto 32

```

```
    if data<i> == '1' then
        data<i-1:0> = data<i-1:0> EOR poly:Zeros(i-32);
    return data<31:0>;
```

shared/functions/crypto/AESInvMixColumns

```
bits(128) AESInvMixColumns(bits (128) op);
```

shared/functions/crypto/AESInvShiftRows

```
bits(128) AESInvShiftRows(bits(128) op);
```

shared/functions/crypto/AESInvSubBytes

```
bits(128) AESInvSubBytes(bits(128) op);
```

shared/functions/crypto/AESMixColumns

```
bits(128) AESMixColumns(bits (128) op);
```

shared/functions/crypto/AESShiftRows

```
bits(128) AESShiftRows(bits(128) op);
```

shared/functions/crypto/AESSubBytes

```
bits(128) AESSubBytes(bits(128) op);
```

shared/functions/crypto/HaveCryptoExt

```
boolean HaveCryptoExt();
```

shared/functions/crypto/ROL

```
// ROL()
// =====

bits(N) ROL(bits(N) x, integer shift)
    assert shift >= 0 && shift <= N;
    if (shift == 0) then
        return x;
    return ROR(x, N-shift);
```

shared/functions/crypto/SHA256hash

```
// SHA256hash()
// =====

bits(128) SHA256hash (bits (128) X, bits(128) Y, bits(128) W, boolean part1)
    bits(32) chs, maj, t;

    for e = 0 to 3
        chs = SHAchoose(Y<31:0>, Y<63:32>, Y<95:64>);
        maj = SHAmajority(X<31:0>, X<63:32>, X<95:64>);
        t = Y<127:96> + SHAhashSIGMA1(Y<31:0>) + chs + Elem[W, e, 32];
        X<127:96> = t + X<127:96>;
        Y<127:96> = t + SHAhashSIGMA0(X<31:0>) + maj;
        <Y, X> = ROL(Y : X, 32);
    return (if part1 then X else Y);
```

shared/functions/crypto/SHAchoose

```
// SHAchoose()
// =====

bits(32) SHAchoose(bits(32) x, bits(32) y, bits(32) z)
    return ((y EOR z) AND x) EOR z;
```

shared/functions/crypto/SHAhashSIGMA0

```
// SHAhashSIGMA0()
// =====

bits(32) SHAhashSIGMA0(bits(32) x)
    return ROR(x, 2) EOR ROR(x, 13) EOR ROR(x, 22);
```

shared/functions/crypto/SHAhashSIGMA1

```
// SHAhashSIGMA1()
// =====

bits(32) SHAhashSIGMA1(bits(32) x)
    return ROR(x, 6) EOR ROR(x, 11) EOR ROR(x, 25);
```

shared/functions/crypto/SHAmajority

```
// SHAmajority()
// =====

bits(32) SHAmajority(bits(32) x, bits(32) y, bits(32) z)
    return ((x AND y) OR ((x OR y) AND z));
```

shared/functions/crypto/SHAparity

```
// SHAparity()
// =====

bits(32) SHAparity(bits(32) x, bits(32) y, bits(32) z)
    return (x EOR y EOR z);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/ClearExclusiveByAddress

```
// Clear the global Exclusive Monitors for all PEs EXCEPT processorid if they
// record any part of the physical address region of size bytes starting at address.
// It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the global Exclusive Monitor for processorid
// is also cleared if it records any part of the address region.
ClearExclusiveByAddress(FullAddress address, integer processorid, integer size);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/ClearExclusiveLocal

```
// Clear the local Exclusive Monitor for the specified processorid.
ClearExclusiveLocal(integer processorid);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/ClearExclusiveMonitors

```
// ClearExclusiveMonitors()
// =====

// Clear the local Exclusive Monitor for the executing PE.

ClearExclusiveMonitors()
    ClearExclusiveLocal(ProcessorID());
```

shared/functions/exclusive/ExclusiveMonitorsStatus

```
// Returns '0' to indicate success if the last memory write by this PE was to
// the same physical address region endorsed by ExclusiveMonitorsPass().
// Returns '1' to indicate failure if address translation resulted in a different
// physical address.
bit ExclusiveMonitorsStatus();
```

shared/functions/exclusive/IsExclusiveGlobal

```
// Return TRUE if the global Exclusive Monitor for processorid includes all of
// the physical address region of size bytes starting at paddress.
boolean IsExclusiveGlobal(FullAddress paddress, integer processorid, integer size);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/IsExclusiveLocal

```
// Return TRUE if the local Exclusive Monitor for processorid includes all of
// the physical address region of size bytes starting at paddress.
boolean IsExclusiveLocal(FullAddress paddress, integer processorid, integer size);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/MarkExclusiveGlobal

```
// Record the physical address region of size bytes starting at paddress in
// the global Exclusive Monitor for processorid.
MarkExclusiveGlobal(FullAddress paddress, integer processorid, integer size);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/MarkExclusiveLocal

```
// Record the physical address region of size bytes starting at paddress in
// the local Exclusive Monitor for processorid.
MarkExclusiveLocal(FullAddress paddress, integer processorid, integer size);
```

shared/functions/exclusive/ProcessorID

```
// Return the ID of the currently executing PE.
integer ProcessorID();
```

shared/functions/float/fixedtofp/FixedToFP

```
// FixedToFP()
// =====

// Convert M-bit fixed point OP with FBITS fractional bits to
// N-bit precision floating point, controlled by UNSIGNED and ROUNDING.

bits(N) FixedToFP(bits(M) op, integer fbits, boolean unsigned, FPCRTYPE fpcr, FPRounding rounding)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    assert M IN {32,64};
    bits(N) result;
    assert fbits >= 0;
    assert rounding != FPRounding_ODD;

    // Correct signed-ness
    int_operand = Int(op, unsigned);

    // Scale by fractional bits and generate a real value
    real_operand = Real(int_operand) / 2.0^fbits;

    if real_operand == 0.0 then
        result = FPZero('0');
    else
```



```

        result = FPRound(real_operand, fpcr, rounding);

    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpabs/FPAbs

```

// FPAbs()
// =====

bits(N) FPAbs(bits(N) op)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    return '0' : op<N-2:0>;

```

shared/functions/float/fpadd/FPAAdd

```

// FPAAdd()
// =====

bits(N) FPAAdd(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    rounding = FPRoundingMode(fpcr);
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Infinity);  inf2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Zero);      zero2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Zero);
        if inf1 && inf2 && sign1 == NOT(sign2) then
            result = FPDefaultNaN();
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
        elseif (inf1 && sign1 == '0') || (inf2 && sign2 == '0') then
            result = FPinfinity('0');
        elseif (inf1 && sign1 == '1') || (inf2 && sign2 == '1') then
            result = FPinfinity('1');
        elseif zero1 && zero2 && sign1 == sign2 then
            result = FPZero(sign1);
        else
            result_value = value1 + value2;
            if result_value == 0.0 then // Sign of exact zero result depends on rounding mode
                result_sign = if rounding == FPRounding_NEGINF then '1' else '0';
                result = FPZero(result_sign);
            else
                result = FPRound(result_value, fpcr, rounding);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpcompare/FPCompare

```

// FPCompare()
// =====

bits(4) FPCompare(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, boolean signal_nans, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    if type1==FPTYPE_SNaN || type1==FPTYPE_QNaN || type2==FPTYPE_SNaN || type2==FPTYPE_QNaN then
        result = '0011';
        if type1==FPTYPE_SNaN || type2==FPTYPE_SNaN || signal_nans then
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    else
        // All non-NaN cases can be evaluated on the values produced by FPUntpack()
        if value1 == value2 then
            result = '0110';
        elseif value1 < value2 then
            result = '1000';

```

```

        else // value1 > value2
            result = '0010';
        return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpcompareeq/FPCompareEQ

```

// FPCompareEQ()
// =====

boolean FPCompareEQ(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    if type1==FPTType_SNaN || type1==FPTType_QNaN || type2==FPTType_SNaN || type2==FPTType_QNaN then
        result = FALSE;
    if type1==FPTType_SNaN || type2==FPTType_SNaN then
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    else
        // All non-NaN cases can be evaluated on the values produced by FPUntpack()
        result = (value1 == value2);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpcomparege/FPCompareGE

```

// FPCompareGE()
// =====

boolean FPCompareGE(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    if type1==FPTType_SNaN || type1==FPTType_QNaN || type2==FPTType_SNaN || type2==FPTType_QNaN then
        result = FALSE;
    FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    else
        // All non-NaN cases can be evaluated on the values produced by FPUntpack()
        result = (value1 >= value2);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpcomparegt/FPCompareGT

```

// FPCompareGT()
// =====

boolean FPCompareGT(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    if type1==FPTType_SNaN || type1==FPTType_QNaN || type2==FPTType_SNaN || type2==FPTType_QNaN then
        result = FALSE;
    FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    else
        // All non-NaN cases can be evaluated on the values produced by FPUntpack()
        result = (value1 > value2);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpconvert/FPConvert

```

// FPConvert()
// =====

// Convert floating point OP with N-bit precision to M-bit precision,
// with rounding controlled by ROUNDING.

bits(M) FPConvert(bits(N) op, FPCRTType fpcr, FPRounding rounding)

```

```

assert M IN {16,32,64};
assert N IN {16,32,64};
bits(M) result;

// Unpack floating-point operand optionally with flush-to-zero.
(type,sign,value) = FPUntpack(op, fpcr);

alt_hp = (M == 16) && (fpcr.AHP == '1');

if type == FPType_SNaN || type == FPType_QNaN then
    if alt_hp then
        result = FPZero(sign);
    elseif fpcr.DN == '1' then
        result = FPDefaultNaN();
    else
        result = FPConvertNaN(op);
        if type == FPType_SNaN || alt_hp then
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
elseif type == FPType_Infinity then
    if alt_hp then
        result = sign:Ones(M-1);
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    else
        result = FPInfinity(sign);
elseif type == FPType_Zero then
    result = FPZero(sign);
else
    result = FPRound(value, fpcr, rounding);

return result;

// FPConvert()
// =====

bits(M) FPConvert(bits(N) op, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    return FPConvert(op, fpcr, FPRoundingMode(fpcr));

```

shared/functions/float/fpconvertnan/FPConvertNaN

```

// FPConvertNaN()
// =====

// Converts a NaN of one floating-point type to another

bits(M) FPConvertNaN(bits(N) op)
    assert N IN {16,32,64};
    assert M IN {16,32,64};
    bits(M) result;
    bits(51) frac;

    sign = op<N-1>;

    // Unpack payload from input NaN
    case N of
        when 64 frac = op<50:0>;
        when 32 frac = op<21:0>:Zeros(29);
        when 16 frac = op<8:0>:Zeros(42);

    // Repack payload into output NaN, while
    // converting an SNaN to a QNaN.
    case M of
        when 64 result = sign:Ones(M-52):frac;
        when 32 result = sign:Ones(M-23):frac<50:29>;
        when 16 result = sign:Ones(M-10):frac<50:42>;

    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpcrtype/FPCRTType

```
type FPCRTType;
```

shared/functions/float/fpdecoderm/FPDecodeRM

```
// FPDecodeRM()
// =====

// Decode most common AArch32 floating-point rounding encoding.

FPRounding FPDecodeRM(bits(2) rm)
  case rm of
    when '00' return FPRounding_TIEAWAY; // A
    when '01' return FPRounding_TIEEVEN; // N
    when '10' return FPRounding_POSINF; // P
    when '11' return FPRounding_NEGINF; // M
```

shared/functions/float/fpdecoderounding/FPDecodeRounding

```
// FPDecodeRounding()
// =====

// Decode floating-point rounding mode and common AArch64 encoding.

FPRounding FPDecodeRounding(bits(2) rmode)
  case rmode of
    when '00' return FPRounding_TIEEVEN; // N
    when '01' return FPRounding_POSINF; // P
    when '10' return FPRounding_NEGINF; // M
    when '11' return FPRounding_ZERO; // Z
```

shared/functions/float/fpdefaultnan/FPDefaultNaN

```
// FPDefaultNaN()
// =====

bits(N) FPDefaultNaN()
  assert N IN {16,32,64};
  constant integer E = (if N == 16 then 5 elsif N == 32 then 8 else 11);
  constant integer F = N - E - 1;
  sign = '0';
  exp = Ones(E);
  frac = '1':Zeros(F-1);
  return sign : exp : frac;
```

shared/functions/float/fpdiv/FPDiv

```
// FPDiv()
// =====

bits(N) FPDiv(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
  assert N IN {32,64};
  (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
  (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
  (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
  if !done then
    inf1 = (type1 == FPTType_Infinity);
    inf2 = (type2 == FPTType_Infinity);
    zero1 = (type1 == FPTType_Zero);
    zero2 = (type2 == FPTType_Zero);
    if (inf1 && inf2) || (zero1 && zero2) then
      result = FPDefaultNaN();
      FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    elsif inf1 || zero2 then
```

```

        result = FPInfinity(sign1 EOR sign2);
        if !inf1 then FPProcessException(FPExc_DivideByZero, fpcr);
    elseif zero1 || inf2 then
        result = FPZero(sign1 EOR sign2);
    else
        result = FPRound(value1/value2, fpcr);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpexc/FPExc

```

enumeration FPExc      {FPExc_InvalidOp, FPExc_DivideByZero, FPExc_Overflow,
                        FPExc_Underflow, FPExc_Inexact, FPExc_InputDenorm};

```

shared/functions/float/fpinfinity/FPInfinity

```

// FPInfinity()
// =====

bits(N) FPInfinity(bit sign)
    assert N IN {16,32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 16 then 5 elsif N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
    exp = Ones(E);
    frac = Zeros(F);
    return sign : exp : frac;

```

shared/functions/float/fpmax/FPMax

```

// FPMax()
// =====

bits(N) FPMax(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        if value1 > value2 then
            (type,sign,value) = (type1,sign1,value1);
        else
            (type,sign,value) = (type2,sign2,value2);
        if type == FPTYPE_Infinity then
            result = FPInfinity(sign);
        elseif type == FPTYPE_Zero then
            sign = sign1 AND sign2; // Use most positive sign
            result = FPZero(sign);
        else
            result = FPRound(value, fpcr);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpmaxnormal/FPMaxNormal

```

// FPMaxNormal()
// =====

bits(N) FPMaxNormal(bit sign)
    assert N IN {16,32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 16 then 5 elsif N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
    exp = Ones(E-1):'0';
    frac = Ones(F);
    return sign : exp : frac;

```

shared/functions/float/fpmaxnum/FPMaxNum

```
// FPMaxNum()
// =====

bits(N) FPMaxNum(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};

    (type1,-,-) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,-,-) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);

    // treat a single quiet-NaN as -Infinity
    if type1 == FPType_QNaN && type2 != FPType_QNaN then
        op1 = FPInfinity('1');
    elseif type1 != FPType_QNaN && type2 == FPType_QNaN then
        op2 = FPInfinity('1');

    return FPMAX(op1, op2, fpcr);
```

shared/functions/float/fpmin/FPMin

```
// FPMin()
// =====

bits(N) FPMin(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPPROCESSNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        if value1 < value2 then
            (type,sign,value) = (type1,sign1,value1);
        else
            (type,sign,value) = (type2,sign2,value2);
        if type == FPType_Infinity then
            result = FPInfinity(sign);
        elseif type == FPType_Zero then
            sign = sign1 OR sign2; // Use most negative sign
            result = FPZero(sign);
        else
            result = FPRound(value, fpcr);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fpminnum/FPMinNum

```
// FPMinNum()
// =====

bits(N) FPMinNum(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};

    (type1,-,-) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,-,-) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);

    // Treat a single quiet-NaN as +Infinity
    if type1 == FPType_QNaN && type2 != FPType_QNaN then
        op1 = FPInfinity('0');
    elseif type1 != FPType_QNaN && type2 == FPType_QNaN then
        op2 = FPInfinity('0');

    return FPMIN(op1, op2, fpcr);
```

shared/functions/float/fpmul/FPMul

```

// FPMul()
// =====

bits(N) FPMul(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Infinity);
        inf2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Zero);
        zero2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Zero);
        if (inf1 && zero2) || (zero1 && inf2) then
            result = FPDefaultNaN();
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
        elsif inf1 || inf2 then
            result = FPInfinity(sign1 EOR sign2);
        elsif zero1 || zero2 then
            result = FPZero(sign1 EOR sign2);
        else
            result = FPRound(value1*value2, fpcr);
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpmuladd/FPMulAdd

```

// FPMulAdd()
// =====
//
// Calculates addend + op1*op2 with a single rounding.

bits(N) FPMulAdd(bits(N) addend, bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    rounding = FPRoundingMode(fpcr);
    (typeA,signA,valueA) = FPUnpack(addend, fpcr);
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    inf1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Infinity); zero1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Zero);
    inf2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Infinity); zero2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Zero);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs3(typeA, type1, type2, addend, op1, op2, fpcr);

    if typeA == FPTYPE_QNaN && ((inf1 && zero2) || (zero1 && inf2)) then
        result = FPDefaultNaN();
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);

    if !done then
        infA = (typeA == FPTYPE_Infinity); zeroA = (typeA == FPTYPE_Zero);

        // Determine sign and type product will have if it does not cause an Invalid
        // Operation.
        signP = sign1 EOR sign2;
        infP = inf1 || inf2;
        zeroP = zero1 || zero2;

        // Non SNaN-generated Invalid Operation cases are multiplies of zero by infinity and
        // additions of opposite-signed infinities.
        if (inf1 && zero2) || (zero1 && inf2) || (infA && infP && signA != signP) then
            result = FPDefaultNaN();
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);

        // Other cases involving infinities produce an infinity of the same sign.
        elsif (infA && signA == '0') || (infP && signP == '0') then
            result = FPInfinity('0');
        elsif (infA && signA == '1') || (infP && signP == '1') then
            result = FPInfinity('1');

```

```
// Cases where the result is exactly zero and its sign is not determined by the
// rounding mode are additions of same-signed zeros.
elseif zeroA && zeroP && signA == signP then
    result = FPZero(signA);

// Otherwise calculate numerical result and round it.
else
    result_value = valueA + (value1 * value2);
    if result_value == 0.0 then // Sign of exact zero result depends on rounding mode
        result_sign = if rounding == FPRounding_NEGINF then '1' else '0';
        result = FPZero(result_sign);
    else
        result = FPRound(result_value, fpcr);

return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fpmulx/FPMuIX

```
// FPMuIX()
// =====

bits(N) FPMuIX(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    bits(N) result;
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUntpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUntpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Infinity);
        inf2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPTYPE_Zero);
        zero2 = (type2 == FPTYPE_Zero);
        if (inf1 && zero2) || (zero1 && inf2) then
            result = FPTwo(sign1 EOR sign2);
        elseif inf1 || inf2 then
            result = FPinfinity(sign1 EOR sign2);
        elseif zero1 || zero2 then
            result = FPZero(sign1 EOR sign2);
        else
            result = FPRound(value1*value2, fpcr);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fpneg/FPNeg

```
// FPNeg()
// =====

bits(N) FPNeg(bits(N) op)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    return NOT(op<N-1>) : op<N-2:0>;
```

shared/functions/float/fponepointfive/FPOnePointFive

```
// FPOnePointFive()
// =====

bits(N) FPOnePointFive(bit sign)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
    exp = '0':Ones(E-1);
    frac = '1':Zeros(F-1);
    return sign : exp : frac;
```


shared/functions/float/fpprocessexception/FPProcessException

```
// FPProcessException()
// =====
//
// The 'fpcr' argument supplies FPCR control bits. Status information is
// updated directly in the FPSR where appropriate.

FPProcessException(FPExc exception, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    // Determine the cumulative exception bit number
    case exception of
        when FPExc_InvalidOp      cumul = 0;
        when FPExc_DivideByZero    cumul = 1;
        when FPExc_Overflow        cumul = 2;
        when FPExc_Underflow       cumul = 3;
        when FPExc_Inexact         cumul = 4;
        when FPExc_InputDenorm     cumul = 7;
    enable = cumul + 8;
    if fpcr<enable> == '1' then
        // Trapping of the exception enabled.
        // It is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED whether the enable bit may be set at all, and
        // if so then how exceptions may be accumulated before calling FPTrapException()
        IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED "floating-point trap handling";
    elseif UsingAArch32() then
        // Set the cumulative exception bit
        FPSR<cumul> = '1';
    else
        // Set the cumulative exception bit
        FPSR<cumul> = '1';
    return;
```

shared/functions/float/fpprocessnan/FPProcessNaN

```
// FPProcessNaN()
// =====

bits(N) FPProcessNaN(FPTYPE type, bits(N) op, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    assert type IN {FPTYPE_QNaN, FPTYPE_SNaN};

    topfrac = if N == 32 then 22 else 51;
    result = op;
    if type == FPTYPE_SNaN then
        result<topfrac> = '1';
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    if fpcr.DN == '1' then // DefaultNaN requested
        result = FPDefaultNaN();
    return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fpprocessnans/FPProcessNaNs

```
// FPProcessNaNs()
// =====
//
// The boolean part of the return value says whether a NaN has been found and
// processed. The bits(N) part is only relevant if it has and supplies the
// result of the operation.
//
// The 'fpcr' argument supplies FPCR control bits. Status information is
// updated directly in the FPSR where appropriate.

(boolean, bits(N)) FPProcessNaNs(FPTYPE type1, FPTYPE type2,
                                bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2,
                                FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    if type1 == FPTYPE_SNaN then
```

```

        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type1, op1, fpcr);
    elseif type2 == FPType_SNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type2, op2, fpcr);
    elseif type1 == FPType_QNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type1, op1, fpcr);
    elseif type2 == FPType_QNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type2, op2, fpcr);
    else
        done = FALSE; result = Zeros(); // 'Don't care' result
    return (done, result);

```

shared/functions/float/fpprocessnans3/FPProcessNaNs3

```

// FPProcessNaNs3()
// =====
//
// The boolean part of the return value says whether a NaN has been found and
// processed. The bits(N) part is only relevant if it has and supplies the
// result of the operation.
//
// The 'fpcr' argument supplies FPCR control bits. Status information is
// updated directly in the FPSR where appropriate.

(boolean, bits(N)) FPProcessNaNs3(FPType type1, FPType type2, FPType type3,
                                   bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, bits(N) op3,
                                   FPCRTYPE fpcr)

    assert N IN {32,64};
    if type1 == FPType_SNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type1, op1, fpcr);
    elseif type2 == FPType_SNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type2, op2, fpcr);
    elseif type3 == FPType_SNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type3, op3, fpcr);
    elseif type1 == FPType_QNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type1, op1, fpcr);
    elseif type2 == FPType_QNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type2, op2, fpcr);
    elseif type3 == FPType_QNaN then
        done = TRUE; result = FPProcessNaN(type3, op3, fpcr);
    else
        done = FALSE; result = Zeros(); // 'Don't care' result
    return (done, result);

```

shared/functions/float/fprecipestimate/FPrecepEstimate

```

// FPrecepEstimate()
// =====

bits(N) FPrecepEstimate(bits(N) operand, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32, 64};
    (type,sign,value) = FPUnpack(operand, fpcr);
    if type == FPType_SNaN || type == FPType_QNaN then
        result = FPProcessNaN(type, operand, fpcr);
    elseif type == FPType_Infinity then
        result = FPZero(sign);
    elseif type == FPType_Zero then
        result = FPinfinity(sign);
        FPProcessException(FPExc_DivideByZero, fpcr);
    elseif (N == 32 && Abs(value) < 2.0^-128)
        || (N == 64 && Abs(value) < 2.0^-1024) then
        case FPRoundingMode(fpcr) of
            when FPRounding_TIEEVEN
                overflow_to_inf = TRUE;
            when FPRounding_POSINF
                overflow_to_inf = (sign == '0');
            when FPRounding_NEGINF

```

```

        overflow_to_inf = (sign == '1');
        when FPRounding_ZERO
            overflow_to_inf = FALSE;
        result = if overflow_to_inf then FPIInfinity(sign) else FPMMaxNormal(sign);
        FPPProcessException(FPExc_Overflow, fpcr);
        FPPProcessException(FPExc_Inexact, fpcr);
    elseif fpcr.FZ == '1'
        && ((N == 32 && Abs(value) >= 2.0^126)
            || (N == 64 && Abs(value) >= 2.0^1022)) then
            // Result flushed to zero of correct sign
            result = FPZero(sign);
            if UsingAArch32() then
                FPSR.UFC = '1';
            else
                FPSR.UFC = '1';
    else
        // Scale to a double-precision value in the range 0.5 <= x < 1.0, and
        // calculate result exponent. Scaled value has copied sign bit,
        // exponent = 1022 = double-precision biased version of -1,
        // fraction = original fraction extended with zeros.

        if N == 32 then
            fraction = operand<22:0> : Zeros(29);
            exp = UInt(operand<30:23>);
        else // N == 64
            fraction = operand<51:0>;
            exp = UInt(operand<62:52>);

        if exp == 0 then
            if fraction<51> == 0 then
                exp = -1;
                fraction = fraction<49:0> : '00';
            else
                fraction = fraction<50:0> : '0';
            scaled = '0' : '01111111110' : fraction<51:44> : Zeros(44);

        if N == 32 then
            result_exp = 253 - exp;    // In range 253-254 = -1 to 253+1 = 254
        else // N == 64
            result_exp = 2045 - exp;   // In range 2045-2046 = -1 to 2045+1 = 2046

        // Call C function to get reciprocal estimate of scaled value.
        // Input is rounded down to a multiple of 1/512.
        estimate = recip_estimate(scaled);

        // Result is double-precision and a multiple of 1/256 in the range 1 to 511/256.
        // Convert to scaled single-precision result with copied sign bit and high-order
        // fraction bits, and exponent calculated above.

        fraction = estimate<51:0>;
        if result_exp == 0 then
            fraction = '1' : fraction<51:1>;
        elseif result_exp == -1 then
            fraction = '01' : fraction<51:2>;
            result_exp = 0;
        if N == 32 then
            result = sign : result_exp<N-25:0> : fraction<51:29>;
        else // N == 64
            result = sign : result_exp<N-54:0> : fraction<51:0>;

    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fprecpx/FPRecpX

```

// FPRecpX()
// =====

```

```

bits(N) FPrepX(bits(N) op, FPCRTType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    bits(N) result;
    integer esize = if N == 32 then 8 else 11;
    bits(esize) exp;
    bits(esize) max_exp;
    bits(N-esize-1) frac = Zeros();

    if N == 32 then
        exp = op<23+esize-1:23>;
    else
        exp = op<52+esize-1:52>;
    max_exp = Ones(esize) - 1;

    (type,sign,value) = FPUnpack(op, fpcr);
    if type == FPTType_SNaN || type == FPTType_QNaN then
        result = FPProcessNaN(type, op, fpcr);
    else
        if IsZero(exp) then // Zero and denormals
            result = sign:max_exp:frac;
        else // Infinities and normals
            result = sign:NOT(exp):frac;

    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpround/FPRound

```

// FPRound()
// =====

// Convert a real number OP into an N-bit floating-point value using the
// supplied rounding mode RMODE.

bits(N) FPRound(real op, FPCRTType fpcr, FPRounding rounding)
    assert N IN {16,32,64};
    assert op != 0.0;
    assert rounding != FPRounding_TIEAWAY;
    bits(N) result;

    // Obtain format parameters - minimum exponent, numbers of exponent and fraction bits.
    if N == 16 then
        minimum_exp = -14; E = 5; F = 10;
    elseif N == 32 then
        minimum_exp = -126; E = 8; F = 23;
    else // N == 64
        minimum_exp = -1022; E = 11; F = 52;

    // Split value into sign, unrounded mantissa and exponent.
    if op < 0.0 then
        sign = '1'; mantissa = -op;
    else
        sign = '0'; mantissa = op;
    exponent = 0;
    while mantissa < 1.0 do
        mantissa = mantissa * 2.0; exponent = exponent - 1;
    while mantissa >= 2.0 do
        mantissa = mantissa / 2.0; exponent = exponent + 1;

    // Deal with flush-to-zero.
    if fpcr.FZ == '1' && N != 16 && exponent < minimum_exp then
        // Flush-to-zero never generates a trapped exception
        if UsingAArch32() then
            FPSR.UFC = '1';
        else
            FPSR.UFC = '1';
    return FPZero(sign);

```

```

// Start creating the exponent value for the result. Start by biasing the actual exponent
// so that the minimum exponent becomes 1, lower values 0 (indicating possible underflow).
biased_exp = Max(exponent - minimum_exp + 1, 0);
if biased_exp == 0 then mantissa = mantissa / 2.0^(minimum_exp - exponent);

// Get the unrounded mantissa as an integer, and the "units in last place" rounding error.
int_mant = RoundDown(mantissa * 2.0^F); // < 2.0^F if biased_exp == 0, >= 2.0^F if not
error = mantissa * 2.0^F - Real(int_mant);

// Underflow occurs if exponent is too small before rounding, and result is inexact or
// the Underflow exception is trapped.
if biased_exp == 0 && (error != 0.0 || fpcr.UFE == '1') then
    FPProcessException(FPExc_Underflow, fpcr);

// Round result according to rounding mode.
case rounding of
    when FPRounding_TIEEVEN
        round_up = (error > 0.5 || (error == 0.5 && int_mant<0> == '1'));
        overflow_to_inf = TRUE;
    when FPRounding_POSINF
        round_up = (error != 0.0 && sign == '0');
        overflow_to_inf = (sign == '0');
    when FPRounding_NEGINF
        round_up = (error != 0.0 && sign == '1');
        overflow_to_inf = (sign == '1');
    when FPRounding_ZERO, FPRounding_ODD
        round_up = FALSE;
        overflow_to_inf = FALSE;

if round_up then
    int_mant = int_mant + 1;
    if int_mant == 2^F then // Rounded up from denormalized to normalized
        biased_exp = 1;
    if int_mant == 2^(F+1) then // Rounded up to next exponent
        biased_exp = biased_exp + 1; int_mant = int_mant DIV 2;

// Handle rounding to odd aka Von Neumann rounding
if error != 0.0 && rounding == FPRounding_ODD then
    int_mant<0> = '1';

// Deal with overflow and generate result.
if N != 16 || fpcr.AHP == '0' then // Single, double or IEEE half precision
    if biased_exp >= 2^E - 1 then
        result = if overflow_to_inf then FPInfinity(sign) else FPMaxNormal(sign);
        FPProcessException(FPExc_Overflow, fpcr);
        error = 1.0; // Ensure that an Inexact exception occurs
    else
        result = sign : biased_exp<N-F-2:0> : int_mant<F-1:0>;
else // Alternative half precision
    if biased_exp >= 2^E then
        result = sign : Ones(N-1);
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
        error = 0.0; // Ensure that an Inexact exception does not occur
    else
        result = sign : biased_exp<N-F-2:0> : int_mant<F-1:0>;

// Deal with Inexact exception.
if error != 0.0 then
    FPProcessException(FPExc_Inexact, fpcr);

return result;

// FPRound()
// =====

bits(N) FPRound(real op, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    return FPRound(op, fpcr, FPRoundingMode(fpcr));

```

shared/functions/float/fprounding/FPRounding

```
enumeration FPRounding {FPRounding_TIEEVEN, FPRounding_POSINF,  
                        FPRounding_NEGINF, FPRounding_ZERO,  
                        FPRounding_TIEAWAY, FPRounding_ODD};
```

shared/functions/float/fproundingmode/FPRoundingMode

```
// FPRoundingMode()  
// =====  
  
// Return the current floating-point rounding mode.  
  
FPRounding FPRoundingMode(FPCRTYPE fpcr)  
    return FPDecodeRounding(fpcr.RMode);
```

shared/functions/float/fproundint/FPRoundInt

```
// FPRoundInt()  
// =====  
  
// Round OP to nearest integral floating point value using rounding mode ROUNDING.  
// If EXACT is TRUE, set FPSR.IXC if result is not numerically equal to OP.  
  
bits(N) FPRoundInt(bits(N) op, FPCRTYPE fpcr, FPRounding rounding, boolean exact)  
    assert rounding != FPRounding_ODD;  
    assert N IN {32,64};  
  
    // Unpack using FPCR to determine if subnormals are flushed-to-zero  
    (type,sign,value) = FPUntpack(op, fpcr);  
  
    if type == FPTYPE_SNaN || type == FPTYPE_QNaN then  
        result = FPProcessNaN(type, op, fpcr);  
    elseif type == FPTYPE_Infinity then  
        result = FPinfinity(sign);  
    elseif type == FPTYPE_Zero then  
        result = FPZero(sign);  
    else  
        // extract integer component  
        int_result = RoundDown(value);  
        error = value - Real(int_result);  
  
        // Determine whether supplied rounding mode requires an increment  
        case rounding of  
            when FPRounding_TIEEVEN  
                round_up = (error > 0.5 || (error == 0.5 && int_result<0> == '1'));  
            when FPRounding_POSINF  
                round_up = (error != 0.0);  
            when FPRounding_NEGINF  
                round_up = FALSE;  
            when FPRounding_ZERO  
                round_up = (error != 0.0 && int_result < 0);  
            when FPRounding_TIEAWAY  
                round_up = (error > 0.5 || (error == 0.5 && int_result >= 0));  
  
        if round_up then int_result = int_result + 1;  
  
        // Convert integer value into an equivalent real value  
        real_result = Real(int_result);  
  
        // Re-encode as a floating-point value, result is always exact  
        if real_result == 0.0 then  
            result = FPZero(sign);  
        else  
            result = FPRound(real_result, fpcr, FPRounding_ZERO);
```

```

    // Generate inexact exceptions
    if error != 0.0 && exact then
        FPProcessException(FPExc_Inexact, fpcr);

    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fprsqrtestimate/FPRSqrtEstimate

```

// FPRSqrtEstimate()
// =====

bits(N) FPRSqrtEstimate(bits(N) operand, FPCRTYPE fpcr)
    assert N IN {32, 64};
    (type,sign,value) = FPUntpack(operand, fpcr);
    if type == FPTYPE_SNaN || type == FPTYPE_QNaN then
        result = FPProcessNaN(type, operand, fpcr);
    elseif type == FPTYPE_Zero then
        result = FPinfinity(sign);
        FPProcessException(FPExc_DivideByZero, fpcr);
    elseif sign == '1' then
        result = FPDefaultNaN();
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    elseif type == FPTYPE_Infinity then
        result = FPZero('0');
    else
        // Scale to a double-precision value in the range 0.25 <= x < 1.0, with the
        // evenness or oddness of the exponent unchanged, and calculate result exponent.
        // Scaled value has copied sign bit, exponent = 1022 or 1021 = double-precision
        // biased version of -1 or -2, fraction = original fraction extended with zeros.

        if N == 32 then
            fraction = operand<22:0> : Zeros(29);
            exp = UInt(operand<30:23>);
        else // N == 64
            fraction = operand<51:0>;
            exp = UInt(operand<62:52>);

        if exp == 0 then
            while fraction<51> == 0 do
                fraction = fraction<50:0> : '0';
                exp = exp - 1;
            fraction = fraction<50:0> : '0';

        if exp<0> == '0' then
            scaled = '0' : '0111111110' : fraction<51:44> : Zeros(44);
        else
            scaled = '0' : '0111111101' : fraction<51:44> : Zeros(44);

        if N == 32 then
            result_exp = (380 - exp) DIV 2;
        else // N == 64
            result_exp = (3068 - exp) DIV 2;

        // Call C function to get reciprocal estimate of scaled value.
        estimate = recip_sqrt_estimate(scaled);

        // Result is double-precision and a multiple of 1/256 in the range 1 to 511/256.
        // Convert to scaled single-precision result with copied sign bit and high-order
        // fraction bits, and exponent calculated above.

        if N == 32 then
            result = '0' : result_exp<N-25:0> : estimate<51:29>;
        else // N == 64
            result = '0' : result_exp<N-54:0> : estimate<51:0>;
    return result;

```

shared/functions/float/fpsqrt/FPSqrt

```
// FPSqrt()
// =====

bits(N) FPSqrt(bits(N) op, FPCRType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    (type,sign,value) = FPUnpack(op, fpcr);
    if type == FPType_SNaN || type == FPType_QNaN then
        result = FPProcessNaN(type, op, fpcr);
    elsif type == FPType_Zero then
        result = FPZero(sign);
    elsif type == FPType_Infinity && sign == '0' then
        result = FPInfinity(sign);
    elsif sign == '1' then
        result = FPDefaultNaN();
        FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    else
        result = FPRound(Sqrt(value), fpcr);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fpsub/FPSub

```
// FPSub()
// =====

bits(N) FPSub(bits(N) op1, bits(N) op2, FPCRType fpcr)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    rounding = FPRoundingMode(fpcr);
    (type1,sign1,value1) = FPUnpack(op1, fpcr);
    (type2,sign2,value2) = FPUnpack(op2, fpcr);
    (done,result) = FPProcessNaNs(type1, type2, op1, op2, fpcr);
    if !done then
        inf1 = (type1 == FPType_Infinity);
        inf2 = (type2 == FPType_Infinity);
        zero1 = (type1 == FPType_Zero);
        zero2 = (type2 == FPType_Zero);
        if inf1 && inf2 && sign1 == sign2 then
            result = FPDefaultNaN();
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InvalidOp, fpcr);
        elsif (inf1 && sign1 == '0') || (inf2 && sign2 == '1') then
            result = FPInfinity('0');
        elsif (inf1 && sign1 == '1') || (inf2 && sign2 == '0') then
            result = FPInfinity('1');
        elsif zero1 && zero2 && sign1 == NOT(sign2) then
            result = FPZero(sign1);
        else
            result_value = value1 - value2;
            if result_value == 0.0 then // Sign of exact zero result depends on rounding mode
                result_sign = if rounding == FPRounding_NEGINF then '1' else '0';
                result = FPZero(result_sign);
            else
                result = FPRound(result_value, fpcr, rounding);
    return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fpthree/FPThree

```
// FPThree()
// =====

bits(N) FPThree(bit sign)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
```



```
exp = '1':Zeros(E-1);
frac = '1':Zeros(F-1);
return sign : exp : frac;
```

shared/functions/float/fptofixed/FPToFixed

```
// FPToFixed()
// =====

// Convert N-bit precision floating point OP to M-bit fixed point with
// FBITS fractional bits, controlled by UNSIGNED and ROUNDING.

bits(M) FPToFixed(bits(N) op, integer fbits, boolean unsigned, FPCRTYPE fpcr, FPRounding rounding)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    assert M IN {32,64};
    assert fbits >= 0;
    assert rounding != FPRounding_ODD;

    // Unpack using fpcr to determine if subnormals are flushed-to-zero
    (type,sign,value) = FPUntpack(op, fpcr);

    // If NaN, set cumulative flag or take exception
    if type == FPTYPE_SNaN || type == FPTYPE_QNaN then
        FPPROCESSException(FPEXC_InvalidOp, fpcr);

    // Scale by fractional bits and produce integer rounded towards minus-infinity
    value = value * 2.0^fbits;
    int_result = RoundDown(value);
    error = value - Real(int_result);

    // Determine whether supplied rounding mode requires an increment
    case rounding of
        when FPRounding_TIEEVEN
            round_up = (error > 0.5 || (error == 0.5 && int_result<0> == '1'));
        when FPRounding_POSINF
            round_up = (error != 0.0);
        when FPRounding_NEGINF
            round_up = FALSE;
        when FPRounding_ZERO
            round_up = (error != 0.0 && int_result < 0);
        when FPRounding_TIEAWAY
            round_up = (error > 0.5 || (error == 0.5 && int_result >= 0));

    if round_up then int_result = int_result + 1;

    // Generate saturated result and exceptions
    (result, overflow) = SatQ(int_result, M, unsigned);
    if overflow then
        FPPROCESSException(FPEXC_InvalidOp, fpcr);
    elsif error != 0.0 then
        FPPROCESSException(FPEXC_Inexact, fpcr);

    return result;
```

shared/functions/float/fptwo/FPTwo

```
// FPTwo()
// =====

bits(N) FPTwo(bit sign)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
    exp = '1':Zeros(E-1);
    frac = Zeros(F);
    return sign : exp : frac;
```

shared/functions/float/fptype/FPType

```
enumeration FPType      {FPType_Nonzero, FPType_Zero, FPType_Infinity,  
                        FPType_QNaN, FPType_SNaN};
```

shared/functions/float/fpunpack/FPUnpack

```
// FPUnpack()  
// =====  
//  
// Unpack a floating-point number into its type, sign bit and the real number  
// that it represents. The real number result has the correct sign for numbers  
// and infinities, is very large in magnitude for infinities, and is 0.0 for  
// NaNs. (These values are chosen to simplify the description of comparisons  
// and conversions.)  
//  
// The 'fpcr' argument supplies FPCR control bits. Status information is  
// updated directly in the FPSR where appropriate.  
  
(FPType, bit, real) FPUnpack(bits(N) fpval, FPCRTYPE fpcr)  
    assert N IN {16,32,64};  
  
    if N == 16 then  
        sign = fpval<15>;  
        exp16 = fpval<14:10>;  
        frac16 = fpval<9:0>;  
        if IsZero(exp16) then  
            // Produce zero if value is zero  
            if IsZero(frac16) then  
                type = FPType_Zero; value = 0.0;  
            else  
                type = FPType_Nonzero; value = 2.0-14 * (Real(UInt(frac16)) * 2.0-10);  
        elseif IsOnes(exp16) && fpcr.AHP == '0' then // Infinity or NaN in IEEE format  
            if IsZero(frac16) then  
                type = FPType_Infinity; value = 2.01000000;  
            else  
                type = if frac16<9> == '1' then FPType_QNaN else FPType_SNaN;  
                value = 0.0;  
        else  
            type = FPType_Nonzero;  
            value = 2.0(UInt(exp16)-15) * (1.0 + Real(UInt(frac16)) * 2.0-10);  
  
    elseif N == 32 then  
  
        sign = fpval<31>;  
        exp32 = fpval<30:23>;  
        frac32 = fpval<22:0>;  
        if IsZero(exp32) then  
            // Produce zero if value is zero or flush-to-zero is selected.  
            if IsZero(frac32) || fpcr.FZ == '1' then  
                type = FPType_Zero; value = 0.0;  
            if !IsZero(frac32) then // Denormalized input flushed to zero  
                FPProcessException(FPEXC_InputDenorm, fpcr);  
        else  
            type = FPType_Nonzero; value = 2.0-126 * (Real(UInt(frac32)) * 2.0-23);  
    elseif IsOnes(exp32) then  
        if IsZero(frac32) then  
            type = FPType_Infinity; value = 2.01000000;  
        else  
            type = if frac32<22> == '1' then FPType_QNaN else FPType_SNaN;  
            value = 0.0;  
    else  
        type = FPType_Nonzero;  
        value = 2.0(UInt(exp32)-127) * (1.0 + Real(UInt(frac32)) * 2.0-23);  
  
    else // N == 64
```

```

sign = fpval<63>;
exp64 = fpval<62:52>;
frac64 = fpval<51:0>;
if IsZero(exp64) then
    // Produce zero if value is zero or flush-to-zero is selected.
    if IsZero(frac64) || fpcr.FZ == '1' then
        type = FPType_Zero; value = 0.0;
        if !IsZero(frac64) then // Denormalized input flushed to zero
            FPProcessException(FPExc_InputDenorm, fpcr);
    else
        type = FPType_Nonzero; value = 2.0-1022 * (Real(UInt(frac64)) * 2.0-52);
elseif IsOnes(exp64) then
    if IsZero(frac64) then
        type = FPType_Infinity; value = 2.01000000;
    else
        type = if frac64<51> == '1' then FPType_QNaN else FPType_SNaN;
        value = 0.0;
else
    type = FPType_Nonzero;
    value = 2.0(UInt(exp64)-1023) * (1.0 + Real(UInt(frac64)) * 2.0-52);

if sign == '1' then value = -value;
return (type, sign, value);

```

shared/functions/float/fpzero/FPZero

```

// FPZero()
// =====

bits(N) FPZero(bit sign)
    assert N IN {16,32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 16 then 5 elsif N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
    exp = Zeros(E);
    frac = Zeros(F);
    return sign : exp : frac;

```

shared/functions/float/vfpexpandimm/VFPEExpandImm

```

// VFPEExpandImm()
// =====

bits(N) VFPEExpandImm(bits(8) imm8)
    assert N IN {32,64};
    constant integer E = (if N == 32 then 8 else 11);
    constant integer F = N - E - 1;
    sign = imm8<7>;
    exp = NOT(imm8<6>):Replicate(imm8<6>,E-3):imm8<5:4>;
    frac = imm8<3:0>:Zeros(F-4);
    return sign : exp : frac;

```

shared/functions/integer/AddWithCarry

```

// AddWithCarry()
// =====
// Integer addition with carry input, returning result and NZCV flags

(bits(N), bits(4)) AddWithCarry(bits(N) x, bits(N) y, bit carry_in)
    integer unsigned_sum = UInt(x) + UInt(y) + UInt(carry_in);
    integer signed_sum = SInt(x) + SInt(y) + UInt(carry_in);
    bits(N) result = unsigned_sum<N-1:0>; // same value as signed_sum<N-1:0>
    bit n = result<N-1>;
    bit z = if IsZero(result) then '1' else '0';
    bit c = if UInt(result) == unsigned_sum then '0' else '1';
    bit v = if SInt(result) == signed_sum then '0' else '1';
    return (result, n:z:c:v);

```

shared/functions/memory/AccType

```
enumeration AccType {AccType_NORMAL, AccType_VEC,           // Normal loads and stores
                     AccType_STREAM, AccType_VECSTREAM,    // Streaming loads and stores
                     AccType_ATOMIC,                       // Atomic loads and stores
                     AccType_ORDERED,                      // Load-Acquire and Store-Release
                     AccType_UNPRIV,                      // Load and store unprivileged
                     AccType_IFETCH,                      // Instruction fetch
                     AccType_PTW,                         // Page table walk
                     // Other operations
                     AccType_DC,                          // Data cache maintenance
                     AccType_IC,                          // Instruction cache maintenance
                     AccType_AT};                         // Address translation
```

shared/functions/memory/AddressDescriptor

```
type AddressDescriptor is (
    FaultRecord    fault,      // fault.type indicates whether the address is valid
    MemoryAttributes memattrs,
    FullAddress     paddress,
    bits(32)        vaddress
)
```

shared/functions/memory/Allocation

```
constant bits(2) MemHint_No = '00'; // No allocate
constant bits(2) MemHint_WA = '01'; // Write-allocate, Read-no-allocate
constant bits(2) MemHint_RA = '10'; // Read-allocate, Write-no-allocate
constant bits(2) MemHint_RWA = '11'; // Read-allocate and Write-allocate
```

shared/functions/memory/BigEndian

```
// BigEndian()
// =====

boolean BigEndian()
    boolean bigend;

    bigend = (PSTATE.E != '0');
    return bigend;
```

shared/functions/memory/BigEndianReverse

```
// BigEndianReverse()
// =====

bits(width) BigEndianReverse (bits(width) value)
    assert width IN {8, 16, 32, 64, 128};
    integer half = width DIV 2;
    if width == 8 then return value;
    return BigEndianReverse(value<half-1:0>) : BigEndianReverse(value<width-1:half>);
```

shared/functions/memory/Cacheability

```
constant bits(2) MemAttr_NC = '00'; // Non-cacheable
constant bits(2) MemAttr_WT = '10'; // Write-through
constant bits(2) MemAttr_WB = '11'; // Write-back
```

shared/functions/memory/DataFullBarrier

```
DataFullBarrier();
```

shared/functions/memory/DataMemoryBarrier

```
DataMemoryBarrier(MBReqDomain domain, MBReqTypes types);
```

shared/functions/memory/DataSynchronizationBarrier

```
DataSynchronizationBarrier(MBReqDomain domain, MBReqTypes types);
```

shared/functions/memory/DeviceType

```
enumeration DeviceType {DeviceType_GRE, DeviceType_nGRE, DeviceType_nGnRE, DeviceType_nGnRnE};
```

shared/functions/memory/Fault

```
enumeration Fault {Fault_None,
    Fault_AccessFlag,
    Fault_Alignment,
    Fault_Background,
    Fault_Domain,
    Fault_Permission,
    Fault_Translation,
    Fault_AddressSize,
    Fault_SyncExternal,
    Fault_SyncExternalOnWalk,
    Fault_SyncParity,
    Fault_SyncParityOnWalk,
    Fault_AsyncParity,
    Fault_AsyncExternal,
    Fault_Debug,
    Fault_TLBConflict,
    Fault_Lockdown,
    Fault_Exclusive,
    Fault_ICacheMaint};
```

shared/functions/memory/FaultRecord

```
type FaultRecord is (Fault    type,           // Fault Status
    AccType acctype,         // Type of access that faulted
    bits(32) ipaddress,
    boolean s2fs1walk,       // Is on a Stage 1 page table walk
    boolean write,           // TRUE for a write, FALSE for a read
    integer level,           // For translation, access flag and permission faults
    bit extflag,             // IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED syndrome for external aborts
    boolean secondstage,     // Is a Stage 2 abort
    bits(4) domain,          // Domain number, AArch32 only
    bits(4) debugmoe)        // Debug method of entry, from AArch32 only
```

shared/functions/memory/FullAddress

```
type FullAddress is (
    bits(32) physicaladdress
)
```

shared/functions/memory/Hint_Prefetch

```
// Signals the memory system that memory accesses of type HINT to or from the specified address are
// likely in the near future. The memory system may take some action to speed up the memory accesses
// when they do occur, such as pre-loading the the specified address into one or more caches as
// indicated by the innermost cache level target (0=L1, 1=L2, etc) and non-temporal hint stream.
// Any or all prefetch hints may be treated as a NOP. A prefetch hint must not cause a synchronous
// abort due to alignment or translation faults and the like. Its only effect on software visible
// state should be on caches and TLBs associated with address, which must be accessible by reads,
// writes or execution as defined in the translation regime of the current Exception level.
```

```
// It is guaranteed not to access Device memory.  
// A Prefetch_EXEC hint must not result in an access that could not be performed by a speculative  
// instruction fetch, therefore if all associated MMUs are disabled, then it cannot access any  
// memory location that cannot be accessed by instruction fetches.  
Hint_Prefetch(bits(64) address, PrefetchHint hint, integer target, boolean stream);
```

shared/functions/memory/MBReqDomain

```
enumeration MBReqDomain {MBReqDomain_Nonshareable, MBReqDomain_InnerShareable,  
                          MBReqDomain_OuterShareable, MBReqDomain_FullSystem};
```

shared/functions/memory/MBReqTypes

```
enumeration MBReqTypes {MBReqTypes_Reads, MBReqTypes_Writes, MBReqTypes_All};
```

shared/functions/memory/MPURecord

```
type MPURecord is (  
    Permissions perms,  
    AddressDescriptor addrdesc,  
    boolean br_enabled  
)
```

shared/functions/memory/MemAttrHints

```
type MemAttrHints is (  
    bits(2) attrs, // The possible encodings for each attributes field are as below  
    bits(2) hints, // The possible encodings for the hints are below  
    boolean transient  
)
```

shared/functions/memory/MemType

```
enumeration MemType {MemType_Normal, MemType_Device};
```

shared/functions/memory/MemoryAttributes

```
type MemoryAttributes is (  
    MemType type,  
  
    DeviceType device, // For Device memory types  
    MemAttrHints inner, // Inner hints and attributes  
    MemAttrHints outer, // Outer hints and attributes  
  
    boolean shareable,  
    boolean outershareable  
)
```

shared/functions/memory/Permissions

```
type Permissions is (  
    bits(3) ap, // Access permission bits  
    bit xn, // Execute-never bit  
    bit pxn // Privileged execute-never bit  
)
```

shared/functions/memory/PrefetchHint

```
enumeration PrefetchHint {Prefetch_READ, Prefetch_WRITE, Prefetch_EXEC};
```

shared/functions/memory/TLBRecord

```
type TLBRecord is (
    Permissions perms,
    bit nG,          // '0' = Global, '1' = not Global
    bits(4) domain,  // AArch32 only
    boolean contiguous, // Contiguous bit from page table
    integer level,    // In AArch32 Short-descriptor format, indicates Section/Page
    integer blocksize, // Describes size of memory translated in KBytes
    AddressDescriptor addrdesc
)
```

shared/functions/memory/_Mem

```
// These two _Mem[] accessors are the hardware operations which perform
// single-copy atomic, aligned, little-endian memory accesses of size
// bytes from/to the underlying physical memory array of bytes.
//
// The functions address the array using desc.PADDRESS which supplies:
//
// * A 48-bit physical address
// * A single NS bit to select between Secure and Non-secure parts of
//   the array.
//
// The acctype parameter describes the access type: normal, exclusive,
// ordered, streaming, etc.
bits(8*size) _Mem[AddressDescriptor desc, integer size, AccType acctype];

_Mem[AddressDescriptor desc, integer size, AccType acctype] = bits(8*size) value;
```

shared/functions/registers/BranchTo

```
// BranchTo()
// =====

// Set program counter to a new address, which may include a tag in the top eight bits,
// with a branch reason hint for possible use by hardware fetching the next instruction.

BranchTo(bits(N) target, BranchType branch_type)
    Hint_Branch(branch_type);
    if N == 32 then
        assert UsingAArch32();
        _PC = ZeroExtend(target);
    return;
```

shared/functions/registers/BranchToAddr

```
// BranchToAddr()
// =====

// Set program counter to a new address, which does not include a tag in the top eight bits,
// with a branch reason hint for possible use by hardware fetching the next instruction.

BranchToAddr(bits(N) target, BranchType branch_type)
    Hint_Branch(branch_type);
    if N == 32 then
        assert UsingAArch32();
        _PC = ZeroExtend(target);
    return;
```

shared/functions/registers/BranchType

```
enumeration BranchType {BranchType_CALL, BranchType_ERET, BranchType_DBGEXIT,
    BranchType_RET, BranchType_JMP, BranchType_EXCEPTION,
    BranchType_UNKNOWN};
```

shared/functions/registers/Hint_Branch

```
// Report the hint passed to BranchTo() and BranchToAddr(), for consideration when processing
// the next instruction.
Hint_Branch(BranchType hint);
```

shared/functions/registers/NextInstrAddr

```
// Return address of the next instruction.
bits(N) NextInstrAddr();
```

shared/functions/registers/ResetExternalDebugRegisters

```
// Reset the External Debug registers in the Core power domain.
ResetExternalDebugRegisters(bootstrap cold_reset);
```

shared/functions/registers/ThisInstrAddr

```
// ThisInstrAddr()
// =====
// Return address of the current instruction.

bits(N) ThisInstrAddr()
    assert N == 64 || (N == 32 && UsingAArch32());
    return _PC<N-1:0>;
```

shared/functions/registers/_PC

```
bits(64) _PC;
```

shared/functions/registers/_R

```
array bits(64) _R[0..30];
```

shared/functions/registers/_V

```
array bits(128) _V[0..31];
```

shared/functions/sysregisters/SPSR

```
// SPSR[] - non-assignment form
// =====

bits(32) SPSR[]
    bits(32) result;
    if UsingAArch32() then
        case PSTATE.M of
            when M32_FIQ      result = SPSR_fiq;
            when M32_IRQ      result = SPSR_irq;
            when M32_Svc      result = SPSR_svc;
            when M32_Abort     result = SPSR_abt;
            when M32_Hyp       result = SPSR_hyp;
            when M32_Undef     result = SPSR_und;
            otherwise         Unreachable();

    return result;

// SPSR[] - assignment form
// =====

SPSR[] = bits(32) value
    if UsingAArch32() then
        case PSTATE.M of
```



```

when M32_FIQ      SPSR_fiq = value;
when M32_IRQ      SPSR_irq = value;
when M32_Svc      SPSR_svc = value;
when M32_Abort    SPSR_abt = value;
when M32_Hyp      SPSR_hyp = value;
when M32_Undef    SPSR_und = value;
otherwise         Unreachable();

```

```
return;
```

shared/functions/system/ArchVersion

```

enumeration ArchVersion {
    ARMv8p0,
};

```

shared/functions/system/ClearEventRegister

```
ClearEventRegister();
```

shared/functions/system/ConditionHolds

```

// ConditionHolds()
// =====

// Return TRUE iff COND currently holds

boolean ConditionHolds(bits(4) cond)
// Evaluate base condition.
case cond<3:1> of
    when '000' result = (PSTATE.Z == '1');           // EQ or NE
    when '001' result = (PSTATE.C == '1');           // CS or CC
    when '010' result = (PSTATE.N == '1');           // MI or PL
    when '011' result = (PSTATE.V == '1');           // VS or VC
    when '100' result = (PSTATE.C == '1' && PSTATE.Z == '0'); // HI or LS
    when '101' result = (PSTATE.N == PSTATE.V);       // GE or LT
    when '110' result = (PSTATE.N == PSTATE.V && PSTATE.Z == '0'); // GT or LE
    when '111' result = TRUE;                         // AL

// Condition flag values in the set '111x' indicate always true
// Otherwise, invert condition if necessary.
if cond<0> == '1' && cond != '1111' then
    result = !result;

return result;

```

shared/functions/system/CurrentInstrSet

```

// CurrentInstrSet()
// =====

InstrSet CurrentInstrSet()

if UsingAArch32() then
    result = if PSTATE.T == '0' then InstrSet_A32 else InstrSet_T32;
    // PSTATE.J is RES0. Implementation of T32EE or Jazelle state not permitted.
else
    result = InstrSet_A64;
return result;

```

shared/functions/system/CurrentPL

```
// CurrentPL()
// =====

PrivilegeLevel CurrentPL()
    return PLOFEL(PSTATE.EL);
```

shared/functions/system/EL0

```
constant bits(2) EL3 = '11';
constant bits(2) EL2 = '10';
constant bits(2) EL1 = '01';
constant bits(2) EL0 = '00';
```

shared/functions/system/ELFromM32

```
// ELFromM32()
// =====

(boolean, bits(2)) ELFromM32(bits(5) mode)
    // Convert an AArch32 mode encoding to an Exception level.
    // Returns (valid, EL):
    // 'valid' is TRUE if 'mode<4:0>' encodes a mode that is both valid for this implementation
    // and the current value of SCR.NS/SCR_EL3.NS.
    // 'EL' is the Exception level decoded from 'mode'.
    bits(2) el;
    boolean valid = !BadMode(mode); // Check for modes that are not valid for this implementation
    case mode of
        when M32_Monitor
            el = EL3;
        when M32_Hyp
            el = EL2;
        when M32_FIQ, M32_IRQ, M32_Svc, M32_Abort, M32_Undef, M32_System
            el = EL1;
        when M32_User
            el = EL0;
        otherwise
            valid = FALSE; // Passed an illegal mode value
    if !valid then el = bits(2) UNKNOWN;
    return (valid, el);
```

shared/functions/system/ELFromSPSR

```
// ELFromSPSR()
// =====

// Convert an SPSR value encoding to an Exception level.
// Returns (valid, EL):
// 'valid' is TRUE if 'spsr<4:0>' encodes a valid mode for the current state.
// 'EL' is the Exception level decoded from 'spsr'.

(boolean, bits(2)) ELFromSPSR(bits(32) spsr)
    return ELFromM32(spsr<4:0>);
```

shared/functions/system/ELUsingAArch32

```
// ELUsingAArch32()
// =====

boolean ELUsingAArch32(bits(2) el)
    if !HaveEL(el) then
        return FALSE; // The Exception level is not implemented
    else
        return TRUE;
```

shared/functions/system/EndOfInstruction

```
// Terminate processing of the current instruction.
EndOfInstruction();
```

shared/functions/system/EventRegisterSet

```
// Set the local event register in this PE.
EventRegisterSet();
```

shared/functions/system/EventRegistered

```
boolean EventRegistered();
```

shared/functions/system/GetPSRFromPSTATE

```
// GetPSRFromPSTATE()
// =====
// Return a PSR value which represents the current PSTATE

bits(32) GetPSRFromPSTATE()
    bits(32) spsr = Zeros();
    spsr<31:28> = PSTATE.<N,Z,C,V>;
    spsr<21>    = PSTATE.SS;
    spsr<20>    = PSTATE.IL;
    if PSTATE.nRW == '1' then // AArch32 state
        spsr<27>    = PSTATE.Q;
        spsr<26:25> = PSTATE.IT<1:0>;
        spsr<19:16> = PSTATE.GE;
        spsr<15:10> = PSTATE.IT<7:2>;
        spsr<9>     = PSTATE.E;
        spsr<8:6>   = PSTATE.<A,I,F>; // No PSTATE.D in AArch32 state
        spsr<5>     = PSTATE.T;
        assert PSTATE.M<4> == PSTATE.nRW; // bit [4] is the discriminator
        spsr<4:0>   = PSTATE.M;
    else // AArch64 state
        spsr<9:6>   = PSTATE.<D,A,I,F>;
        spsr<4>     = PSTATE.nRW;
        spsr<3:2>   = PSTATE.EL;
        spsr<0>     = PSTATE.SP;
    return spsr;
```

shared/functions/system/HasArchVersion

```
// HasArchVersion()
// =====

// Return TRUE if the implemented architecture includes the extensions defined in the specified
// architecture version.

boolean HasArchVersion(ArchVersion version)
    return version == ARMv8p0 || boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED;
```

shared/functions/system/HaveAnyAArch32

```
// HaveAnyAArch32()
// =====
// Return TRUE if AArch32 state is supported at any Exception level

boolean HaveAnyAArch32()
    return boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED;
```

shared/functions/system/HaveEL

```
// HaveEL()
// =====
// Return TRUE if Exception level 'el' is supported

boolean HaveEL(bits(2) el)
    if el IN {EL1,EL0} then
        return TRUE; // EL1 and EL0 must exist
    return boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED;
```

shared/functions/system/HighestEL

```
// HighestEL()
// =====
// Returns the highest implemented Exception level.

bits(2) HighestEL()
    if HaveEL(EL3) then
        return EL3;
    elseif HaveEL(EL2) then
        return EL2;
    else
        return EL1;
```

shared/functions/system/HighestELUsingAArch32

```
// HighestELUsingAArch32()
// =====
// Return TRUE if configured to boot into AArch32 operation

boolean HighestELUsingAArch32()
    if !HaveAnyAArch32() then return FALSE;
    return boolean IMPLEMENTATION_DEFINED; // e.g. CFG32SIGNAL == HIGH
```

shared/functions/system/Hint_Yield

```
Hint_Yield();
```

shared/functions/system/IllegalExceptionReturn

```
// IllegalExceptionReturn()
// =====

boolean IllegalExceptionReturn(bits(32) spsr)

    // Check for return:
    // * With an illegal value of SPSR.M.
    (valid, target) = ELFromSPSR(spsr);
    if !valid then return TRUE;

    // Check for return to higher Exception level
    if UInt(target) > UInt(PSTATE.EL) then return TRUE;

    // Check for return to EL1 in Non-secure state when HCR.TGE is set
    if HaveEL(EL2) && target == EL1 && HCR.TGE == '1' then return TRUE;
    return FALSE;
```

shared/functions/system/InstrSet

```
enumeration InstrSet {InstrSet_A64, InstrSet_A32, InstrSet_T32};
```

shared/functions/system/InstructionSynchronizationBarrier

```
InstructionSynchronizationBarrier();
```

shared/functions/system/InterruptPending

```
boolean InterruptPending();
```

shared/functions/system/IsSecure

```
// IsSecure()
// =====

boolean IsSecure()
    return FALSE;
```

shared/functions/system/Mode_Bits

```
constant bits(5) M32_User    = '10000';
constant bits(5) M32_FIQ    = '10001';
constant bits(5) M32_IRQ    = '10010';
constant bits(5) M32_Svc    = '10011';
constant bits(5) M32_Monitor = '10110';
constant bits(5) M32_Abort   = '10111';
constant bits(5) M32_Hyp     = '11010';
constant bits(5) M32_Undef   = '11011';
constant bits(5) M32_System  = '11111';
```

shared/functions/system/PLOfEL

```
// PLOfEL()
// =====

PrivilegeLevel PLOfEL(bits(2) e1)
    case e1 of
        when EL3 return if HighestELUsingAArch32() then PL1 else PL3;
        when EL2 return PL2;
        when EL1 return PL1;
        when EL0 return PL0;
```

shared/functions/system/PSTATE

```
ProcState PSTATE;
```

shared/functions/system/PrivilegeLevel

```
enumeration PrivilegeLevel {PL3, PL2, PL1, PL0};
```

shared/functions/system/ProcState

```
type ProcState is (
    bits (1) N,      // Negative condition flag
    bits (1) Z,      // Zero condition flag
    bits (1) C,      // Carry condition flag
    bits (1) V,      // oVerflow condition flag
    bits (1) D,      // Debug mask bit                [AArch64 only]
    bits (1) A,      // SError interrupt mask bit
    bits (1) I,      // IRQ mask bit
    bits (1) F,      // FIQ mask bit
    bits (1) SS,     // Software step bit
    bits (1) IL,     // Illegal Execution state bit
    bits (2) EL,     // Exception Level
    bits (1) nRW,    // not Register Width: 0=64, 1=32
```

```

bits (1) SP,      // Stack pointer select: 0=SP0, 1=SPx [AArch64 only]
bits (1) Q,      // Cumulative saturation flag [AArch32 only]
bits (4) GE,     // Greater than or Equal flags [AArch32 only]
bits (8) IT,     // If-then bits, RES0 in CPSR [AArch32 only]
bits (1) J,      // J bit, RES0 [AArch32 only, RES0 in SPSR and CPSR]
bits (1) T,     // T32 bit, RES0 in CPSR [AArch32 only]
bits (1) E,     // Endianness bit [AArch32 only]
bits (5) M,     // Mode field [AArch32 only]
)

```

shared/functions/system/RestoredITBits

```

// RestoredITBits()
// =====
// Get the value of PSTATE.IT to be restored on this exception return.

bits(8) RestoredITBits(bits(32) spsr)
    it = spsr<15:10,26:25>;

    // When PSTATE.IL is set, it is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether the IT bits are each set
    // to zero or copied from the SPSR.
    if PSTATE.IL == '1' then
        if ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then return '00000000';
        else return it;

    // The IT bits are forced to zero when they are set to a reserved value.
    if !IsZero(it<7:4>) && IsZero(it<3:0>) then
        return '00000000';

    // The IT bits are forced to zero when returning to A32 state, or when returning to an EL
    // with the ITD bit set to 1, and the IT bits are describing a multi-instruction block.
    itd = if PSTATE.EL == EL2 then HSCTLR.ITD else SCTLR.ITD;
    if (spsr<5> == '0' && !IsZero(it)) || (itd == '1' && !IsZero(it<2:0>)) then
        return '00000000';
    else
        return it;

```

shared/functions/system/SCRTType

```
type SCRTType;
```

shared/functions/system/SendEvent

```

// Signal an event to all PEs.
SendEvent();

```

shared/functions/system/SetPSTATEFromPSR

```

// SetPSTATEFromPSR()
// =====
// Set PSTATE based on a PSR value

SetPSTATEFromPSR(bits(32) spsr)

    SynchronizeContext();
    if IllegalExceptionReturn(spsr) then
        PSTATE.IL = '1';
    else
        // State that is reinstated only on a legal exception return
        PSTATE.IL = spsr<20>;
        // If PSTATE.IL is set and returning to AArch32 state, it is CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE whether
        // the T bit is set to zero or copied from SPSR.
        if PSTATE.IL == '1' then
            if ConstrainUnpredictableBool() then spsr<5> = '0';

```

```
// State that is reinstated regardless of illegal exception return
PSTATE.<N,Z,C,V> = spsr<31:28>;
PSTATE.Q         = spsr<27>;
PSTATE.IT        = RestoredITBits(spsr);
PSTATE.GE        = spsr<19:16>;
PSTATE.E         = spsr<9>;
PSTATE.<A,I,F>   = spsr<8:6>;
PSTATE.T         = spsr<5>;

return;
```

shared/functions/system/SynchronizeContext

```
SynchronizeContext();
```

shared/functions/system/ThisInstr

```
bits(32) ThisInstr();
```

shared/functions/system/ThisInstrLength

```
integer ThisInstrLength();
```

shared/functions/system/Unreachable

```
Unreachable()
    assert FALSE;
```

shared/functions/system/UsingAArch32

```
// UsingAArch32()
// =====
// Return TRUE if the current Exception level is using AArch32, FALSE if using AArch64.

boolean UsingAArch32()
    boolean aarch32 = (PSTATE.nRW == '1');
    if !HaveAnyAArch32() then assert !aarch32;
    if HighestELUsingAArch32() then assert aarch32;
    return aarch32;
```

shared/functions/system/WaitForEvent

```
WaitForEvent();
```

shared/functions/system/WaitForInterrupt

```
WaitForInterrupt();
```

shared/functions/unpredictable/ConstrainUnpredictable

```
// Return the appropriate Constraint result to control the caller's behavior. The return value
// is IMPLEMENTATION DEFINED within a permitted list for each UNPREDICTABLE case.
// (The permitted list is determined by an assert or case statement at the call site.)
Constraint ConstrainUnpredictable();
```

shared/functions/unpredictable/ConstrainUnpredictableBits

```
// This is a variant of ConstrainUnpredictable for when the result can be Constraint_UNKNOWN.  
// If the result is Constraint_UNKNOWN then the function also returns UNKNOWN value, but that  
// value is always an allocated value; that is, one for which the behavior is not itself  
// CONSTRAINED.  
(Constraint, bits(width)) ConstrainUnpredictableBits();
```

shared/functions/unpredictable/ConstrainUnpredictableBool

```
// ConstrainUnpredictableBool()  
// =====  
  
// This is a simple wrapper function for cases where the constrained result is either TRUE or FALSE.  
  
boolean ConstrainUnpredictableBool()  
  
    c = ConstrainUnpredictable();  
    assert c IN {Constraint_TRUE, Constraint_FALSE};  
    return (c == Constraint_TRUE);
```

shared/functions/unpredictable/ConstrainUnpredictableInteger

```
// This is a variant of ConstrainUnpredictable for when the result can be Constraint_UNKNOWN. If  
// the result is Constraint_UNKNOWN then the function also returns an UNKNOWN value in the range  
// low to high, inclusive.  
(Constraint, integer) ConstrainUnpredictableInteger(integer low, integer high);
```

shared/functions/unpredictable/Constraint

```
enumeration Constraint    { // General:  
    Constraint_NONE, Constraint_UNKNOWN,  
    Constraint_UNDEF, Constraint_NOP,  
    Constraint_TRUE, Constraint_FALSE,  
    Constraint_DISABLED,  
    Constraint_UNCOND, Constraint_COND, Constraint_ADDITIONAL_DECODE,  
    // Load-store:  
    Constraint_WBSUPPRESS, Constraint_FAULT,  
    // IPA too large  
    Constraint_FORCE, Constraint_FORCENOSLCHECK};
```

shared/functions/vector/AdvSIMDExpandImm

```
// AdvSIMDExpandImm()  
// =====  
  
bits(64) AdvSIMDExpandImm(bit op, bits(4) cmode, bits(8) imm8)  
    case cmode<3:1> of  
        when '000'  
            imm64 = Replicate(Zeros(24):imm8, 2);  
        when '001'  
            imm64 = Replicate(Zeros(16):imm8:Zeros(8), 2);  
        when '010'  
            imm64 = Replicate(Zeros(8):imm8:Zeros(16), 2);  
        when '011'  
            imm64 = Replicate(imm8:Zeros(24), 2);  
        when '100'  
            imm64 = Replicate(Zeros(8):imm8, 4);  
        when '101'  
            imm64 = Replicate(imm8:Zeros(8), 4);  
        when '110'  
            if cmode<0> == '0' then  
                imm64 = Replicate(Zeros(16):imm8:Ones(8), 2);  
            else  
                imm64 = Replicate(Zeros(8):imm8:Ones(16), 2);
```



```

when '111'
  if cmode<0> == '0' && op == '0' then
    imm64 = Replicate(imm8, 8);
  if cmode<0> == '0' && op == '1' then
    imm8a = Replicate(imm8<7>, 8); imm8b = Replicate(imm8<6>, 8);
    imm8c = Replicate(imm8<5>, 8); imm8d = Replicate(imm8<4>, 8);
    imm8e = Replicate(imm8<3>, 8); imm8f = Replicate(imm8<2>, 8);
    imm8g = Replicate(imm8<1>, 8); imm8h = Replicate(imm8<0>, 8);
    imm64 = imm8a:imm8b:imm8c:imm8d:imm8e:imm8f:imm8g:imm8h;
  if cmode<0> == '1' && op == '0' then
    imm32 = imm8<7>:NOT(imm8<6>):Replicate(imm8<6>,5):imm8<5:0>:Zeros(19);
    imm64 = Replicate(imm32, 2);
  if cmode<0> == '1' && op == '1' then
    if UsingAArch32() then ReservedEncoding();
    imm64 = imm8<7>:NOT(imm8<6>):Replicate(imm8<6>,8):imm8<5:0>:Zeros(48);

return imm64;

```

shared/functions/vector/PolynomialMult

```

// PolynomialMult()
// =====

bits(M+N) PolynomialMult(bits(M) op1, bits(N) op2)
  result = Zeros(M+N);
  extended_op2 = ZeroExtend(op2, M+N);
  for i=0 to M-1
    if op1<i> == '1' then
      result = result EOR LSL(extended_op2, i);
  return result;

```

shared/functions/vector/SatQ

```

// SatQ()
// =====

(bits(N), boolean) SatQ(integer i, integer N, boolean unsigned)
  (result, sat) = if unsigned then UnsignedSatQ(i, N) else SignedSatQ(i, N);
  return (result, sat);

```

shared/functions/vector/SignedSatQ

```

// SignedSatQ()
// =====

(bits(N), boolean) SignedSatQ(integer i, integer N)
  if i > 2^(N-1) - 1 then
    result = 2^(N-1) - 1; saturated = TRUE;
  elsif i < -(2^(N-1)) then
    result = -(2^(N-1)); saturated = TRUE;
  else
    result = i; saturated = FALSE;
  return (result<N-1:0>, saturated);

```

shared/functions/vector/UnsignedRSqrtEstimate

```

// UnsignedRSqrtEstimate()
// =====

bits(32) UnsignedRSqrtEstimate(bits(32) operand)

  if operand<31:30> == '00' then // Operands <= 0x3FFFFFF produce 0xFFFFFFFF
    result = Ones(32);
  else
    // Generate double-precision value = operand * 2^(-32). This has zero sign bit, with:

```

```
//      exponent = 1022 or 1021 = double-precision representation of 2^(-1) or 2^(-2)
//      fraction taken from operand, excluding its most significant one or two bits.
if operand<31> == '1' then
    dp_operand = '0 0111111110' : operand<30:0> : Zeros(21);
else // operand<31:30> == '01'
    dp_operand = '0 0111111101' : operand<29:0> : Zeros(22);

// Call C function to get reciprocal estimate of scaled value.
estimate = recip_sqrt_estimate(dp_operand);

// Result is double-precision and a multiple of 1/256 in the range 1 to 511/256.
// Multiply by 2^31 and convert to an unsigned integer - this just involves
// concatenating the implicit units bit with the top 31 fraction bits.
result = '1' : estimate<51:21>;

return result;
```

shared/functions/vector/UnsignedRecipEstimate

```
// UnsignedRecipEstimate()
// =====

bits(32) UnsignedRecipEstimate(bits(32) operand)

if operand<31> == '0' then // Operands <= 0x7FFFFFFF produce 0xFFFFFFFF
    result = Ones(32);
else
    // Generate double-precision value = operand * 2^(-32). This has zero sign bit, with:
    //      exponent = 1022 = double-precision representation of 2^(-1)
    //      fraction taken from operand, excluding its most significant bit.
    dp_operand = '0 0111111110' : operand<30:0> : Zeros(21);

    // Call C function to get reciprocal estimate of scaled value.
    estimate = recip_estimate(dp_operand);

    // Result is double-precision and a multiple of 1/256 in the range 1 to 511/256.
    // Multiply by 2^31 and convert to an unsigned integer - this just involves
    // concatenating the implicit units bit with the top 31 fraction bits.
    result = '1' : estimate<51:21>;

return result;
```

shared/functions/vector/UnsignedSatQ

```
// UnsignedSatQ()
// =====

(bits(N), boolean) UnsignedSatQ(integer i, integer N)
    if i > 2^N - 1 then
        result = 2^N - 1; saturated = TRUE;
    elsif i < 0 then
        result = 0; saturated = TRUE;
    else
        result = i; saturated = FALSE;
    return (result<N-1:0>, saturated);
```

H1.3.4 shared/translation

shared/translation/attrs/CombineS1S2AttrHints

```
// CombineS1S2AttrHints()
// =====
```

```
MemAttrHints CombineS1S2AttrHints(MemAttrHints s1desc, MemAttrHints s2desc)
```

```
    MemAttrHints result;

    if s2desc.attrs == '01' || s1desc.attrs == '01' then
        result.attrs = bits(2) UNKNOWN; // Reserved
    elseif s2desc.attrs == MemAttr_NC || s1desc.attrs == MemAttr_NC then
        result.attrs = MemAttr_NC; // Non-cacheable
    elseif s2desc.attrs == MemAttr_WT || s1desc.attrs == MemAttr_WT then
        result.attrs = MemAttr_WT; // Write-through
    else
        result.attrs = MemAttr_WB; // Write-back

    result.hints = s1desc.hints;
    result.transient = s1desc.transient;

    return result;
```

shared/translation/attrs/CombineS1S2Desc

```
// CombineS1S2Desc()
// =====
// Combines the address descriptors from stage 1 and stage 2

AddressDescriptor CombineS1S2Desc(AddressDescriptor s1desc, AddressDescriptor s2desc)

    AddressDescriptor result;

    result.paddress = s2desc.paddress;

    if IsFault(s1desc) || IsFault(s2desc) then
        result = if IsFault(s1desc) then s1desc else s2desc;
    elseif s2desc.memattrs.type == MemType_Device || s1desc.memattrs.type == MemType_Device then
        result.memattrs.type = MemType_Device;
        if s1desc.memattrs.type == MemType_Normal then
            result.memattrs.device = s2desc.memattrs.device;
        elseif s2desc.memattrs.type == MemType_Normal then
            result.memattrs.device = s1desc.memattrs.device;
        else // Both Device
            result.memattrs.device = CombineS1S2Device(s1desc.memattrs.device,
                                                         s2desc.memattrs.device);
    else // Both Normal
        result.memattrs.type = MemType_Normal;
        result.memattrs.device = DeviceType UNKNOWN;
        result.memattrs.inner = CombineS1S2AttrHints(s1desc.memattrs.inner, s2desc.memattrs.inner);
        result.memattrs.outer = CombineS1S2AttrHints(s1desc.memattrs.outer, s2desc.memattrs.outer);
        result.memattrs.shareable = (s1desc.memattrs.shareable || s2desc.memattrs.shareable);
        result.memattrs.outershareable = (s1desc.memattrs.outershareable ||
                                           s2desc.memattrs.outershareable);

    result.memattrs = MemAttrDefaults(result.memattrs);

    return result;
```

shared/translation/attrs/CombineS1S2Device

```
// CombineS1S2Device()
// =====
// Combines device types from stage 1 and stage 2

DeviceType CombineS1S2Device(DeviceType s1device, DeviceType s2device)

    if s2device == DeviceType_nGnRnE || s1device == DeviceType_nGnRnE then
        result = DeviceType_nGnRnE;
    elseif s2device == DeviceType_nGnRE || s1device == DeviceType_nGnRE then
        result = DeviceType_nGnRE;
```

```

elseif s2device == DeviceType_nGRE || s1device == DeviceType_nGRE then
    result = DeviceType_nGRE;
else
    result = DeviceType_GRE;

return result;

```

shared/translation/attrs/LongConvertAttrsHints

```

// LongConvertAttrsHints()
// =====
// Convert the long attribute fields for Normal memory as used in the MAIR fields
// to orthogonal attributes and hints

MemAttrHints LongConvertAttrsHints(bits(4) attrfield, AccType acctype, boolean secondstage)
    assert !IsZero(attrfield);
    MemAttrHints result;
    if !secondstage && PSTATE.EL != EL2 then
        enable = if acctype == AccType_IFETCH then SCTL.R.I else SCTL.R.C;
    else
        enable = if acctype == AccType_IFETCH then HSCTL.R.I else HSCTL.R.C;

    if enable == '0' then
        result.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
        result.hints = MemHint_No;
    else
        if attrfield<3:2> == '00' then // Write-through transient
            result.attrs = MemAttr_WT;
            result.hints = attrfield<1:0>;
            result.transient = TRUE;
        elseif attrfield<3:0> == '0100' then // Non-cacheable (no allocate)
            result.attrs = MemAttr_NC;
            result.hints = MemHint_No;
            result.transient = FALSE;
        elseif attrfield<3:2> == '01' then // Write-back transient
            result.attrs = attrfield<1:0>;
            result.hints = MemAttr_WB;
            result.transient = TRUE;
        else // Write-through/Write-back non-transient
            result.attrs = attrfield<3:2>;
            result.hints = attrfield<1:0>;
            result.transient = FALSE;

    return result;

```

shared/translation/attrs/MemAttrDefaults

```

// MemAttrDefaults()
// =====
// Supply default values for memory attributes, including overriding the shareability attributes
// for Device and Non-cacheable memory types.

MemoryAttributes MemAttrDefaults(MemoryAttributes memattrs)

    if memattrs.type == MemType_Device then
        memattrs.inner = MemAttrHints UNKNOWN;
        memattrs.outer = MemAttrHints UNKNOWN;
        memattrs.shareable = TRUE;
        memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;
    else
        memattrs.device = DeviceType UNKNOWN;
        if memattrs.inner.attrs == MemAttr_NC && memattrs.outer.attrs == MemAttr_NC then
            memattrs.shareable = TRUE;
            memattrs.outershareable = TRUE;

    return memattrs;

```

shared/translation/validation/HasS2Validation

```
// HasS2Validation()  
// =====  
// Returns TRUE if stage 2 address validation is present for the current memory  
// access regime
```

```
boolean HasS2Validation()  
    return (HaveEL(EL2) && PSTATE.EL IN {EL0, EL1});
```

shared/translation/validation/S1ValidationRegime

```
// S1ValidationRegime()  
// =====  
// Returns the Exception level controlling the current Stage 1 memory access regime.
```

```
bits(2) S1ValidationRegime()  
    if PSTATE.EL != EL0 then  
        return PSTATE.EL;  
    else  
        return EL1;
```


Part I

Appendixes

Appendix I1

ARMv8-R AArch32 CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE behaviors

This chapter describes the architectural constraints on UNPREDICTABLE behaviors in the ARMv8-R AArch32 architecture. It contains the following sections:

- [*Reserved values in System registers and memory attribute settings*](#) on page I1-354.

I1.1 Reserved values in System registers and memory attribute settings

Unless otherwise stated, all unallocated or reserved values of fields with allocated values in the System registers and memory attribute settings behave in one of the following ways:

- The encoding maps onto any of the allocated values, but otherwise does not cause CONSTRAINED UNPREDICTABLE behavior.
- The encoding causes effects that could be achieved by a combination of more than one of the allocated encodings.
- The encoding causes the field to have no functional effect.